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ABSTRACT

American Novels amidst the Rise of New Media: Emergent Publics and Forms
by
Sarah Ruth Jacobs

Advisor: Matthew K. Gold

This dissertation examines long-term shifts in the quantities and demographics
(namely the race and educational attainment) of twentieth-century American literary
readers alongside the rise and popular consumption of new media (namely television and
the internet). The twentieth and twenty-first centuries are testament to a great expansion
in the numbers and demographics of literary readers, and in turn an increase in the variety
and intended audiences of literary publications. Examples include the rise of
“middlebrow” readers and books in the 1940s and the rise of African-American, feminist,
and countercultural small presses in the 1960s and 1970s. However, even as the variety of
literary production and literary readership increased, so did the consumption of other
emergent mass media.
While literary readers are more numerous and diverse than ever before, there have
been in recent decades moderate declines in literary reading, likely due to competition
with other media, namely television and the internet. The novel, never that popular to
begin with, has been surpassed in popularity and purpose by emergent forms of media,
creating new, though imperfectly “public,” spheres and audiences. In other words, new
iv

media have formed new vernaculars.
Rhetoric concerning the “death of the novel” or declines in reading ability has,
this dissertation argues, been in response to real and significant shifts in the media
landscape, including the enfranchisement of literary readers and the loss in cultural
hegemony of the novel form in comparison to other media. While these dominant
rhetorics attempt to situate these changes within a narrative of cultural crisis and decline,
this dissertation considers an alternative discourse that emphasizes the continued
enfranchisement and empowerment of media consumers through increased access to an
education that prioritizes functional literacies over “great literature.”
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INTRODUCTION

Our conventional response to all media, namely that it is how they
are used that counts, is the numb stance of the technological idiot.
For the ‘content’ of a medium is like the juicy piece of meat
carried by the burglar to distract the watchdog of the mind. The
effect of the medium is made strong and intense just because it is
given another medium as ‘content.’ The content of a movie is a
novel or a play or an opera.
—Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media

The history of the written word is one of continual but uneven increases in the
enfranchisement of previously illiterate or subliterate populations. For ancient cultures
such as Egypt and Babylonia, print was used by monarchs to conserve and concentrate
their power—to track trade and establish laws. The scholar John Ray estimates that at
most one percent of ancient Egyptians could read and write (65), and today UNESCO
estimates that about 86% of the world population is literate (3).
This study began with four deceptively simple questions that circle around issues
of twentieth-century American readership and literary enfranchisement: Is there any truth
to rhetoric around the death of the novel? Are people actually reading fewer books? Has
book reading declined because of competition with other media? Has the novel form
changed in response to competition with other media?
From my own personal experience, I expected to find that literary reading had
faced slight to moderate declines due to competition with online reading of news and
social media posts. My personal media ethnography bore this out: I grew up during the
1

advent of the internet, and once I gained internet access, I spent less of my leisure time
reading books and more time in online chats and forums. Today, I would say that I read a
wider array of media than ever before, and I access more books than ever (via Google
Books), but I spend less of my free time than I did before the internet reading literature
and I rarely read a book from cover to cover. I would maintain that the time I spend
reading literature has been reduced because of competition with online media, from news
stories to comment sections and social media. My reading habits are also more extensive
and less intensive than they would be without the internet, at least in relation to the
increased number of sources I access and the lessened amount of time and concentration
that I exert upon each source.
Indeed, there is evidence of a moderate reduction in American literary reading in
recent decades. As Caleb Crain writes in The New Yorker in an article titled “Twilight of
the Books,” the National Endowment for the Arts’ statistics show that “Between 1982
and 2002, the percentage of Americans who read literature declined not only in every age
group but in every generation—even in those moving from youth into middle age, which
is often considered the most fertile time of life for reading. We are reading less as we age,
and we are reading less than people who were our age ten or twenty years ago.”
Literature is not the center of the media universe, and Crain considers how society might
change “if the eclipse of reading continues,” and America stays on the current path
toward what scholar Walter J. Ong terms “secondary orality,” meaning forms of
communication, from television broadcasts to online forums, that are oral or interpersonal
but informed by or reliant on print culture.
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The article above by Crain was published in 2007; in 2018 he wrote a second,
follow-up article in The New Yorker titled “Why We Don’t Read, Revisited,” in which he
again finds that since he last wrote about the topic, “a decline [in reading] is taking place
across every subgroup,” based on the U.S. Census’s Time Usage Survey. Crain posits
that the modest declines in reading were related to comparable increases in television
watching. Anecdotally, I have found that in casual conversations, Americans now relate
to each other more regarding television and movies than they do about books. Books are
not slated to die anytime soon, and they may in fact capture America’s imagination on a
grand scale if they are televised or cinematized, as in the case of the Harry Potter series,
but one must acknowledge that literary reading in particular has been to a small extent
reduced, and was most likely displaced by online reading and other media.
Exactly how much the declines in literary reading are a direct result of
competition with other media is difficult to discern. In a 2005 Gallup poll, 73% of
American adults said that the internet hadn’t affected their reading habits, 16% said that
the internet made them read less, and 6% said that the internet made them read more
(Moore), though how much of their reading was literary reading was not part of the
survey. The relationship of the internet to literary reading is not necessarily antagonistic
or irreversible: recent efforts in the online distribution of poetry, such as Poem-a-Day; the
rise of Instagram poets like Rupi Kaur; and high school poetry reading initiatives like
Poetry Out Loud were likely factors that led to a survey by the National Endowment for
the Arts finding an increase from 6.7 percent in 2012 to 11.7 percent in 2018 in American
adults who had read poetry in the last year (Iyengar).
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While recent decades have seen modest declines in literary reading, much of the
contemporaneous rhetoric that concerns itself with the state of reading is extreme and
reactionary in tone and in its predictions of a future. Crain, for example, posits that
reading could just be an “old habit:” “It may simply be the case that many Americans
prefer to learn about the world and to entertain themselves with television and other
streaming media, rather than with the printed word, and that it is taking a few generations
for them to shed old habits like newspapers and novels.” This line of thinking falls into
the kind of anti-television, anti-soundbyte thinking of scholars like Neil Postman, who
would caution Americans against the consumption of pre-digested media pap, of news
clips that are based more on emotions and personality than on facts.
Entire books have been written on the alleged crisis in reading, such as Mark
Bauerlein’s The Dumbest Generation: How the Digital Age Stupefies Young Americans
and Jeopardizes Our Future. Bauerlein remarks on how the information age hasn’t
exactly delivered any increases in student competency: college students “read less on
their own, both books and newspapers, and you would have to canvass a lot of college
English instructors and employers before you found one who said that they compose
better paragraphs” (9). A few pages later, Bauerlein points to the usual culprits as being
at fault for the decline in American reading and the rise in “an anti-intellectual outlook”
(16): the youth “are encased in more immediate realities that shut out conditions
beyond—friends, work, clothes, pop music, sitcoms, Facebook” (13).
This study intervenes in and objects to this rhetoric of cultural decay and decline
in a number of ways. I situate the concern of cultural decline historically to show that
4

highbrow versus lowbrow rhetoric and rhetoric around the decline of literature coincided
with historical increases in literacy, access to education, and the consumption and
production of cultural products on the part of previously marginalized segments of
American society. In this study I argue that the height of the “death of the novel” rhetoric
occurred at the same time at which the novel form was at historical heights of diversity in
terms of its readers and producers, and thus this rhetoric amounts to a reaction to very
real losses of cultural power and hegemony, and might be considered a rhetoric of
cultural decay, that is, the fear of “mass” culture overtaking “high” culture.
McLuhan, Bauerlein, Crain, and Postman all place the blame for alleged cultural
decay squarely upon the hypnotizing and mind-altering effects of new kinds of media on
the human brain. If that were true, then the internet would dissolve everyone’s minds
equally, but that isn’t the case. While much of this dissertation agrees with McLuhan’s
stance that the form of media helps to reshape social behavior—and indeed, I do argue
that the novel has been displaced and superseded in popularity because of the formal
competition of other media—I also would partially disagree with the above quote. I am
happy to stand among the “technological idiots” who insist that media shouldn’t be
considered only for their form, but also for how people, and specifically different publics,
use the same form of media. For some, the internet is a poisonous portal that allows for
the spread of fake news and inaccurate memes, and for others the internet is a portal for
scientific research. Rich students and poor students from all across the globe use the
internet in different ways: Rosamund Hutt notes that a 2016 study by the Organisation
[sic] for Economic Development and Co-operation found that overall “richer teenagers
were more likely to use the internet to search for information or to read news rather than
5

to chat or play video games” (Hutt). This study therefore takes a page from readerresponse theory, and argues that media studies needs to be very wary of making
generalizations about or totalizing entire audiences or the effects of certain media, and
should instead carefully unpack the demographics of who uses different media and how.
Not considering the socioeconomic differences between users of media risks mimicking
the mistake made in much of the rhetoric of the last one hundred years against cultural
decline, which automatically takes the position of the ruling class bracing against the
encroachment of new media forms and new users.
While I was somewhat validated in my expectations about how there has been a
slight decline in literary reading in recent decades, I was altogether surprised to find that
the greater part of the twentieth century in America saw enormous rises in literary
reading and book purchasing on the part of previously unrepresented segments of
American society. From the increases in general education that were sought and won by
the Progressives around the turn of the twentieth century to the increasing
enfranchisement of women, African Americans, and other minorities in college education
in the middle of the century, the rhetoric surrounding the perceived decline in literature
was paradoxically a reaction to a startling ascension of literary readers and writers. What
began as an examination of rates of literary reading transformed into a history of new
readers, a history that is elusive and difficult to fully capture, though the pioneering work
of Carl Kaestle, Janice Radway, Joan Shelley Rubin, and Donald Joyce has provided the
basis for my claims about shifts in American literary readership.
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The classic rhetoric around the death of the novel, the decline of American
reading, and the threat of lowbrow culture is written from the position of the welleducated, powerful, and informed consumer of media. The position of said rhetoric is to
draw boundaries against “lower” forms of media and to brace against cultural decay.
However, deriding and resisting new forms of media has always been a losing battle. The
perceived “crisis” of the novel form’s death or decline is actually the result of an
unprecedented expansion in readers and overall media usage. The amount of time that
Americans spend using media is at an all-time high—we are at what is being termed
“peak media” (Frank, Chin, and Ciolli). According to Nielsen, the average American in
2018 spent eleven hours and six minutes a day using and consuming media, which is an
increase from nine hours and thirty-two minutes circa 2014 (Fottrell). We are not in the
midst of a decline in thinking, as Bauerlein would allege, but rather in the midst of an
unprecedented increase in the users and usage time of textual and visual communication
tools. If wearable tech like Google Glass becomes viable, we will have moved past “peak
media” and entered a zone where we are constantly immersed in an augmented reality.
Now that scientists have discovered a way to translate thoughts to speech, we could even
be producing media in our sleep (Anumanchipalli, Chartier, and Chang).
While the popular reach and ubiquity of the internet, television, and social media
should be celebrated for their democratizing potential, the current media landscape is not
without its problems. Many internet users are trapped in ideological bubbles or echo
chambers, and algorithms may further cater to users’ inherent biases and interests. Rather
than blaming the internet as being inherently mindless, or asking, as Nicholas Carr does,
“what the internet is doing to our brains,” this dissertation argues that the same forces that
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led to the current mass usage of media—technological innovations and increases in
educational attainment and literacy—can and should be used to ameliorate its crises.
Specifically, I argue that America’s high literacy rate—99 percent (Roser and OrtizOspina)—is actually deceptive, in that it cloaks the continued inequalities between users
of media to evaluate, comprehend, and utilize sources of information, a problem of
subliteracies—lower-than-average rates of literacies—that has made itself known through
recent political conflicts, including the information campaign undertaken by Russia in the
2016 election. In this regard McLuhan is prophetic: his 1970 book Culture is Our
Business states that “World War III is a guerrilla information war with no division
between military and civilian participation” (66). The most socially pressing crisis we
face is not that of a clash between new and old or “high” and “low” media, but rather that
of narrowing but persistent and increasingly leveraged gaps in the educational
preparation and literacy levels of the growing publics of media users.
This work first seeks to establish the historical context of “death of the novel” and
decline of reading rhetorics alongside media usage surveys and demographic shifts in
those who consume various media. The first chapter, “A Fear of Crowds: Death of the
Novel Rhetoric as a Reaction to a Twentieth-Century Expansion in Readership, New
Book Markets, and Competition with Other Media” examines long-term shifts in
American literary readership over the twentieth century as well as how the consumption
of literature compares to that of other emergent media. I describe how increases in
educational attainment and innovations in publishing enabled new publics of middle and
working class and African American book buyers, which in turn ensured the production
of titles that were aimed at these previously marginalized groups. At the same time,
8

literary audiences were dwarfed by the growing audiences of other media. I therefore
argue that the rhetoric around the death of the novel was a reaction to real shifts in the
media landscape: the racial and socioeconomic diversification of novel readers, and to an
extent, writers, and the rise of other, more popular, media. The publishing industry also
shifted to include more African-American editors and publishers, though overall the
industry is still lacking in diversity, with a 2015 survey by Jason Low of Lee & Low
Books finding that publishing workers are overall 79% white, and high-level publishing
executives are 86% white. This chapter establishes that while the novel and American
reading are not in danger of perishing, the novel form and its hegemonic positioning has
faced real pressures from the growing popularity of new media and the expansion in
reader demographics.
Following the first chapter’s investigation into the rhetoric of the death of the
novel, a rhetoric that often decries the “dilution” of high culture by more popular forms,
the second chapter, “The Great Divide in the Age of Digital Distribution,” considers how
the digital distribution of media affects longstanding debates on and consideration around
the existence and degree of the divide between high and low culture. While
acknowledging that there are differences between the audiences and the difficulty of
various cultural products, this chapter argues that, like the rhetoric of the death of the
novel, the simplistic division between high and low serves the dominant rhetoric of
cultural decay, a position of superiority that cloaks subliteracies (inequalities in literacy
levels) and complex struggles for social and material power in the realm of cultural
production and consumption. An oppositional rhetoric would celebrate how digital
culture in many cases has connected previously distinct publics, while also recognizing
9

that deficiencies in digital literacies and the continuation of racial and intellectual
hegemonies between the analog and digital realms need to be interrogated and addressed.
The second half of this dissertation studies how, given the above tensions between
the novel and more popular media, the novel form has reacted to the social and formal
competition posed by new media. The third chapter, “Literary Hybridity: the Novel’s
Incorporation of New Media,” describes how the novel competes and cooperates with
other media and asks to what extent novels can be termed media hybrids. I use textual
computation methods to examine differences in the openings of popular novels over the
last 110 years and introduce three case studies to determine whether the novel form has
altered or hybridized itself in a measurable or discernible way in response to intermedia
competition.
The last chapter, “Online Reading and the Diminished Sociocultural Salience of
the Novel Form Relative to Other Media,” considers the original purposes of the novel
form, as described by scholars such as Ian Watt, Benedict Anderson, and Mikhail Bakhtin,
and whether those purposes are better served by interactive and social media. As the
chapter title indicates, I argue that the novel as a form of nationalist, individualist, and
class consciousness has been largely superseded by more socially salient (in terms of
brevity, simultaneous apperception, and instantaneous distribution) forms of media.
This dissertation therefore establishes that the novel is more popular than ever in
terms of its consumption by different racial and socioeconomic demographics of
Americans—the novel has, in a very real sense, continued to rise, and it is paradoxically
this expansion in popularity, I argue, that partly enacted the dominant rhetoric concerned
10

with the death of the novel. The editors and publishers of novels have also expanded
demographically, though they remain overwhelmingly white, more so than the audiences
that they reach (Low; Statista, “Share of Adults”). Even as readers have become more
diverse, the popularity of the novel (in terms of average time spent by American
consumers) has been eclipsed by other media, from radio to social media, which may
have precipitated the slight declines in the average time Americans spend reading literary
works in the past few decades (Crain). The supposed death of a novel, then, is a crisis,
ironically, of an expansion in racially and economically diverse literary readers,
alongside growing competition with ultimately more popular and arguably more relevant
forms of media. While debates about the declines in reading and the dangers of new
media have often been framed in terms of cultural (Birkerts; Bauerlein) or civic decline
(National Endowment for the Arts, Reading at Risk), I argue here that concerns about the
perceived dilution of discourse by popular media would be best addressed by shifting
focus from the perceived quality of various media as the problem and moving toward
addressing gaps in the education, functional literacy, and information literacy of media
publics.

11

Chapter 1: A Fear of Crowds: Death of the Novel Rhetoric as a Reaction to a TwentiethCentury Expansion in Readership, New Book Markets, and Competition with Other
Media
In 1967 Toni Morrison became the first African American woman to work as a
senior fiction editor at Random House (Davis and Morrison 141). This was one of many
breakthroughs in a decades-long process wherein African American readers and authors
began to be valued and recognized—albeit to a very limited extent—by mainstream book
publishing. “The novel,” Morrison writes, “has always functioned for the class or the
group that wrote it. The history of the novel as a form began when there was a new class,
a middle class, to read it; it was an art form that they needed. The lower classes didn’t
need novels at that time because they had an art form already: they had songs, and dances,
and ceremony, and gossip, and celebrations” (57). For the growing but historically
undocumented numbers of African American book readers, the 1960s and 1970s
witnessed an explosion of small black-owned book publishers, as Donald F. Joyce
documents in Gatekeepers of Black Culture: Black-owned Book Publishing in the United
States, 1817-1981. The 1960s also marked the increasing presence of television in the
American home, the intensification of culture and literary canon wars, and a rise in small
presses and literary magazines made possible by the new technology of the mimeograph.
There had never been so much diversity in American readers and publications, and yet, as
this chapter will show, it was in this same period in which the prophecies of the death of
the novel peaked in frequency. Even today, as racial gaps in readership and college
education continue to narrow, when 71 percent of African Americans and 78 percent of
white Americans have consumed a book in any format in the last year (Statista, “Share of
12

Adults”), the media narrative focuses on the negative aspect: how “One in four
Americans didn’t read a book last year” (Blakemore). If one cares to look, in the subtext
of most narratives of literary decline is an uncelebrated expansion of readers and popular
forms of media. This chapter considers rhetoric on the death of the novel against
contemporaneous changes in book readership and production, arguing that this rhetoric
can help to illuminate the very real and historically-grounded forces at play beneath its
surface. Such forces include new publishing technologies; competition with new media;
shifts in various systems of power, including higher education and the culture industries;
and, last but not least, a historical expansion of the American reading public and
American book markets.
The death of the novel was predicted as early as the nineteenth century; a New
York Times article by Eliakim Littell in 1899 discussed the possibility of the novel’s
demise due to the form’s increasing brevity (609). In the ensuing years writers including
F.T. Marinetti, Walter Benjamin, Edwin Muir, Alain Robbe-Grillet, Roland Barthes, and
John Barth wrote on crises in the novel form and warned that traditional narrative was
becoming obsolete. Perhaps most famously, Ortega y Gasset wrote in 1925 that the novel
was almost “exhausted” and had “entered its last phase” (56). In his 1967 essay “The
Curious Death of the Novel,” Louis D. Rubin lists but contemptuously dismisses all of
the usual causes of death:
We are told that the Age of Prose Fiction is over, that the Novel was a nineteenthcentury phenomenon which depended for its life on the breakdown of the
traditional class structure, and now that the class structure is permanently fluid
(try that one at the Country Club), there is no place for the novel. The bewildering
13

cacophony of modern times, with its continual crises, its everyday reality more
weird than anything formerly portrayed in the most visionary works of fiction, has
left no room for the mere loveliness of the belles-lettres. Actual events boggle the
imagination; this is the age of nonfiction, of the quest for meaning involved in
interpretive reportage. Furthermore, television and journalism have provided our
culture with art forms that mirror contemporary reality far more accurately and
faithfully than the leisurely prose of the novel could ever do. And besides, the
discoveries of modern physics and behavioral psychology have all but destroyed
the old certainty of the human ordering of experience, so that there can be no solid
basis, whether in finite matter or human reason, upon which the novelist can erect
his commentary. The vast terror of the atomic bomb has rendered individual
tragedy inconclusive and unimportant. (5-6)
Rubin goes on to insist that the novel is only dead in the imagination of critics who are
too busy looking for the next Joyce or Faulkner to notice the brilliant works being written
in their own time (4-7); additionally, Rubin argues that the above concerns are “no more
true now than during those past times when the novel was supposedly at its heyday” (6).
Thus he joins other critics such as Robert Clark Young who insist that obituaries for the
novel are continuous, irrational, and lack any historical grounding. On the contrary,
though, rhetoric around the death of the novel has not been continuous and ahistorical,
but rather rose in quantity, peaked during the late 1960s, and followed historicallysituated lines of logic.
For critics in the past and present, the death or decline of the novel is often treated
as an abstract concept, as the novel doesn’t and has never seemed to be in danger of truly
14

disappearing. For example, in 2013 Tim Parks in The New York Review of Books
despaired at the narrative hollowness, plot predictability, and self-aggrandizing of the
generic individual protagonist that he perceived as being part and parcel of traditional and
even many untraditional novels. Likewise, in 1994 in The Gutenberg Elegies Sven
Birkerts wasn’t so much worried about the death of the novel as he was about the decline
of the traditional, isolated experience of print reading in favor of hypertextual
engagement. The internet may have a slight negative effect on book reading, but that
effect seems negligible: a 2005 Gallup poll found that 73 percent of respondents said that
internet use had no effect on their book reading, 16 percent of respondents said they were
reading fewer books, 6 percent said they were reading more books, and 5 percent had no
opinion (Moore). Nicolas Carr’s 2010 work The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to
Our Brains similarly concerned itself not with the disappearance of the book as a material
form, but rather with “the constant distraction that the Net encourages” (119).
Many writers who do attempt a practical examination of the prevalence of the
novel form do not currently write of the novel’s death, but rather of lesser fears such as
the death of print books at the hand of ebooks, as in a 2011 blog post by Michael
MacLeod on The Guardian Books Blog that asks whether “ebooks will kill off the
humble paper book.” Those who have in turn declared the printed book alive and well
include Sadie Stein of The Paris Review and Sarah Dohrmann of The Observer, while
ultimately the hard sales figures on print versus ebooks are mixed: in 2014 predictions
leaned toward ebook profits rising and print book profits falling slightly (Statista,
“Ebooks Set to Surpass”). In 2016 the trend reversed toward print book growth and
ebook decline, with a dramatic rise in audio titles (Talking New Media). By all accounts,
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literary publishing is not under grave threat; book publishing and now self-publishing are
thriving (Statista, Book Market in the U.S. 16) and global markets are expanding; the
international consulting firm PwC Global, for example, forecasts global book revenue
increasing from 114.8 billion dollars in 2016 to 121.1 billion in 2021. American book
publishing revenue was steady from 2008 to 2013, with projections into 2020 not
showing signs of decline (Statista, “Revenue of Book Publishing”). Overall, book sales
by American publishers increased by 6.2% between 2011 and 2014, reaching $36.42
billion (Statista, “Book Publishing Industry Revenue”). The number of units sold by
American publishers has also remained steady, with a rise from 2.53 billion in 2010 to
2.7 billion in 2016 (Statista, Book Market in the U.S. 15). Yet the quantity of materials
purchased can be misleading. An increase in reading purchases does not necessarily
indicate an increase in the number or percentage of buyers. Furthermore, it is not always
an indication of an increase in time spent reading; the health of certain sectors, such as
adult fiction; or of the growth of the publishing industry. As journalist Jessica Conditt
documents via Department of Labor statistics, almost all of the publishing industry’s
employment growth in the last decade has been consigned to Amazon and other digital
giants rather than traditional publishers.
While American book publishing sales as a whole are robust, and the death of the
novel is nowhere in sight, in recent years there has been a renewed concern about modest
declines in literary reading along with slightly falling sales of adult fiction. Specifically,
while nonfiction adult book sales by American publishers rose by 5.4% from 2016 to
2017, revenue for adult fiction declined by 1.2% during the same period (Association of
American Publishers). Between 2013 and 2017, fiction sales dropped 16%, and
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speculations as to why, according to Jim Milliot and Rachel Deahl in Publishers Weekly,
include a lessening share of media exposure for fiction and authors, “increased
competition for consumers’ attention from a widening array of content options on
television,” and a greater thirst for nonfiction. These percentages include ebook and
audiobook revenue. In 2018, Caleb Crain, writing for The New Yorker, used the
American Time Use Survey to make the argument that time spent doing literary reading
has been displaced by other media: “between 2003 and 2016, the amount of time that the
average American devoted to reading for personal interest on a daily basis dropped from
.36 hours to .29 hours,” a reduction that extended across genders, races, and the
employed versus unemployed populations. The number of Americans who haven’t read a
book in the past year has steadily increased from a low of 8% in 1978 to 23% in 2014,
based on statistics from Gallup and Pew Research that were compiled by Jordan
Weissman (again, “reading” in recent years includes listening to audiobooks and perusing
a Kindle). To complicate the issue further, the 2017 National Endowment for the Arts’
Survey of Public Participation in the Arts found that the percentage of American adults
who had read poetry in the last year had rebounded: in 2002 12.1 percent of adults had
read poetry in the last year, a figure that declined to 6.7 percent in 2012 and rose again to
11.7 percent in 2017 (Iyengar). The same survey found that the percentage of adults who
had read a novel or short story declined from 45.2 percent in 2012 to 41.8 percent in 2017
(National Endowment for the Arts, U.S. Trends 10). Such declines, however, appear
modest and certainly may not warrant some of the warnings from writers such as
Christopher Ingraham who, writing for the Washington Post, paints a picture of a steady
decline in literary reading (NEA statistics show that the percentage of Americans who
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read a work of literature in the last year declined from 56.9 percent in 1982 to 43.1
percent in 2015) and warns that “we may be becoming a less empathetic country as a
result.”
The specter of literary decline therefore lingers in twentieth and twenty-first
century America, along with questions about what might have caused such a decline and
what it might signify for American publics. Many lines of text have been spent on the
question of the extent and characteristics of any purported decline of the Great American
Novel, and many critics’ corresponding reverence for Harold Bloom’s literary canon
unfortunately reveals more about class anxiety and privilege than it does about the past or
present status of literature. Kathleen Fitzpatrick unpacks this anxiety about the alleged
fall in the readership and popularity of “classic” novels due to competition from
television and mass culture in The Anxiety of Obsolescence, in which she defines
obsolescence as “the release of the white male author from responsibility through an at
times histrionic concern for his own imminent demise, a conversion of the forms and
gestures of oppressed cultures to his own project of maintaining his cultural (and social)
centrality” (233). Fitzpatrick compares the fear of new media taking the place of literary
works to the nineteenth-century paranoia that photography would make painting obsolete
(31). Instead, Fitzpatrick points out that book production is not dramatically decreasing,
and she reasons that “[older] forms” of media simply “find niches” that aren’t satisfied by
newer forms (38). Robert Clark Young agrees, declaring claims of the death of the novel
to be the “histrionic declarations” of bitter writers (Young 164). Milan Kundera embraces
the novel as alive and evolving as long as it is not censored by a “Totalitarian” regime
(14); he muses about its future, remarking that “If the novel should really disappear, it
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will do so not because it has exhausted its powers but because it exists in a world grown
alien to it” (16). Jess Row in the Boston Review writes that writers’ essays questioning
the future of the novel mark “a silent—perhaps largely unintentional—effort to maintain
cultural, racial, and geographic boundaries.” Others, such as Andrew Marr, have
validated the fall of the novel, saying that compared to nonfiction, “[fiction] is no longer
a way of understanding the world freshly.” Naturally, each critic’s argument has its own
agenda items, strengths, weaknesses, and blind spots. Common weaknesses on both sides
of the debate include the failure to historicize (most often by equating all periods), spare
or overly selective references to hard data or research, the tendency to emphasize one
variable while ignoring or dismissing other possible variables, and the urge to “choose a
side;” clearly, few critics today wish to stand on the side of privilege, though examining
the historical circumstances surrounding veiled laments of lost hegemony can actually
reveal degrees of social progress in terms of the growing enfranchisement of previously
marginalized consumers of culture.
While largely embracing Fitzpatrick’s notion that rhetoric around the death of the
novel can be attributed to fears of losing white male cultural hegemony, this chapter
argues that in fact these fears, while selfish and biased, do have some basis in reality, as
the novel as a form has both become more demographically diverse in readership and to a
lesser degree in production, even as it has been surpassed in cultural relevance and
centrality by other media with regard to average consumer usage time and monetary
spending. Rather than terming the death of the novel as “histrionic,” a word that both
Young (164) and Fitzpatrick use (233), this chapter argues that this rhetoric was in direct
response to real historical shifts in the demographics of readership as well as to the rise of
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new forms of media that better lent themselves to popular—or what I would term
“vernacular”—success, meaning that a medium’s impact extends into different
demographic groups. Of course, these demographic gains and the current cultural sphere
or spheres haven’t come close to closing various gaps in opportunity or cultural capital
for Americans of diverse backgrounds. These changes should be met with optimism, not
despair: behind the so-called death of the novel is the birth of new readers and new
popular forms. And, paradoxically, while much of the death of the novel rhetoric is an
attempt to maintain cultural hegemony, it is important not to dismiss said rhetoric’s
legitimate critiques of mass culture and corporatization.
A consideration of long-term trends in twentieth and twenty-first-century
American literary reading and book production must separate and weigh numerous
confounding variables. For example, one might struggle to balance the overall effect of
the internet on American literary reading as it allows for the wider dissemination of
literature while simultaneously offering new forms of social media that directly compete
with literature. Similarly, tracing the degree to which one media displaces the time spent
using another is difficult without longitudinal studies of individuals’ media consumption,
the likes of which are almost never done, and even within such studies the inevitable
personal life changes and historical changes that individuals encounter are almost
impossible to control for. Nonetheless, one can say with certainty that America in the
twentieth century bore witness to a dramatic expansion in the racial1 demographics of
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literary readership and the socioeconomic2 demographics of literary book-buying. Factors
such as increased access to education, government policies such as the 1944 GI Bill, new
technologies in the publishing industry, improved labor standards, and the founding of
new publishing houses and institutions all favored increases in the number and
percentage of African Americans, middle-to-lower-class Americans, and others
previously marginalized by and within the publishing industry who read and/or purchased
literature. Even as the producers of and audiences for literary works broadened
demographically, new forms of popular media, such as television, arose which would
come to command greater shares of Americans’ leisure time than did literary works. Thus,
in observing the rises and trends in consumption of different forms of media in twentiethcentury America, one is struck by how literary production increased in volume and
diversity even as literature lost its relative allocation of American leisure time and its
popular relevance in comparison with other, newly emergent mass media forms. As this
chapter will show, statistics from the Bureau of Labor (American Time Usage Survey)
and a study by the National Endowment for the Arts (Reading at Risk) have suggested
that the average amount of time that Americans spend reading literary works has
moderately declined in recent decades, though a subsequent NEA study suggests that that
decline may have reversed, perhaps because of an increase in the use of ebooks or
ereaders in schools (Reading on the Rise). This decline in literary reading was concurrent
with the rise of new literacies and modes of communication, from text messages to online
2
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comment sections, or what this chapter poses as new sites of vernacular communication.
With the aforementioned trends in mind, this chapter argues that the rhetoric surrounding
the purported death of the novel should be considered as reactive to both a real loss of
privileged cultural hegemony and the real competition faced by a rise in popularity of
other media. The novel can therefore be said to have been superseded by the prominence
and popularity of other media, even as, paradoxically, it has increased in variety and
accessibility.

A Long View of Twentieth-Century Class Disparities in Literary Reading and Purchasing
To a great extent, rhetoric around the decline of literature can be understood as
reflecting the historically-situated and ever-shifting debates over literary taste and
canonization. The recognition of English language literature as being worthy of scholarly
respect and study is in itself relatively recent, having, in America, emerged in the late
nineteenth century following the previous tradition of undergraduate study in classical
rhetoric in the form of Latin and Greek philosophy: as William Riley Parker notes, it
wasn’t until 1876, more than two centuries after its founding, that Harvard appointed its
first professor of English (341). Furthermore, contemporary literature generally wasn’t
taught in American colleges until the 1920s, when World War I and the progressive
education movement centralized works of American literature in the curriculum as a sign
of loyalty: as James Berlin attests, “English courses…were seen as central to the effort to
make the world safe for democracy” (57).
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In the nineteenth century, following the first paperback revolution, but before
colleges had canonized works of American literature, there was considerable moral and
religious concern over the illicit content of publications ranging from pamphlets aimed at
women readers to works like The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn.3 These concerns can
and should be differentiated from those brought forth in the 1930s to 1950s (and beyond)
by critics regarding the literary quality of books that were published through new national
channels of distribution for a mass audience of readers.
The differences between the early paperback publishing of the nineteenth century
(including dime novels) and the mass market paperback publishing of the early twentieth
century are differences in scale and centralization—mass market paperbacks published in
the early twentieth century used larger, national channels of distribution and thereby
reached larger audiences, an advancement made possible by developments in publishing
technology, higher educational enrollments, and exponential explosions in population.
Though there have been numerous polls and surveys on American literary reading
over the past century, the variables and measurements used have differed considerably.
There is, for example, no means of comparing the percentage of Americans who read one
book for pleasure in the previous year, along racial lines, from 1900 to 2015. Yet a
combination of literacy statistics, educational achievement statistics, reading surveys,
publishing data, and late twentieth-century media consumption questionnaires all indicate
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a growing enfranchisement of minority and middle-to-lower class Americans in literary
reading and publication. Tracing such shifts across different metrics, from gains in basic
literacy, to increased circulation of cheap pamphlets, to the expansion of individuals’
ability to purchase or access reading materials, to the establishment of new presses, is an
exercise that requires a healthy skepticism and a degree of imagination. Whenever
possible, this chapter offers direct comparisons of media consumption over time, but on
occasion it resorts to what might best be considered a chronologically-ordered patchwork
of findings.
Estimates on how many Americans read and what they read in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century are based on anecdote, literacy rates, and newspaper
circulation rates. In volume four of A History of the Book in America, which covers 1880
to 1940, Carl F. Kaestle and Janice A. Radway note that in 1880 the population of the
U.S. was around 50 million, with newspapers having an “aggregate daily circulation
[totaling] 3.5 million” (29). At this time there were enormous class and racial inequalities
in levels of education, with, for example, “9 percent of native-born whites over the age of
10,” “12 percent” of “foreign-born whites,” and “70 percent” of people “of color”
reporting that they couldn’t write in 1880 (Kaestle and Radway). Overall Kaestle and
Radway report “many Americans possessed basic reading ability while a more elite corps
was educated to higher literacy,” with “less than 5 percent” of the population enrolled in
high school and “about 2 percent” enrolled in college in 1880 (29).
While it’s impossible to report how much crossover there was between the very
unequal levels of education and different types of reading materials, it is fair to say that
the prices and content of reading materials catered to different audiences based on what
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readers could afford. Barbara Hochman argues that the tension between fine and common
reading material had existed through much of the 1800s, long before the tension between
different classes of readers (607-608). Kaestle and Radway agree that there was a good
deal of overlap between texts and classes of readers, but write that Dime novels, which
became more prevalent in the second half of the nineteenth century, were largely aimed
at middle or working class readers (Kaestle and Radway 40-41), while “bound books”
were generally aimed at “social and cultural elites” (Kaestle and Radway 19). However,
the increased availability of books through lending libraries and the growing insistence
on quality public education both were to increase toward the end of the century, opening
up new territories of readership.
Thomas D. Snyder’s analysis of U.S. Department of Education statistics
illustrates the growth of the potential American reading audience from the nineteenth to
the twentieth century by showing the dramatic gains in college enrollment across all
American colleges: total enrollment went from 62,839 in 1869 to 152,254 in 1899 and
then dramatically to 1.1 million in 1929 (75). This increase isn’t so much a result of
higher rates of literacy as it is of massive population growth: comparatively, the change
in the percentage of the population enrolled in college between 1869 and 1929 was 1.3 to
7.2 (76).
Kaestle and Radway describe the unique growth in mass publishing during this
era as one of simultaneous centralization and diversification:
During this period, more tightly integrated, national oriented print forms and
institutions emerged that were devoted to assembling and addressing larger and
larger audiences. Inextricably bound up with the creation of a consumer culture
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and its requisite technology and institutions, these new forms and the
establishments responsible for them—from ad agencies to book clubs to
syndicated newspaper features—exploited economies of scale and speed to
augment opportunities for realizing profits from the business of print and
publication. Simultaneously, however, the same technological innovations and
changes in the distribution of literacy that fueled the rise of the mass press in the
United States also enabled the proliferation of smaller, more narrowly focused,
local print cultures… (2-3)
It is no coincidence that this newly emergent national print culture that dared to address
“larger and larger” audiences would be seen as a threat by the literary elite. This period
was marked by a clash between advocates for high levels of literacy and reading versus
more elitist protectors of fine literature (Hochman 600-606).4 The twentieth-century
paperback revolution came with a new business model that sought to find bestsellers
through the trial-and-error of releasing multiple titles, a strategy which, as James L.W.
West III notes, placed publishers’ fingers more directly upon the pulse of their reading
publics (782). Over the course of the twentieth century, publishing houses increasingly
consolidated and corporatized, even as new and more diverse or specialized markets
developed. As Lawrence C. Stedman, Katherine Tinsley, and Carl F. Kaestle find in their
study, “Literacy as a Consumer Activity,” the average American’s financial expenditures
4
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on books rose, with a slight decline during the Depression, from twenty to forty inflationadjusted dollars between 1929 to 1969, and then hit a plateau and dipped slightly between
1969 and 1989 (155).
At its apogee in 1944, spending on reading materials (meaning the inflationadjusted sales figures on books, magazines, and newspapers) made up 32 percent of all
recreational expenditures (Stedmen, Tinsley, and Kaestle 155-6); since the bottom of
their decline relative to other recreational spending in the early 1980s and into the present
day, reading expenditures make up closer to ten percent of all recreational expenditures
(U.S. Bureau of the Census, “Personal Consumption Expenditures”). Of course, now
more than ever, with the availability of zero-cost reading material on the internet, reading
expenditures are not a clear indication of reading habits. Nonetheless, even before the rise
of home internet use in the 1990s, reading lost much of its market share in comparison to
other recreational activities.
Ironically, although average expenditures on books rose during the 1960s, during
the latter half of the 60s spending on books relative to other mass media (“televisions,
radios, records, and musical instruments, as well as radio and television repairs”) fell
(Stedman, Tinsley, and Kaestle 157). This trend shows that “It was not until the 1960s
that the electronic age took hold, as evidenced by steady increases in expenditures on
audiovisual and electronic items” (Stedman, Tinsley, and Kaestle 159). Stedman, Tinsley
and Kaestle theorize that since adjusted expenditures on reading rose until 1979, reading,
though outpaced in market growth by other media, was able to compete with other media
until that date, at which point “even constant-dollar expenditures on reading [were]
adversely affected by the…diversity of media choices” (157).
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Since the above statistics are taken from the Department of Commerce, which
collected data from sellers, these figures do not reflect how many individuals bought and
consumed these items, meaning that the number of people who paid for each form of
media cannot be gauged (Stedman, Tinsley, and Kaestle 160). However, when comparing
Department of Commerce Data with population studies by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
and the Department of Agriculture, one can see that although the money expended on
literature increased from 1960 to 1972, fewer people were actually buying literature
(Stedman, Tinsley, and Kaestle 162). The data shows that 92% of the 1960 population
purchased “reading materials” (newspapers, magazines, or books) over the course of the
year compared to just 84% of the 1972 population. The reason that expenditures went up
was that a smaller percentage of the 1972 population was purchasing a higher adjusted
amount of reading material—$44 per buyer on average, compared to $31 per buyer on
average in 1960 (Stedman, Tinsley, and Kaestle 162).
Thus, while literature and the novel form are in no danger of becoming extinct or
“dying,” and publishing revenues are actually on the rise, there is an argument to be made
that newer, emergent forms of media have eclipsed the popularity and cultural relevance
of the novel, simply based on usage time and expenditure statistics. New forms of media
do not make older forms outright obsolete, but with the public’s limited leisure time and
spending power, newer forms may displace older forms to a greater or lesser degree in
terms of the time or money spent by consumers. Stedman, Tinsley, and Kaestle certainly
posit that one medium can displace another; they argue that the new presence of
televisions in the American home may have taken a toll on newspaper purchases, which
declined in the 1960s as more and more people got their news from television or weekly
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magazines (162). The Bureau of Labor Statistics and Department of Agriculture figures
show that the percentage of Americans buying newspapers fell from over 90% “early in
the century” to less than 60% by 1972 (Stedman, Tinsley, and Kaestle 163). Based on this
and other evidence, Stedman, Tinsley and Kaestle “conclude…that the spreading
influence of electronic media indeed reduced the public’s use of newspapers” (163).
Later, beyond the advent of television, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the
freedom of information found through the internet hurt the profitability of newspaper
journalism again, resulting in the dismissal of 20 percent of all working journalists
between 2001 and 2009 (Saba). While the toll that television and the internet took on the
newspaper industry was unfortunate for many editors and journalists, consumers have
benefited from the swifter, simultaneous, and shared information delivery offered by
television and the internet.
Magazine purchases also decreased as television use increased in the 1960s, but
book buying increased during the same time period (Stedman, Tinsley, and Kaestle 163).
In 1918-19 15% of white urban households bought books, but by the 1970s more than
54% of the entire population bought books (Stedman, Tinsley, and Kaestle 163). This
suggests that gains in educational attainment enabled book buying to outpace any losses
from competition with other media.
In the past decade, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has shown that consumer book
expenditures have markedly increased with the help of ebook sales (“Spending and
Employment”). At the same time, the traditional publishing industry has been slightly
wounded by the massive increase of internet publishing and broadcasting; Bureau of
Labor statistics found that employment at book publishers has declined from 80,500
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people in 2004 to 67,200 people in 2014, even as employment at internet publishers and
broadcasters exploded from 65,000 to 157,400 during the same period (“Spending and
Employment”).

A Long View of Rhetoric Concerning the Death of the Novel
The “loss of cultural hegemony” inherent to much death of the novel rhetoric was
not just “perceived,” but very much grounded in systemic and demographic changes in
literary consumption and production. The previously outlined data on American media
consumption demonstrates that the novel has in fact been outranked in terms of time and
money spent relative to other media.
Though in recent years many critics have revisited or dismissed the alleged death
of the novel, there has not been a comprehensive historical review of the strains of this
rhetoric alongside developments in the form(s) and readership(s) of the novel. Such a
historical examination brings a new awareness of the social conflicts in the development
of American literary readership, as well as the evolution and cultural prominence of the
American novel alongside other forms of media.
The number of mentions of the death of the novel in books and in the New York
Times gradually rose in the 1920s, peaked in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and
continued at a slightly lower rate through the first decade of the 21st century (see fig. 1-1).
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Fig. 1-1. Number of New York Times Articles Mentioning the “Death of the Novel,”
1920-2009; Search result frequency for the phrase “death of the novel” in The New York
Times ProQuest Historical Newspapers database; https://search-proquestcom.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/hnpnewyorktimes?accountid=7287.

One might wonder whether this trend is unique to The New York Times as a publication—
perhaps a certain editor who worked for the Times in the 1960s was particularly zealous
about this narrative of literary demise. Similar results show up in a search of fiction via
Google’s Ngram Viewer, a project that scans individual words and word combinations
across collections of books that were digitized from academic libraries. Because the
books collected are taken from libraries, they are not representative of all books in
English, but rather of books in academic library collections. A search of the phrase “death
of the novel” in the Google Ngram Viewer’s American English corpus shows a similar
increase in the use of the term during the 1950s and 1960s, though the first date of the
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phrase’s occurrence is 1906 (Michel et al.). Since the concept of the death of the novel
was quite popular, long-lived, and well-known, these results likely are not hiding
alternate terminology for this phenomenon. If concerns surrounding the novel’s demise
were, as Young claims, as constant and as old as the novel form itself, then why would
there be such a pronounced peak in the 1960s and 1970s? Examining the rhetoric shows
that in fact these fears are very historically situated.
Much of the early rhetoric in The New York Times or on the part of prominent
critics around the death of the novel, from the 1930s to 1950s, was reflective of their
disdain for the concurrent rise of middle-class readers and “middlebrow” books, a shift
that is described by Joan Shelley Rubin in The Making of Middlebrow Culture. As
Gordon Hutner documents, more and more middle and lower-class Americans began to
purchase novels, particularly in the 1920s to1950s, as their expendable income, school
enrollment, and leisure time increased, and as books began to be produced more cheaply.
This greatly expanded the market and led the way for the publication of many books
written from a middle-class perspective (Hutner). “In the three decades following the
First World War,” notes Joan Shelley Rubin, “Americans created an unprecedented range
of activities aimed at making literature and other forms of ‘high’ culture available to a
wide reading public. Beginning with the Book-of-the-Month Club, founded in 1926, book
clubs provided subscribers with recently published works chosen by expert judges” (xi).
With this expanded audience, difficult literature (defined by readability tests and
estimates of reading grade level) gave way in prominence and popularity to more
readable books or books deemed to be of enough popular interest to be publicized by the
Book of the Month Club. In response to this wider book market, many literary critics,
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including Virginia Woolf in The Death of the Moth, proclaimed that the high literary
novel had been deluged by what they saw as mediocre fiction.
The eight New York Times articles that used the phrase “death of the novel” from
1929 to 1959 share a good deal of common ground; of the six of these articles that
suggest a reason for the death of the novel, four of them attribute it to the lack of great
ideas or purpose on the part of new writers (Horwill “Death Verdict;” “People Who
Read;” Pryce-Jones); one of them attributes the idea to contemporary writers’ inability to
describe the intricacies of modern life (O’Connor); and one them attributes the alleged
death to competition from “the cinema and the radio” (Pryce-Jones). Indeed, death of the
novel rhetoric by literary critics in the 1930s to 1950s was mostly led by those of “high
literary taste” who saw literary standards threatened by the dramatic rise of middle and
lower-class book buyers.
Perhaps no more exemplary elitist condemnation of middlebrow books exists than
a 1937 letter by American horror writer H.P. Lovecraft. Lovecraft, writing to fellow
writer Catherine L. Moore about the future of American society, which was still mired in
the Great Depression, denounces those of less-than-high stations and origins whose tastes
might taint the literary marketplace:
Bourgeois capitalism gave artistic excellence & sincerity a death-blow by
enthroning cheap amusement-value at the expense of that intrinsic excellence
which only cultivated, non-acquisitive persons of assured position can enjoy. The
determinant market for written, pictorial, musical, dramatic, decorative,
architectural, & other heretofore aesthetic material ceased to be a small circle of
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truly educated persons, but became a substantially larger (even with a vast
proportion of society starved & crushed into a sodden, inarticulate helplessness
through commercial and commercial-satellitic greed & callousness) circle of
mixed origin numerically denominated by crude, half-educated clods whose
systematically perverted ideals (worship of low cunning, material acquisition,
cheap comfort & smoothness, worldly success, ostentation, speed, intrinsic
magnitude, surface glitter, &c.) prevented them from ever achieving the tastes and
perspectives of the gentlefolk whose dress & speech and external manners they so
assiduously mimicked. This herd of acquisitive boors brought up from the shop &
the counting-house a complete set of artificial attitudes, over-simplifications, &
mawkish sentimentalities which no sincere art or literature could gratify--& they
so outnumbered the remaining educated gentlefolk that most of the purveying
agencies became at once reoriented to them. Literature & art lost most of their
market; & writing, painting, drama, &c. became engulfed more & more in the
domain of amusement enterprises. (397-98)
Lovecraft’s letter is not merely a missive but a performance, an enactment of class
superiority through an exercise in attitude and verbiage that is meant to exclude less-thanexcellent readers. He indicates that status and reading ability are hopelessly intertwined,
and that people of lower classes can only debase the market and attempt to mimic the
assuredness and poise of the higher classes. Ironically, Lovecraft states that people of
upper classes are not concerned with material things and the acquisition of wealth; they
are seemingly satisfied already with the vast wealth that they have accrued. Rather than
being at all sympathetic to the plight of the poor, Lovecraft contemptuously terms them
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“inarticulate,” “helpless,” and consumed by commercially-driven “greed.” The letter also
involves a breed of racial bigotry in accusing those less educated of also being of “mixed
origin.”
Lovecraft was correct that middle and lower class Americans were increasingly
likely to purchase books between the 1930s to 1950s. Of course, it’s debatable whether
the books favored by buyers at lower scales of income were in fact more “amusing” or
“superficial” than books purchased by those at higher scales of income. Hutner’s study of
the period does indicate that books with middle-class protagonists and written from a
middle-class perspective were increasingly popular (117-336).
Regarding the alleged divide between supposedly highbrow versus middlebrow
reading, in their study, “Highbrow and Middlebrow Magazines of 1920,” William
Trollinger and Carl F. Kaestle used textual analysis to determine whether there is a
demonstrable difference in the difficulty of magazines that they believed to have been
targeting either highbrow or middlebrow audiences during the 1920s. They analyzed the
text using the “Flesch Readability Ratings” (209), the “Young-Miller Analysis” (216217), and the “Susan Kemper” model (217), all of which are measures of textual
complexity, that is, sentence length and word length, organizational complexity, and
inferential difficulty,5 respectively. They found that magazines that were proclaimed to
be high literature required higher grade levels of reading comprehension and that a
sample story from the highbrow Atlantic Monthly was more complex and at a higher
reading level than one from the middlebrow Saturday Evening Post (209-217).

5

Inferential processing is a measure of how difficult figurative language is to understand. For more
information, see Kemper’s “Inferential Processing and the Comprehension of Idioms,” 43-55.
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While some critics might use such a study to argue that middlebrow publications
were watered-down versions of highbrow publications, and therefore shouldn’t be taken
seriously by critics, Trollinger and Kaestle’s focus is on the bolstering of literacy, and
how differences in publications’ reading difficulty shed some light on educational
inequalities:
We believe that high literacy has shown great staying power. We are more
impressed than ever with its complexity, its influence, and its apparent
inaccessibility to the average reader. In saying this we are not making a value
judgment regarding average readers. There is no question that many readers of the
popular press succeeded in their jobs and led virtuous, intelligent lives, and
perhaps it does not matter that most people could not read the Atlantic Monthly.
But the fact remains that the educational system equipped only a limited number
of people with sophisticated reading skills, reading skills that also acted as an
entry qualification and a necessary prerequisite to participation in many
commanding institutions of society. In this regard, educational stratification
contributed to the stratification of American society and was reflected in the
varying complexity of publications read by adults. (Trollinger and Kaestle 221).
Clearly, then, Lovecraft as well as Trollinger and Kaestle are concerned about the reading
abilities of this new market of lower and middle class readers, though Lovecraft from the
perspective of the maintenance of cultural hegemony and Trollinger and Kaestle from the
opposing perspective of the amelioration of social stratification via an improvement in
general education. Later on in his letter Lovecraft does in fact advocate for better
educational standards as a way to rescue society from mediocrity: “Under a better
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controlled economic system, with Federal encouragement of mass-education (even if the
first few sets of government adult-instruction commissioners lack perfect drawing-room
manners), an appreciable rise in public taste might be expected” (400). While on the one
hand differences in the complexity of magazines do reveal some educational inequality,
the rise and popularity of middlebrow magazines during the 1920s could also be seen as a
partial collapse of cultural hegemony via a growth in markets for classes that were
previously underrepresented—a step toward a kind of literary vernacularization.

“Death of the Novel” Rhetoric of the 1960s and 1970s
The social unrest of the 1960s meant a widespread cultural skepticism about
authority and the status quo. This questioning and new, low-budget printing technologies
brought an explosion in small literary and poetry presses which represented the interests
of previously underrepresented readers. These included “the feminist press, the
fundamentalist press, gay periodicals, and black-owned book publishing” (Kaestle 273).
The extent of this growth in small and alternative presses can be grasped by the fact that
in “1958, 1,000 publishers issued 13,500 titles, and by 1985, 15,000 publishers, most of
them issuing fewer than 5 titles each, issued 50,000 new titles” (Kaestle 288).
These presses were only made possible through technological revolutions in
printing, and the mimeograph machine in particular, which gave a title to this explosion
of diversity in publishing: the Mimeo Revolution. The rise of small literary presses
during this period is documented in books such as Steven Clay and Rodney Phillips’s A
Secret Location on the Lower East Side: Adventures in Writing 1960-1980 and Ross
Hair’s Avant-Folk: Small Press Poetry Networks from 1950 to the Present, the latter of
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which discusses the consequences of “the revolution in small press mimeograph
publishing that peaked in the 1960s” (137). The Black Arts Movement, which saw the
birth of small black-owned presses, theaters, and other cultural institutions in the 1960s
and 1970s, is covered in books such as Julius E. Thompson’s Dudley Randall, Broadside
Press, and the Black Arts Movement in Detroit, 1960-1995 and James Smethurst’s The
Black Arts Movement: Literary Nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s.
As discussed previously, the most frequent use of rhetoric concerning “the death
of the novel” in the New York Times and in books via Google Ngrams occurred between
1960 and 1969, a time in which small, feminist, and African-American presses—such as
Black Sparrow, Feminist Press (founded in 1970), and Broadside, respectively—
flourished, and countercultures were in full swing.
A common theme concerning the death of the novel in these articles—many of
which proclaim the form as alive and well but evolving—is the contemporaneous absence
of great white male authors (though of course race and sex are not directly mentioned)
such as Hemingway and Proust. Louis D. Rubin, in his 1967 book The Curious Death of
the Novel, addresses the “current lull in the American novel” (18) and reminisces about a
simpler time when novelists wrote from the inner turmoil of the human heart and without
a care as to what the marketplace demanded (22-23). He speaks with a hint of contempt
about Susan Sontag, who by publishing in “middlebrow” publications and critiquing
meaning-making is guilty of saying that “the second-rate is preferable to the first-rate”
(18). This sense of nostalgia for the greats of the past is mentioned and dismissed in
articles by Elliot Fremont-Smith (“Books of the Times”) and Robert Scholes
(“Disciple”).
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Another frequent theme in these articles is the pressure on the novel form from
other media and popular culture. Russell Baker cites the death of the novel among a
whole host of fears that include “the possibility that the culture boom leaves us
uncultivated…vanishing newspapers…television…draft dodgers…hippies” (32). The
cultural revolutions in the 1960s thus manifest in part as a crisis of the novel, a form that
must find a new place in a sea of activism and louder and more popular media. The elitist
critics who revered the great authors of the past were unable to come to grips with the
new populist and countercultural tides. John Leonard reflects on this divide in his 1969
article about the populist explosion of paperbacks:
The esthetes (they are all writing monographs on Kafka: the bedbug as
prototypical spermatazoan) resent the Paperback Revolution because it attacks
their private property prerogatives. The social engineers (they are all writing
monographs on the selection of color-compatible kindergarten furniture for the
Garden City public schools) approve of the Revolution as the systemization of
vulgarity which is a Democratic Triumph.” (“Pulling the Tab Off the Boo,”
BRA4).
Leonard tries to move beyond both sides to point out that the repositioning of literary
books as popular commodities in drugstores and supermarkets is a radical act that in itself
changes the value and perceived sacredness of literary objects (BRA4). It is not just the
white male authors who are dethroned, but the high literary book as a privileged form.
H.P. Lovecraft’s similar concerns about the popularization of fiction in 1937 (398) and
his worry about the speeding up of society not leaving room for literary pleasure (394)
show some continuity in strains of rhetoric around the fate of the form.
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The novel in the 1960s increasingly found itself popularized and forced to
compete with other media objects. In his 1967 New York Times book review of Andre
Dubus’ The Lieutenant, Thomas Fleming wonders whether the novel’s price point is too
high for it to compete with other media:
This is an average novel; perhaps even a bit above average for a first book by a
31-year-old author. But is the subject—the psychological travails of a young
officer struggling to protect his men from drumhead justice, Navy style—worth a
novel?
Perhaps we should begin questioning the dimensions, the significance of our
novels, using the perspectives gained from the multiple media now at our
disposal.
“The Lieutenant” does not offer much more dimension than one expects from a
good TV script. Can we honestly expect the reader to pay the covered hardcover
prices—when, for the same amount, he can get a subscription to a magazine, see a
Broadway play or two movies?” (BR30)
This crisis of competition with other media is quite valid as television made enormous
gains in popularity and the occupation of American leisure time during this decade.
Ironically, though, the mass production of popular novels and the apparatus of big
publishing also was growing at the same time. This fear, then, is not so much the death or
disappearance of the novel, but its commodification and giving way of prominence in
comparison with other media.
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A Long View of the Decreasing Twentieth-Century Racial Disparities in Literary
Reading and Publishing
Sometimes, when the ever-changing canon of American literature focuses on the
exception, readers can lose perspective on what was the norm. For example, when readers
consider the 1845 Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, they might focus on the
exceptional life of Douglass and lose sight of the fact that in the year that his narrative
was published, there was no estimate of African-American literacy rates. As editor Tom
Snyder documents in 120 Years of Education, it wouldn’t be until 1870 that the U.S.
Census estimated that 79.9% of blacks and other minorities couldn’t read or write
(Snyder 21). From a macro perspective, it is important to remember that the past 150
years have born witness to an incredible expansion in African-American literacy rates
and access to primary, secondary, and post-secondary education.
At the turn of the twentieth century, literary reading, and in fact any form of
reading, in America was an activity that was strongly constrained by class and race. In
1900, the U.S. Census determined that 44.5% of African Americans and other minorities
were unable to read and write, much less participate in literary culture, compared with
6.2% of whites (Snyder 21). By 1947, 11% of African Americans and other minorities
were illiterate, compared with 1.8% of whites (Snyder 21).
Though books authored by African-Americans and African-American presses
have a long history dating back to the abolitionist movement circa 1820, the most
dramatic rise to prominence of African-American literature was in the 1960s, as
described by Donald F. Joyce (3-5). Specifically, the yearly output of book titles by
black-owned publishers exploded from around two to three a year from 1900 to 1960 to
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around twenty-five a year circa 1970, and the number of publishers rose from around
three to five to eighteen during the same time frame (Joyce 147).
The fact that the peak of rhetoric concerned with the death of the novel occurred
during a time (the late 1960s through the 1970s) in which there were concrete changes
being enacted in civil rights is not a coincidence. The majority of critics who bewailed
the death of the novel couched their rhetoric in the reminiscence of a golden age wherein
the dominance and relevance of the great white male authors was undisputed. That the
watershed moment of African-American publishing and various countercultural
movements coincided with a swell in this rhetoric would at least indicate that said
rhetoric has some merit, that there were in fact very significant and material shifts in who
produced novels and for whom they were produced. In The Anxiety of Obsolescence,
Kathleen Fitzpatrick concurs with this analysis, stating that “the pinnacle of the death-ofthe-novel discourse” occurred in the late 1960s, and she argues that the performance of
this rhetoric is largely a means of reifying theory (17-18), and additionally that
“postmodernist theory” the likes of which is espoused by many critics who discuss the
death of the novel “came to prominence in the contemporary academy as a reaction to the
identity-based political and intellectual movements of the 1960s and 1970s” (199).

Standardization and Diversity, 1890-1970
Aided by increases in school enrollment, new printing technologies, national
politics, and shifts in book-buying markets, the twentieth century was marked by
increased consolidation of the operations of major publishers, the development of new
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markets, and periods of explosive diversity in the rise of radical publications and
independent presses (Kaestle 280).
The period between 1880 and 1920 saw both a proliferation of small publications
and a consolidation of the publishing industry (Kaestle 281-282). At the beginning of the
period, an array of small publications appeared—cheap novels, labor publications,
socialist newspapers, and immigrant newspapers among them—to serve “an expanding
body of readers” (282). Then, after 1900, publications in the “mass market” began to
compete for the attention of the general public (Kaestle 282). This competition, alongside
the growth of American media companies and distribution networks, created a print
culture which included more national advertisements and where people across America
were reading the same papers (Kaestle 282-283).
The period of American print culture from 1920 and 1950 witnessed increased
consolidation (Kaestle 283). While the circulation of newspapers from 1920 to 1950
increased, the overall number of newspapers shrank and many consolidated in order to
successfully compete in a large national market and to afford expensive typesetting
equipment (Kaestle 284). The “Red Scare” and the “wartime drive for unity” created
“massive government propaganda and the suppression of dissenting publications”
(Kaestle 283). This “did not simply dissipate after the war, but created harsher pressures
for conformity and assimilation” (Kaestle 283). Many immigrant newspapers “[folded] or
[Americanized]” when Congress blocked immigration (Kaestle 283). Critics such as
Bagdikian argue that the rise of advertising during this time further discouraged
independent or culturally critical publications (235). In a similar fashion, the number of
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magazines decreased from 1930 to 1958, even as the “population and the reading public
increased” (Kaestle 284).
This was also a period in which school enrollment levels rose, which created a
similar growth in the percentage of literature Americans who were potential book readers
(Kaestle 283). For example, in 1920 “17% of 17-year-olds” were enrolled in high school,
compared “to nearly 70% in 1960” (Fallace 103).
As a common example of book publishing’s growing appeal to the masses leading
into the 1950s, the Literary Guild and the Book-of-the-Month Club were formed in the
1920s (Kaestle 285). These and similar organizations undertook the role of popular
tastemakers. As Paul S. Boyer notes in Purity in Print, a history of American book
censorship, their role intensified during the Depression:
…manuscripts were nervously evaluated in the light of Depression tastes….In a
time of financial stringency, the mass distribution of broadly popular books
became the goal….The mass-market standards of the book clubs
continued subtly to influence the editorial judgments of publishers with an eye on
this lucrative source of sales. (Boyer 262)
Of course, American novels had long had to struggle to gain attention and success among
the book buyers of the day. Ironically, though, as book-buying publics widened and
diversified, authors and editors at major publishers felt pressured to consider the potential
of their works in appealing to wider audiences because of the new potential economies of
scale.
In the 1940s, books forged a path alongside the “movie industry,” which
“concurrently and voluntarily supported efforts to revive confidence in and loyalty to
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traditional American values, and in the postwar anti-Communist days rooted out
dissenters and dissent with a vengeance” (Kaestle 285-6). Thus the conformity enacted in
the previous decade as a result of economic scarcity and a move to mass appeal was
additionally entrenched in wartime concerns for patriotism.
The next decade saw the culmination of all of these trends:
By the early 1950s the artifacts of American popular culture had achieved cultural
homogenization. Radios reached everybody, newspapers were heavily
consolidated, and the leading magazines were similar in content and appearance
and devoted to selling the same products. War and McCarthyism had
dampenedpolitical dissent, movies followed safe formulas, and the foreignlanguage press was a mere shadow of what it had been. (Kaestle 286)
Politics, education, and the commercial interest in fostering a mass American culture had
combined to create the cookie-cutter American culture that is emblematic of the 1950s.
While “dissent and diversity still existed….one wouldn’t find it in the reading materials
that faced most readers each day. The society was not really homogeneous, but print
culture was, to an unprecedented degree” (Kaestle 286).
Gore Vidal’s 1956 essay is representative of some of the disdain that cultural
critics felt toward the public’s taste for popular fiction and television at the time:
The fault, if it be a fault, is not the novelist’s (I doubt if there ever have been so
many interesting and excellent writers as there are now working) but of the
audience, an unpleasant accusation to make in a democracy where, ultimately, the
taste of the majority is the measure of all things. Nevertheless, appalling
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education combined with clever new toys has distracted that large public which
found pleasure in prose fictions. (24)
Other critics such as Raymond Williams and Harold Innis were similarly dismayed
during this decade by what they saw as the irreversible move toward a mass culture
without substance or reflection. They sought ways in which “local” and diverse print
cultures could be revived (Kaestle 275). In the 1950s and the decades following, critics
have debated whether capitalism has an inherent tendency to encourage a homogeneous
and bland culture (Kaestle 275). Ironically, though, given the ensuing small press
revolution of the 1960s, it seems that the technological innovations spawned by
capitalism actually work in both directions.
Rather than operating individually, different media and developing technologies
should be understood as negotiating or coordinating with one another in the fulfillment of
different consumer needs, sometimes in divergent and unpredictable ways, as Kaestle
suggests that “the general interest magazine gave way to magazines targeted at more
focused groups because television had garnered the advertising revenues for general
audiences (287). Next chapter will consider the ways in which other forms of media
compete and coordinate with the novel, with attention to the question of whether the
novel has changed in response to other media.
Radical publications rose in the late 1960s, and “Although many countercultural
publications had failed or been commercialized by the late 1970s, in its heyday the
‘underground press’ counted perhaps two million readers, and there was a sense of
tremendous diversity, questioning, and innovation in these publications” (Kaestle 28788).
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Just as the rise of middle and lower class book purchasers had overturned the
status quo in the previous decades, the new demographics of the book markets in the
1960s and 1970s alienated many of America’s solid middle class, particularly when these
new cultural perspectives entered the curriculum (Kaestle 289).
Despite the rise of radical publications and small presses over this time period,
most “features of American reading materials were very sturdy. Consumerism,
patriotism, the comic strips, professional athletics, advertisements that appealed to sexual
stereotypes, newspapers that focused on sensational crime—all of these characterized our
reading material from the 1950s through the 1980s, with little change” (Kaestle 289).
While at first mass market paperbacks encouraged an exploration of new markets
of buyers, eventually “The paperback industry moved from diversity toward an emphasis
on the blockbuster best seller, and a large share of other paperback sales were in formula
romances. Most Americans of the 1980s were plugged into the same electronic news, the
same big-network entertainment, and the same fast-food franchises” (Kaestle 290).
In the twentieth century, and with the rise of the internet, we can see similar albeit
more dramatic tendencies that move at once toward the consolidation of power in mass
media (as John Light documents, fewer and fewer companies own larger and larger
segments of U.S. media since the 1980s) and a diversification of individual and
independent expression. In regarding the progress of these simultaneously divergent and
overlapping trends, no final verdict on consolidation versus diversification can be
made—rather, it might be understood as a dialectic. The mass media’s increased reliance
on and utilization of prosumer and viral news might indicate that diversified journalistic
sources are becoming more mainstream, but at the same time those independent sources
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are only serving to earn ad dollars for media conglomerates who pick up users’ free labor.
In The People’s Platform, Astra Taylor argues that the freedom and openness of the
internet is really an illusion, as most users are taken advantage of and commodified by
ever-larger internet companies. Even though the internet is seen as a free and open
playground, Taylor argues that those who truly own and profit from the internet are
exploiting users and are privileged in terms of race, sex, and class. She advocates for a
publicly-controlled internet platform.
Just as the death of the novel rhetoric from the 1930s to 1960s was reflective of
real contemporary shifts in publishing, more recent rhetoric on the death of literature,
such as Sven Birkerts’ 1994 The Gutenberg Elegies and Kathleen Fitzpatrick’s 2015
“The Future History of the Book: Time, Attention, and Convention,” are also historically
situated in their concern with the rise of new media and audiences’ allegedly shortening
attention spans.

Book Readers Versus Buyers, 1920-1970
There have been occasional surveys, not by the government but by different
groups—such as librarians and reading historians—on the types of reading materials read
by different segments of the American public since the 1930s (Damon-Moore and
Kaestle 180-181). Unfortunately, many of these surveys asked different questions or
phrased similar questions in different ways, so they are not always comparable (DamonMoore and Kaestle 189). According to their analysis, there was a slight upward trend in
how many respondents had read a book in the past year—during the 1960s, surveys gave
a range of 46 to 75 percent of the populace as having read a book in the past year, and
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during the 1970s the range was between 56 to 84 percent (Damon-Moore and Kaestle
189); these findings, however, were contradicted by a Gallup poll in 1983 reporting that
only 50 percent had” read a book in the last year (Stedman, Tinsley, and Kaestle 163). By
comparison to today, a 2013 Huffington Post poll found that 72% of respondents had
read a book in the last year. These statistics encompass all genres of books, not just
literature, and should not be confused with the statistics later on in this chapter that
entertain declines in literary reading.
As disposable income increased and the resources of libraries became more
plentiful per capita, more people had the ability to both buy and borrow books (Stedman,
Tinsley, and Kaestle 165). Based on this data, Stedman, Tinsley, and Kaestle believe that
“Contrary to all the dire predictions, the portion of the public that reads books has
remained roughly constant” (165). However, the adjusted sums spent on books have
declined, for instance from $43 on average in 1950 to $31 in 1970 (Stedman, Tinsley, and
Kaestle 166). They find that “because the use of constant-dollar expenditures controls for
price changes in the goods being purchased, the declines in book expenditures cannot be
attributed to a shift from hardbacks to less-expensive paperbacks. The modern electronic
age, therefore, has had some adverse impact on book expenditures relative to other
expenditures, but not on the percentage of households that read or purchase books”
(Stedman, Tinsley, and Kaestle 166).
By 1972, newspaper and magazine purchases by low-income Americans as well
as the general population had declined compared to the previous decade. However, by
comparison, book purchases by people with low incomes had increased by more than the
general population, a growth that occurred mainly “during the 1960s.” Specifically, “In
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1960…between 7 and 22 percent of those in the bottom fourth of the income pyramid
purchased books, but by 1972 this group ranged from 31 percent to 43 percent”
(Stedman, Tinsley, and Kaestle 171).
Thus, by Stedman, Tinsley, and Kaestle’s calculations, between 1920 and 1970,
the percent of low and middle income Americans to purchase books rose quite
drastically, the percentage of Americans who read books regularly remained more or less
constant, and the percentage of Americans who had read a book over a given year rose.
The market shifted in response to a wider purchasing audience whose members fell in
new income brackets. As a result of the expanding book markets, the income distribution
of print buying is greater than it was in the early part of the century “when the working
classes bought mostly newspapers and book buying was predominantly an activity of
highly educated, higher-income groups. Today a majority of the public buys some books”
(Stedman, Tinsley, and Kaestle 179).

The Recent Alleged Decline in Literary Book Reading
One of the longest-running polls on American reading is from Gallup; it asks
whether people “happen to be reading any books at present.” While it doesn’t separate
fiction from nonfiction, or give a demographic breakdown of respondents, the poll shows
a consistent increase in the percentage of Americans who are currently reading books,
from 21 percent in 1949 to 47 percent in 2005 (Moore). According to the poll, the
percentage of Americans currently reading a book increased from 37 percent in 1990 to
47 percent in 2005, despite the rise of the internet. The percentage also jumped from 23
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percent in 1957 to 37 percent in 1990. These increases corresponded with increasing
attainment in higher education by African Americans and white Americans:
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Fig. 1-2. “Percent of the Black and White Populations 25 Years and Over with a
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher,” U.S. Census 1940-2000, 2015,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/educational-attainment/educationalattainment-1940-2000.html.

The apparent growth in book readers reflected in this poll seems to run contrary to the
alleged fall in the percentage of Americans who had read a book in the last year
(Wiessmann). However, a closer look at the poll results that Wiessmann is using reveals
that the alleged drop in reading was only recent—circa 2012 and 2014, and this drop
occurs around the same years in which the polling organization changes from Gallup to
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Pew, so it’s possible that the difference is more related to polling techniques than actual
shifts in reading. Another long-running poll by Gallup shows that the percent of
Americans who didn’t read a book in the last year modestly increased from 8 percent in
1978 to 16 percent in 2016 (Swift and Ander). These slightly conflicting reports reveal
how the variables may confound the results of surveys; at the same time as the internet
and television may be very slightly reducing time spent on book reading, the number of
readers may be rising along with educational attainment. The impact of the roughly one
million legal immigrants who enter the US each year is never considered. While there
may be a growing number of book readers, there also may be reductions in reading on the
part of previous readers, making directional trends in reading very difficult to untangle.
Certainly, as discussed earlier in the chapter, the revival in the past few years of
some concern over modest declines in fiction sales (Association of American Publishers)
and in literary reading across all formats—ebooks, audiobooks, and print books (Crain,
Weissmann) may have some validity. The percentage of adults who read a book in any
format has been hovering around 72 to 79 percent since 2011 (Statista, “Share of
Adults”). The period from 1985 to 2009 shows a slight decline in inflation-adjusted
dollars spent on reading materials and an increase in inflation-adjusted dollars spent on
other recreational activities (see fig. 1-3).

52

Fig. 1-3. Spending on Reading Materials Versus Fees and Admissions for Entertainment,
1985-2009; “Expenditures Per Consumer Unit for Entertainment and Reading: 1985 to
2009,” U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Bureau of Labor, October 2010.

Earlier surveys that lamented declines in literary reading showed similarly subtle
declines. In 2004, the National Endowment for the Arts released Reading at Risk, the
results of a twenty-year study encompassing 17,000 individuals that was undertaken by
the U.S. Bureau of the Census (vii). The report’s preface, written by the Endowment’s
Chairman, Dana Gioia, attempts to summarize its findings in a single sentence which
states that “literary reading in America is not only declining rapidly among all groups,
but the rate of decline has accelerated, especially among the young” (Reading at Risk vii).
The “massive shift” uncovered in the study is “toward electronic media for entertainment
and information” (Reading at Risk vii). The report adopts a negative tone towards said
media; at times it seems as though it is chastising the American consumer of culture for
choosing junk food over vegetables:
…reading itself is a progressive skill that depends on years of education and
practice. By contrast, most electronic media such as television, recordings, and
radio make fewer demands on their audiences, and indeed often require no more
than passive participation. Even interactive electronic media, such as video games
and the Internet, foster shorter attention spans and accelerated gratification.
(Reading at Risk vii)
However, just as different books cater to different audiences and reading can be done at
different skill levels, “the Internet” is not a monolithic medium with a predetermined use.
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Like traditional forms of reading, the internet encompasses various levels of complexity
and can be perused with different modes of attention. Of course, there may be some truth
to the claim that many of the forms in which information is conveyed online may
promote shorter periods of attention and may “[accelerate] gratification” on the part of
the user; yet to cast a negative value judgment on all electronic media is both reductive
and elitist.
One of the main findings of the study is that the percentage of Americans who
read any literature during a given year declined from 56.9% in 1982 to 54.0% in 1992
and then to 46.7% in 2002 (Reading at Risk ix). Literature could mean novels, short
stories, or plays; it needn’t be in book format; and it could include popular fiction
(Reading at Risk 1-2). The decline in literary reading between 1982 and 2002 “represents
a loss of 20 million readers,” but since the population grew in that time by almost 40
million, the actual number of literary readers remained almost steady at 96 million
(Reading at Risk ix). Though the decline between 1982 and 1992 is minor—a mere 2%—
the decline between 1992 to 2002 is quite stark at almost 7%; overall, over the twenty
year period the percentage of adults reading literature in a given year declined by around
10%, from 56.9% to 46.7%, according to the study. The survey posited that the rise of
internet usage in American homes during the latter ten years might have been responsible
for the reduction in literary reading, though unfortunately the survey didn’t study internet
use as extensively as it studied other media:
As discussed in Chapter 3, television does not seem to be the culprit. In 2002,
those who do read and those who do not read literature watched about the same
amount of TV per day – three hours’ worth. The Internet, however, could have
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played a role. During the time period when the literature participation rates
declined, home Internet use soared. According to a 2000 Census Bureau report,
42 percent of households used the Internet at home – up dramatically from 26
percent in 1998, one of the earliest years of the Bureau’s tracking. By contrast,
literary reading rates reported in 1982 and 1992 were virtually identical in a
period before the Internet was widely available. It was not until 2002 that the
reported percentage of adults reading literature dropped considerably. (Reading at
Risk 30)
Television, of course, has long been vying for Americans’ attention, and the survey found
that 95.7% of Americans over the course of 2002 watched at least an hour of television a
day (Reading at Risk 5). Despite its stated belief that television is not responsible for the
decline in book and literary reading, the study did find that “watching four hours or more
of TV per day had a negative impact on the chances of someone reading 12 books or
more per year,” and “Watching no TV had a positive impact on the probability of
someone reading 12 books or more” (Reading at Risk 29). Although there is no long-term
study to indicate to what extent, if any, television watching has reduced literary reading,
one cannot dispute that television has long overtaken literature in the popular imagination
while simultaneously expanding its audience beyond that of other media. In 2014,
Nielsen found that the average American watches over five hours of television a day,
while the 2012 US Bureau of Labor Time Usage study found that Americans read for
about half an hour a day. The simultaneity of television broadcasting and the amount of
time it occupies in Americans’ daily lives simply mean that literature generally, with
many notable exceptions, is now in the background of popular cultural consciousness.
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The paradox herein is that in the early twentieth century, novels were the domain of the
privileged class, and were not that popular at all. Now, as we progress through the
twenty-first century, novels are more popular than ever, but they are eclipsed in terms of
user time by other media.
The survey found a correlation between reading literature and doing charity work:
only 16.6% of those who read no literature during 2002 performed any charity work
during the same year, while 43.3% of those who read any literature during the year
performed charity work (Reading at Risk 6). Based on this finding, the National
Endowment for the Arts draws the dubious conclusion that reading promotes civic
engagement, arguing that “The decline in reading, therefore, parallels a larger retreat
from participation in civic and cultural life” (Reading at Risk vii). However, such a
retreat and its relationship to reading was not documented in the report. Correlations
between literary reading and charity work (Reading at Risk 6) and literary reading and
visiting museums (Reading at Risk xii) are not enough to prove that “The decline in
literary reading foreshadows an erosion in cultural and civic participation,” as the report
argues (Reading at Risk xii).
Instead, it seems likely that other factors which predict for literary or book
reading are also connected to civic engagement. U.S. adults’ race, gender, age, education
level, and income all strongly predict their levels of literary reading in 2002 (see table 1).
Table 1 Percentage of U.S. Adults Who Read Any Work of Literature During 2002 by
Demographic Variables

56

Source: National Endowment for the Arts, Reading at Risk: A Survey of Literary Reading
in America, National Endowment for the Arts, June 2004,
https://www.arts.gov/sites/default/files/ReadingAtRisk.pdf, table 9, p. 11.

Given that 26.9% of African Americans and 38.6% of white Americans earning $9,999 or
less read literature in 2002, compared with 51.8% of African Americans and 62.8% of
white Americans earning $75,000 or more, it seems that literary reading is often a marker
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of privilege. The results of the Reading at Risk study were generally accepted by literary
theorists, and were used in books like John B. Thompson’s Merchants of Culture to
comment on some of the effects of the digital revolution in media.
In 2007, the National Endowment for the Arts released a new report of national
reading rates which compiled additional data from “U.S. federal agencies” as well as
“academic, foundation, and business surveys” (To Read or Not to Read 5). The new
report confirmed the findings of the 2004 report, and emphasized that “Although there
has been measurable progress in recent years in reading ability at the elementary school
level, all progress appears to halt as children enter their teenage years. There is a general
decline in reading among teenage and adult Americans. Most alarming, both reading
ability and the habit of regular reading have greatly declined among college graduates”
(To Read or Not to Read 5). The report argues that since people are reading less, their
reading skills are declining, which leads to poorer job opportunities, and the likelihood of
lower civic participation (To Read or Not to Read 5). As in the 2004 report, the 2007
report attempts to argue that a lack of literary reading negatively impacts a person’s
likelihood of employment or civic engagement; it does this through a kind of
doublespeak wherein at first Dana Gioia states that correlation doesn’t necessarily prove
cause and effect, but then he nonetheless “[suggests] that since all the data demonstrate
consistent and mostly linear relationships between reading and positive results—and
between poor reading and negative results—reading has played a decisive factor” (To
Read or Not to Read 6).
The 2007 report details declines in standard scores of reading proficiency across
various levels of education (see table 2).
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Table 2 U.S. Adult Literacy Scores by Highest Education Level in 1992 and 2003

Source: National Endowment for the Arts, To Read or Not to Read: A Question of
National Consequence, National Endowment for the Arts, November 2007,
https://www.arts.gov/sites/default/files/ToRead.pdf, p. 14.

While there are noticeable declines, it is difficult to draw any conclusions given that the
average demographic characteristics of adults at these different levels of education have
likely changed over the course of those eleven years. Furthermore, standardized tests
cannot reflect alterations in the public’s general reading habits and approaches. For
instance, a standardized test which places an emphasis on the intensive reading of a
particular text may be blind to the kind of extensive reading between different texts
which the internet fosters.
The 2007 study also highlights the tendency of teenagers to engage with other
media even while they are reading (see table 3).
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Table 3 Percentage of Time U.S. Students Spent Reading While Using Other Media,
2003-2004

Source: National Endowment for the Arts, To Read or Not to Read: A Question of
National Consequence, November 2007,
https://www.arts.gov/sites/default/files/ToRead.pdf, p. 11.

Reading, clearly, is often no longer a focused or continuous activity. The prevalence of
multitasking has likely altered the average American reader’s habits and experience over
the course of the century.
The 2007 report also found a large generational gap in the time that people of
different ages spend reading per day (see table 4).
Table 4 Average Daily Reading Time by Age in 2006
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Source: National Endowment for the Arts, To Read or Not to Read: A Question of
National Consequence, November 2007,
https://www.arts.gov/sites/default/files/ToRead.pdf, p. 10.

While the idea that 15-24 year olds spend an average of seven minutes per weekday
reading might be quite shocking at face value, one also should realize that the particular
survey above did not include using a computer as reading, but rather grouped together all
computer use as one category (Bureau of Labor Statistics). For that reason, it is an
inaccurate reflection of all time spent reading and the types of reading materials
consumed. Nonetheless, the 2012 American Time Use Survey reveals a continuation of
this trend of younger Americans reading less than those who are 45 and above (whether
the latter category has reached retirement or not).
Both the 2004 and the 2007 reports present valid evidence that literary and book
reading has significantly declined in the U.S. since 1982. Yet, their failure to trace trends
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in online reading or in overall civic engagement calls into question their assertion that the
American public is facing crises in reading or political participation. To proclaim that
“unless some effective solution is found…literary culture, and literacy in general, will
continue to worsen,” so that “at the current rate of loss, literary reading as a leisure
activity will virtually disappear in half a century,” is essentially an act of fear mongering
(Reading at Risk xiii). Though one might expect a dip in literary and book reading during
the decade in which the personal computer entered the American home, a continuous
decline at the same rate seems unrealistic. Furthermore, a slight fall in test scores is not
enough to establish a decline in literacy—rather, it begs the question of whether
Americans are engaging in what might be termed new literacies.
The reports’ warnings about the consumption of new media echo eighteenth
century concerns about novel-reading.6 As Robert W. Uphaus notes, “Too often, what is
either ignored or forgotten is that throughout the eighteenth century reading fiction was
regarded as an inferior and oftentimes dangerous activity,” a “threatening if not alien
element in eighteenth-century culture” (vii). Here the danger and inferiority Uphaus
refers to is that of moral degradation and laziness—reading threatened morality and the
Protestant work ethic. By not considering the possibility of online reading being equally
or more constructive than literary reading, surveys like Reading at Risk are designed with
inherent bias.
Of course, a 21st century audience is liable to look back at eighteenth-century
crusades against novel consumption and scoff at them for being reactionary or alarmist.

6

For an overview of early concerns about moral degeneracy from reading novels, see Cathy Davidson’s
Revolution and the Word.
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Yet the form of the eighteenth-century novel and its commercial production did
immensely impact the media landscape of its time and for many decades thereafter. The
hours required to consume novels may have taken away from the time devoted to the
more “serious” reading of such items as “moral treatises, conduct books, education
manuals, and even the Scripture itself” (Uphaus vii).
Certainly, a decline of 10% in American literary readership over 20 years is
substantial. However, suggesting that this decline will reduce levels of civic engagement
and literacy is irresponsible. The rise in internet usage has altered the way in which
Americans read as well as the overall pattern of media consumption. To evaluate this
shift as entirely negative, as presaging “an imminent cultural crisis,” is to oversimplify a
complex and multifaceted issue (Reading at Risk xiii).
Though literary reading may see slight declines, those declines must be
contextualized amidst the twentieth-century expansion of literary reading and book
buying across various racial and economic brackets. The question of “Are books dying?”
has rightfully been refocused to consider what new literacies are overtaking or at the least
competing with traditional literary reading. The values and functions of new digital
literacies in comparison with those of literary reading will be considered in subsequent
chapters.
In 2009, the National Endowment for the Arts released a newly-optimistic report
entitled Reading on the Rise which reported a “reversal” in the decline of literary reading
“among virtually all adult groups” between 2002 and 2008 (1). The overall rise reported
by the NEA is actually rather modest—the number of adults who said they had read a
literary work increased from 46.7 percent in 2002 to 50.2 percent in 2008 (3). Overall,
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the NEA reports a 2.9% decrease in literary readership from 1982 to 1992, a 7.3%
decrease from 1992 to 2002, and a 3.5% increase from 2002 to 2008, with the biggest
increase among 18-24 year olds (4). Unfortunately the NEA’s survey questions do not
specify whether the work of literature was read in print or electronic format; the
respondents’ literary reading could have been done in any medium. The NEA further
attributes this reversal to its own and local initiatives to revive readership (1-2). There
may be other possible reasons for this small increase apart from an expansion of outreach
programs: the rise in popularity of ebooks as well as an increase in online literary
publications could have also contributed to this resurgence in literary reading.
In recent years, the ease of access to literature has increased, with users being
able to access digital books not just on ereaders but on any mobile phone, tablet, or
computer, via apps like the Kindle App. Ironically, then, while non-literary texts and
other media on the internet surely compete for user time spent with literary reading, the
internet also provides new means of literary distribution which encourage increases in
literary reading.

Race and Media Usage: the Argument for the Vernacular Success of New Media
The average time Americans spent in 2014 watching television, listening to radio,
or using their smartphones were each far greater than the amount of time spent on reading
(Nielsen, “Content Is King”). In fact, in 2015 Nielson found that of all forms of media,
radio reached the highest percentage of Americans on a weekly basis (Nielsen, “Apples
to Apples”). While every medium has its blockbusters, the simultaneity of social media,
television, and radio along with their greater consumer usage times compared with
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literary reading would point to these media as having a greater overall share of consumer
attention. While each medium (and each news channel, from FOX to CNN) is fragmented
by different audiences and offerings, the sheer amount of time that Americans spend on
one type of media over another makes a case for different media having more or less
popular or vernacular appeal.
Additionally, as the statistics above show, demographics of race, educational
attainment, and income level correspond with different levels and strategies of media
usage. That is to say, that in terms of not only their popular but also their demographic
reach, different forms of media are not equal. Naturally, even within categories of media,
some media outlets are more popular than others—for example, Facebook reaches a
higher percentage of Americans of every race than does Instagram, Twitter, Pinterest, or
LinkedIn (Krogstad). One could argue that media that are used by a greater percentage of
the population, and that have a more even distribution racially, have more vernacular
weight or popular appeal than other media do. This is obviously a great generalization, as
the demographic fragmentation within each medium is important to consider and explore,
but nonetheless considering a medium’s popular and demographic reach overall is a
helpful starting point in interrogating sociological differences and preferences in media
usage. Surely the fact that Facebook captures a slightly more even distribution of users in
terms of race (roughly 70 percent of blacks, 67 percent of whites, and 73 percent of
Latinos use Facebook) (Pew Research) compared to book reading (76 percent of blacks,
80 percent of whites, and 62 percent of Hispanics consumed a book in any format circa
2016) (Perrin), based on Pew surveys, is significant in considering how racial disparities
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affect media usage, and in turn affect who participates in literary versus social media
conversations/exchanges (Krogstad).
While the racial divide in terms of book readers and users of social media has
narrowed in the twenty-first century, the racial inequalities between the owners of and
authors published by large media and publishing conglomerates is more persistent.
Professor Richard So recently reported computational findings about author race in book
publishing: “between 1950 and 2000, 98% of novelists at major US publishing houses
like Random House were white; 99% of bestselling authors were white; 91% of
prizewinners were white; 90% of the most reviewed authors in magazines and
newspapers were white.” In terms of the diversity of employees in publishing, a 2015
Diversity Baseline Survey by Lee & Low Books found that 86 percent of responding
publishing executives and 79 percent of all employees were white (Low).
Much of the progress that was made by the creation of African-American presses in the
1960s was lost to the closure of many of these presses during the financial crisis in the
1970s.

Rising Internet Use and Declines in Literary Reading
Just as literary reading correlates highly with particular demographics, the growth
of internet use in the 1990s was also largely led by Americans in certain brackets of
income, education, and race. These differences have been termed the “digital divide,”
meaning the “difference in rates of access to computers and the internet…among
different demographic groups” (U.S. Department of Commerce 3). As the divide between
internet users and non-users continues to shrink in categories such as income (Pew
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Research, “Internet Use,”), one might consider whether there are correlations between the
rise of internet use in certain demographics and declines in literary reading.
When the decline in literary reading within different educational categories is
contrasted with the rise in internet use within the same educational categories, a
compelling hypothesis for the displacement of literary reading with internet use emerges
(see table 5).
Table 5 Decline in the Percentage of Adult Americans who Read a Work of Literature by
Education Bracket

Source: National Endowment for the Arts, Reading at Risk: A Survey of Literary Reading
in America, June 2004, https://www.arts.gov/sites/default/files/ReadingAtRisk.pdf, xi.

Based on the above table, all of the educational groups except for those adults whose
highest level of education was grade school declined in literary reading at a higher rate
between 1992 and 2002 than between 1982 and 1992. This indicates that there was an
accelerating factor or accelerating factors in the decade of the 1990s which reduced levels
of literary reading. Looking at the ratio of the 1992-2002 decline to the 1982-1992
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decline, high school graduates declined 2.7 times more rapidly than the previous decade,
adults with some high school declined 2.5 times more rapidly, adults with some college
declined 1.53 times more rapidly, adults who had graduated college declined 1.05 times
more rapidly, and adults who had a grade school education declined .84 times as rapidly.
Although it is veritably impossible to understand all of the variables contributing to the
above declines in reading, these declines largely mirror the rising rates of internet use
(see fig. 1-4).

Fig. 1-4 Internet Access by Educational Attainment, 1998 and 2000; U.S. Department of
Commerce, Economic and Statistics Administration, and National Telecommunications
and Information Administration, Falling Through the Net: Toward Digital Inclusion. U.S.
Department of Commerce, October 2000,
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/fttn00.pdf, Figure I-8, p. 11.
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Similarly, the educational group with the lowest rate of internet access are those adults
with less than a high school education. Taking this into account, it could be hypothesized
that the reason that Table 6 showed that adults with a grade school education were the
only group whose literature consumption declined at a lesser rate in the latter decade than
in the former is that it is this group which was least likely to use the internet. Also, the
theory that the modest decline in reading is related to the rise in internet use seems to line
up with the previously-mentioned Gallup poll in which 16 percent of respondents said
that the internet reduced their book reading and 6 percent said that the internet increased
their book reading (Moore).

The Recognition of New Literacies
The rise of new media in recent decades have borne witness to the proliferation,
acknowledgement, and subsequent classification of various literacies. One only needs to
examine the articles in Reading Research Quarterly, an academic journal founded in
1965, to see evidence of this. Representative articles from the inaugural issue include
Harry Singer’s “A Developmental Model for Speed of Reading in Grades Three Through
Six” and Thomas C. Barrett’s “The Relationship between Measures of Pre-Reading
Visual Discrimination and First Grade Reading Achievement: A Review of the
Literature.” In comparison, the first issue of 2011 features an article by Ana Christina
DaSilva Iddings, Steven G. McCafferty, and Maria Lucia Teixeira da Silva entitled
“Conscientização Through Graffiti Literacies in the Streets of a São Paulo Neighborhood:
An Ecosocial Semiotic Perspective.” Clearly, the setting of formal reading studies is no
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longer confined to the classroom, and the textual medium is likewise no longer limited to
the page.
This shift within Reading Research Quarterly demonstrates the growing
acknowledgment, at least within academe, of the social influence of literacies other than
book reading. With the rise in internet usage, many emergent forms of literacy involve
not just the deciphering of streams of information but the technical knowledge needed to
understand how said streams are formulated and disseminated. For example, Cathy N.
Davidson, an American scholar in the fields of digital literacy, English literature, and
attention, recently proclaimed it necessary that students in the 21st century are trained in
the algorithms such as those that determine the order of search results in internet search
engines:
Here's a definition of Algorthm (sic) adapted from the Wikipedia dictionary.
"Algorithm: A process or set of rules to be followed in calculations or other
problem-solving operations, esp. by a computer." Algorithms are the basis for
computational thinking, programming, writing code, and webcraft. Just as the last
century saw a major educational initiative aimed at basic literacy and numeracy
for the masses, the 21st century should be pushing for basic computational
literacy for everyone, starting with kids and, of course, with adult and lifelong
learning possibilities for all of us. (Davidson, “What are the 4 R’s”)
Based on such a provocation, then, one might imagine a future in which the “layperson”
is able to curate his or her own information stream by designing the algorithm which
collates information that is of interest. However, the technical knowledge and computer
access necessary to promote such a skill is hardly publicly available. In terms of the
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technical expertise necessary to design social networking sites and algorithms, we are
still in the early days of the Gutenberg press, meaning that such expertise is still limited
to the few. Davidson hones in on this point at the end of her article, asking “What could
our world look like if it were being designed by a more egalitarian, publicly educated
cadre of citizens, whose literacies were a right not a privilege mastered in expensive
higher education, at the end of a process that tends to weed out those of lower income?”
In the wake of the Arab Spring, the ability of networks of computer users to share
information has already summoned the beginnings of a more bottom-up system of
knowledge production and human mobilization, from Reddit being used to find a missing
person (Green) to “Twitter and Facebook [being] used to facilitate organization, enable
transportation, track political development, advise wounded protesters, spread
motivational messages, and share international news coverage” in 2014 protests in
Turkey and Ukraine (Oliver). Yet in America and globally, the online production and
dissemination of knowledge through user networks cannot yet be declared egalitarian by
any means. Online literacies, just like traditional reading, must be continually
interrogated in relation to the problem of public access and training, for while the web is
often presented and talked about as a democratic space, online spaces only extend and
complicate traditional concerns around the access to and production of knowledge.

Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the rhetoric surrounding the death of the novel can
best be understood as reactions to real shifts in the demographics of those who read and
purchase literature, corresponding shifts in the demographics of authors and presses, and
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a real overtaking of the cultural prominence (defined in terms of usage time, consumer
spending, media function, and audience distribution) of literary works by new forms of
media such as television and the internet. The availability, authorial diversity, and
audience diversity of literature has never been greater, even as literature has never faced
as much competition from other forms of media. The books that are able to achieve
popular prominence often do so through their translation into or coordination with other
media. The next chapter will examine some of the social and formal pressures that
emerge when literature is in competition with other media.
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Chapter 2: The Great Divide in the Age of Digital Distribution

As capitalist, he is only capital personified. His soul is the soul of
capital. But capital has one single life impulse, the tendency to
create value and surplus-value, to make its constant factor, the
means of production, absorb the greatest possible amount of
surplus-labour. Capital is dead labour, that, vampire-like, only
lives by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour
it sucks.
—Karl Marx, Capital Vol. I
This chapter considers how the digital distribution of media affects longstanding
debates on and consideration around the existence and degree of the divide between high
and low culture. Perhaps the best known writer who addresses this alleged divide,
Andreas Huyssen, in his 1986 work, After the Great Divide, argues that divisions of
“highbrow” and “lowbrow” taste are not meaningful in the context of postmodernism,
which willfully disrupts such distinctions. Author Thomas Mallon in 2014 furthers
Huyssen’s view by arguing that the openness of the internet has blurred and largely
removed barriers between highbrow, middlebrow, and lowbrow culture. He suggests that
these divisions were largely self-imposed by consumers to begin with, as “people used to
settle on a brow for themselves,” but “art at all levels now comes to us, seizes our
attention for a few digital moments before being elbowed aside by something else. More
catholic tastes seem bound to result from more catholic exposure, our brows raising and
lowering themselves like a spreadable iPhone photo.” If the internet has destroyed any
remaining separation between high and low culture, then one might wonder whether
terms like high and low culture or highbrow and lowbrow are now insufficient in
discussing cultural phenomena. Professor Sami Schalk rejects the designation of lowbrow
as inherently bigoted because of its connection to the racist practice of phrenology; as the
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Oxford English Dictionary states, the term is “frequently depreciative,” with the first use
of “low-brow” circa 1645 being meant to suggest a person’s “small brain or primitive
evolutionary status,” and a “lack of intelligence, breeding, or cultured and civilized
behavior,” a meaning that carried through in the later, circa 1901 use of “lowbrow” to
stand for “A person who is not highly intellectual or cultured; one who has a taste for
popular culture rather than rarefied artistic or intellectual matters.” If, as Mallon suggests,
Americans and American cultural products are not divisible along lines of taste or
between popular versus high art, then how would he address the considerable differences
in reading and analytic abilities amongst Americans, with about 23 percent of the
populace in the most recent National Adult Literacy Survey in 2003 scoring at the lowest
level of “prose, document, and quantitative proficiencies,” which means that they may at
most be able to identify a piece of information in a short piece of writing, but they cannot
summarize an argument from a lengthy article (Kirsch et al. xvi)? One might argue that
these 23 percent of Americans who cannot “raise their brows,” (including a quarter of
whom who are immigrants) are consigned to a certain lower level of cultural
consumption or comprehension, with their very existence validating a divide between
consumers of culture. Additionally, how can one set aside divisions between high and
low culture when the internet has brought an explosion of popular culture and the effects
of self-publishing on the traditional book industry are still under debate by writers such as
Henry Mance in the Financial Times? While there are still demonstrable differences
between, for example, the reading levels of different media (Sherk), and between the
average readers of texts and media that are of different levels of difficulty, this chapter
argues that the simplistic division between high and low is a dominant rhetoric of cultural
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decay that serves to cloak subliteracies (inequalities in literacy levels), functional
illiteracies (the inability to perform tasks in daily life, such as calculating interest, or factchecking online), and complex struggles for social and material power in the realm of
cultural production and consumption. In other words, rather than focusing on whether
online content is highbrow or lowbrow, it is more productive to look at the overall
patterns of cultural production, consumption, and utilization that characterize different
demographics of internet users. Ultimately, the internet is at once a force of
democratization and of the capitalist exploitation of various forms of surplus labor. While
the internet has democratized cultural production and strengthened the agency of many
authors and cultural products, privilege (inequalities in education and resource
distribution) still influences who possesses the material and intellectual means of to
meaningfully consume or profitably produce cultural works.

Overturning the Privileged Positioning of Lowbrow Versus Highbrow Rhetoric
As explored in chapter one, the demographics of American readers, book buyers,
and consumers of other media expanded in the twentieth century alongside increases in
educational attainment and socioeconomic opportunity. In that chapter, the rhetoric
around the “death of the novel” was argued to be reactive to real changes in readership,
book buying, and media usage.
Similarly, the rhetoric around lowbrow versus highbrow culture and the divide
between high and low culture is a reaction to real contemporaneous changes in cultural
products and consumers. As Americans’ educational attainment and the demographics of
book buyers expanded during the twentieth century (Kaestle and Radway), an intellectual
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elite was concerned about cultural decline —the undermining or overtaking of
intellectual culture and thought by popular culture or allegedly mindless pleasures.
Rhetoric that excoriated low culture was an attempt to maintain cultural hegemony—an
exercise that may seem abstract, but in actuality translates into a maintenance of control
over who is permitted to judge culture and issue opinions both in news publications and
behind the doors of publishing and media companies.
While this chapter will not repeat the first chapter’s long-term view of twentiethcentury rhetoric and trends, and instead will focus on how the digital realm has altered
cultural divisions, it still is important to have some understanding of the history of high
versus low cultural rhetoric. In reviewing the use of “lowbrow” in American newspapers
circa 1900-1963, I found that the vast majority of this rhetoric is focused not on racial
divisions, but on class divisions between highly educated white Americans and those who
are less educated. For example, there is more than a hint of class anxiety in a joke titled
“Lowbrow” that was published in the 1917 Evening Public Ledger:
“John,” said Mrs. Crosslots, “the cook says she’s going to leave.”
“What’s the trouble?”
“She says she’s used to working for cultivated people and she can’t stand our line
of phonograph records.”
Similarly, in a comic strip by George Harriman published in The Washington Times and
titled “Myrtle Was Lost Between Lowbrow and Highbrow,” a nicely dressed white
secretary is puzzled when two men at her office speak in colloquial versus sophisticated
English:
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Fig. 2-1. Harriman, George. “Myrtle Was Lost Between Lowbrow and Highbrow.” The
Washington Times, 27 Oct. 1918. Chronicling America,
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84026749/1918-10-27/ed-1/seq10/#date1=1789&sort=relevance&date2=1963&searchType=advanced&language=&se
quence=0&index=16&words=Lowbrow&proxdistance=5&rows=20&ortext=lowbrow&
proxtext=&phrasetext=&andtext=&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=2.
These two examples are typical of this rhetoric, which depicts the anxiety that
surrounded a rising tide of popular culture and public education for white Americans in
the early twentieth century. Choosing works and words that were not sophisticated would
signal to others one’s level of education and class. Yet, ironically, those who were highly
educated also risked being misunderstood and seen as out of touch.
In a real sense, this lowbrow versus highbrow rhetoric has continued into the age
of the internet. In 2017, Christian Schneider writes in an oped titled “The Internet is
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Making Us Dumber” in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel that “rather than making the
average American smarter, the Internet has instead allowed us to retreat back to our most
base impulses. Whereas it once promised a high-minded world of boundless knowledge,
interconnectivity has instead reinforced our flaws.” Claiming that the internet threatens to
drag average users down to their base instincts is a renewal of other highbrow and
lowbrow rhetoric that warns of contamination by “lower” forms of culture. Such ideas
come from a position of privilege and dominance in which consuming “lower” forms of
media is a choice made on the part of someone who has the privilege of being able to
consume or participate in “high” culture.
Different media do appeal to demographically different audiences (Pew, “Section
4”). The New York Times and The New York Post have demographically different, albeit
overlapping audiences, and the depth and complexity of their articles are different.
Differences in socioeconomic background predict differences in media consumption. For
example, the likelihood that an American reads a newspaper daily correlates with
education level (Pew, “Newspapers”).
Textual studies generally back up these differences in complexity between media
of the same type. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Trollinger and Kaestle’s book and
newspaper readability studies found differences in complexity between media, including
The Atlantic Monthly and The Saturday Evening Post, that target less educated versus
more educated audiences (209-217).
Critics such as Ruth P. Wood have investigated the question of how the narrative
paths and lessons of supposedly high and low media are similar and different. She uses
Lolita and Peyton Place as examples, and argues that while their themes are certainly the
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same, the meaning and outcome of their narratives are quite different. Wood argues that
high culture such as Lolita thrives on “ambiguous outcomes,” whereas low culture
depends on endings that give solid answers and tie off any loose ends (125). She also
argues that the heroes of highbrow fiction are likely to resist or stand outside of social
norms, whereas “The lowbrow novel treats societal norms like the Ten Commandments”
(61). Rather than arguing for the quality of one form over another, Wood argues that
schoolchildren should be exposed to a variety of texts (125).
The rhetoric of low and high culture depends on the maintenance of various
dichotomies: in summary, that “simpler” work must always cater to baser instincts,
appeal to “the masses,” and contain less sophisticated ideas, whereas more complex work
is assumed to do the opposite. These dichotomies do not always hold true. For example,
in The Myth of Popular Culture Perry Meisel narrates how popular works often contain
hidden critiques and complex interpretive possibilities, with “even the rudest of pop
forms [having] a constitutive relation to precise canonical precedent” (58). In other words,
pop culture and high culture are intertwined and comment on one another, but most
critics do not take seriously the potential of popular culture to critique society.
Seemingly objective measures of how sophisticated or complex a text or work is
can be misleading. Just because a work uses simple words doesn’t mean that its meaning
is simple. For example, when Shane Snow analyzed the reading difficulty of different
authors using the Flesch-Kincaid grade level test, a test that uses word length and
sentence length to calculate a text’s grade level, he found that some authors who are
considered to be difficult or distinguished actually write with simple words and structure.
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Hemingway, for example, writes in a fourth grade reading level, but while his sentences
may be short and concise, they carry layered and subtle levels of subtext.
Thus while there are differences in the levels of complexity and audience
demographics of different media, the objective “difficulty” or “simplicity” of a work isn’t
always predictive of its interpretive nuance or cultural milieu. No matter how much
accuracy its analysis of high versus low culture, hightbrow versus lowbrow rhetoric is
best understand as an attempt on the part of the more privileged and powerful parts of the
population to maintain cultural control and legitimacy in the face of gains in literacy and
cultural representation on the part of less privileged and less powerful segments of the
population. The perspective of this rhetoric is top-down, as it sees “lower” forms of
culture and “lowbrows” as a threat to those who reside on the upper echelons of
education and culture, but this viewpoint doesn’t consider the ability of those who are
less educated or privileged to consume and comprehend complex and challenging
cultural products.
Overturning this rhetoric would mean considering differences in cultural products
from the perspective of Americans who are underprivileged in their levels of education
and literacy. From the perspective of the underprivileged, culture that can be more readily
understood by large segments of the population is a democratizing force, not a source of
decay. The tendency of highbrow-lowbrow rhetoric to dismiss the legitimacy of popular
culture is actually a threat to participation in culture and society for those who are
underprivileged. At its base, this rhetoric is not about cultural taste, but rather about
power, privilege, and class conflict.
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The Materialist Background of the Divide Between High and Popular Culture
Most classic twentieth-century theorists who address the alleged divide between
high and low culture do so with explicit reliance on Marxist thought. In Marxist terms,
culture is an expression of existing class relations and tensions inherent in the
contemporaneous “mode of production in material life” (Marx, A Contribution 11). Thus,
the frictions between high and low cultural forms are posited to be explained by existing
schisms in material reality. Social change or revolution occurs once it is enabled by
material and economic forces (Marx, A Contribution 11-12).
To read Marx as though he is saying that all change comes unidirectionally from
the material means of production (the “base”) to the cultural sphere (“the superstructure”)
would be a grave error. In his narrative, it is quite possible that the desire for social
change or revolution arises culturally before it is possible materially; that is, a tension or
“problem” may manifest itself culturally while the “material conditions necessary for
[the] solution…[are] in the process of formation” (Marx, A Contribution 12-13). Thus, a
pressure toward social or material change can arise first in the superstructure and even
help create the material means to furnish its own realization.
Marx goes so far as to say that the masses, through protest, can recreate the base,
that is, alter material reality and relations of production. In his words, “The weapon of
criticism certainly cannot replace the criticism of weapons; material force must be
overthrown by material force; but theory, too, becomes a material force once it seizes the
masses” (Marx, Critique 137). In other words, Marx argues that it is possible for the
superstructure to inspire individuals to enact change in the base.
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Cultural production is seen in Marxist terms as being controlled by dominant or
vying class forces, a concept later elaborated on by Gramsci as “cultural hegemony”
(357). Again, a Marxist understanding of the divide between “high” and “low” cultural
forms would theorize that any differences in cultural products are a result of tensions in
the relations of production. As the material reality of class relations shifts, a correlative
shift occurs in cultural products and consumption. For example, as the first chapter
showed, “middlebrow” books, that is, those books that aimed to give middle and
working-class readers status as appreciators of literature, first arose when the social and
material conditions enabled a new market share for those readers.
Critics have often cast the alleged differences between highbrow (usually
associated with the highly-educated upper class) and lowbrow culture (meaning cultural
products that cater to base interests or that are in poor taste) in the light of classist
tensions. Specifically, Benjamin and Adorno associate high modernism with bourgeois
culture. Benjamin criticized bourgeois culture for always looking inward for illumination
rather than taking hard political or externally revolutionary stances. He quotes, as an
exemplar, French author Georges Duhamel, who states “the true, deeper revolution,
which could in some sense transform the substance of the Slavic soul itself, has not yet
taken place” (Duhamel qtd. in Benjamin, “Surrealism” 213). Similarly, Adorno draws a
line between mass-produced art of the culture industry and high art that draws away from
corrupt material forces. This distancing from material reality on the part of high culture
comes with the penalty of lesser social impact; it is escapism or the revolutionary urge
internalized and frozen. In Adorno and Horkheimer’s words, “each work of art is closed
off from reality by its own circumference,” (14) that is, high art is “autonomous art”
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(107). The ability to be so abstracted from material reality seems to be a symptom of
class privilege, a point that this chapter will return to later.
Andreas Huyssen in After the Great Divide presents a history of critical divisions
between high and low culture and ultimately argues that such divisions are no longer
valid because of the ways in which postmodernism disrupted and outmoded such value
judgments. Huyssen defines “the Great Divide” as any “discourse which insists on the
categorical distinction between high art and mass culture” (viii). In arguing that this
division is no longer valid, Huyssen describes how with the shift from modernism to
postmodernism, artists and writers were more likely to intermingle high and low
approaches:
There are many successful attempts by artists to incorporate mass cultural forms
into their work, and certain segments of mass culture have increasingly adopted
strategies from on high. If anything, that is the postmodern condition in literature
and the arts. For quite some time, artists and writers have lived and worked after
the Great Divide. It is time for the critics to catch on. (Huyssen ix)
Huyssen’s stance on the closing of the divide between high and low art through
postmodernism is generally considered to be the decisive conclusion of the question.
However, by primarily focusing his analysis on the theory and cultural commentary
surrounding different movements, rather than on the consumers or intended audiences of
cultural works, Huyssen necessarily minimizes the analysis of social or material forces at
play in the production of literary and artistic works. Ultimately, the great divide can’t be
simplified to a matter of critics’ taste: there are important distinctions of class,
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commercial might, and privilege at play on the part of the producers, distributers, and
consumers.
Huyssen makes the difficult critical leap of analyzing commentary on high versus
low culture while himself declining to fully accept or “deny the quality differences
between a successful work of art and cultural trash (Kitsch)” (ix). He reneges any
ultimate responsibility for the examination of quality because his very argument is based
on the precept that quality does not necessarily define a work as highbrow or lowbrow:
To make quality distinctions remains an important task for the critic, and I will
not fall into the mindless pluralism of anything goes. But to reduce all cultural
criticism to the problem of quality is a symptom of the anxiety of contamination.
Not every work of art that does not conform to canonized notions of quality is
therefore automatically a piece of Kitsch, and the working of Kitsch into art can
indeed result in high-quality works. (Huyssen ix)
By using but not defining the term “quality,” Huyssen is able to evade the role of cultural
critic and instead to follow the already established divisions between elite and popular
culture. Nonetheless he does insist that “The boundaries between high art and mass
culture have become increasingly blurred, and we should begin to see that process as one
of opportunity rather than lamenting loss of quality and failure of nerve” (Huyssen ix).
To at once decline to make distinctions between high and low forms of art while insisting
that the boundaries between those forms are “increasingly blurred” is a somewhat
contradictory stance.
Huyssen doesn’t stage this blurring as the result of class conflicts, but rather as
the resolution of ideological differences about the value and purpose of art. While
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Huyssen does an excellent job of outlining the critical and cultural positions of the avantgarde, modernism, and postmodernism, a deep historical and social account of the causes
behind those changes are outside of the purview of his study. For example, he writes that
“the Western codification of modernism as a canon of the 20th century took place during
the 1940s and 1950s, preceding and during the Cold War” (197). Here he alludes to how
canonization was an ancillary project to the war, but he doesn’t elaborate on the social
and institutional pressures and mechanisms through which the canon was installed.
Huyssen historicizes different artistic movements with a focus on how they relate
art to society. Specifically, he discusses the roots of the avant-garde in mid-nineteenthcentury utopian movements and in attempts at remaking society after the French
Revolution; the opposite of this organic insertion of art into bettering society is the way
in which art’s autonomy was threatened by the Leninist “[instrumentalization]” of art to
the state (Huyssen 5). The “[radical]” social projects of the nineteenth century avantgarde directly “rejected bourgeois society and its stagnating cultural conservatism”
(Huyssen 5). Bourgeois art in turn rejected the radical social project of the avant-garde, as
“when the bourgeoisie had fully established its domination of state and industry,” it was
also able to achieve cultural hegemony, which meant that it didn’t have need for social
disruption (Huyssen 5). Modernism consequently didn’t aspire to the radical social
upheavals of the historical avant-garde, but rather turned away from society and sought
freedom in individualism and interiority.
Huyssen describes how modernism and high art have been masculinized and
distanced from the feminized, everyday, mass commodity: “the powerful masculinist
mystique which is explicit in [modernism]…has to be somehow related to the persistent
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gendering of mass culture as feminine and inferior” (55). He traces this dialectic between
autonomous art and the commodity from the very beginnings of commodity culture in the
mid-1800’s through to “the rise of the Western culture industry, which paralleled the
decline of the historical avant-garde,” and which he suggests “has made the avant-garde’s
enterprise itself obsolete” (Huyssen 6). This is not a total obsolescence, but rather a
neutralized representation of avant-garde ideals: “In the United States, a depoliticized
cultural avant-garde has produced largely affirmative culture, most visibly in pop art
where the commodity fetish often reigns supreme” (Huyssen 6). In Huyssen’s view, then,
the postmodernisms of his time fell short of the revolutionary ideals of the historical
avant-garde.
Huyssen’s agenda is therefore unabashedly political, as he wishes “to take up the
historical avant-garde’s insistence on the cultural transformation of everyday life and
from there to develop strategies for today’s cultural and political context” (Huyssen 7).
However, he is unable to find a contemporaneous artistic movement, or even any
historical artistic movement, that succeeds in that aspiration. Nonetheless, Huyssen finds
omens of a future artistic liberation in both popular and avant-garde works. In so doing,
he offers an optimistic reading of Adorno and the Frankfort school’s “seemingly dualistic
theory of a monolithically manipulative culture industry and an avant-garde locked into
negativity” (Huyssen 7). Huyssen cites this dialectic revolutionary impetus in both mass
culture and avant-garde works as being present in Benjamin’s 1930’s writings, where
“the hidden dialectic between avant-garde art and the utopian hope for an emancipatory
mass culture can be grasped alive for the last time” (14). According to Huyssen, massproduced culture always harbored sparks of social change, and “the utopian hopes of the
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historical avant-garde are preserved, even though in distorted form, in this system of
secondary exploitation euphemistically called mass culture” (15). Again, the exact form
that a successful artistic and social revolution might take is unclear, though Huyssen
repeatedly insists that artistic and “political revolution could only be successful if it were
accompanied by a revolution of everyday life” (13). One might imagine that this would
translate into a sort of individual emancipation from economic exploitation, perhaps in
the form of a communist utopia. Of course, because this cataclysmic change has yet to
happen, Huyssen seems content to let its form remain amorphous, though his references
to Marx and Engels might lead one to infer that Huyssen’s notion of utopia might be
modeled after the Communist Manifesto’s: a society where there is no ownership and
love is similarly free.
In the paradigm of the Frankfurt school, mass culture fails because it is
incorporated into the existing economic and social structure. High culture also fails
because it largely turns away from direct social action, and when it is critical or radical, it
is simply absorbed and canonized by the dominant culture. Avant-garde works have also
been both commodified and canonized, with their revolutionary impetus deadened.
The limitation of Huyssen’s, Adorno’s, and Benjamin’s treatments of cultural
products is that they point toward some ultimate revolutionary moment, the perfect
freeing of all oppressed labor and the return from false consciousness, with anything
falling short of that being failed or faulty. Instead, what if artistic and social progress
were seen as more gradual and relative, with no ultimate redemption, but rather continual
minor improvements, or even potentially uneven and sometimes regressive development
toward the impossible ideals of liberation and equality? To see artistic and social progress
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in such a light would mean being forced to define what social and material justice might
look like.
Because Huyssen, Adorno, and Benjamin all address the problem from the
distanced and privileged position of the cultural critic, they don’t offer concrete
interpretations of what would be needed to instantiate social change, and what is holding
back lower and working classes from progressing in class conflict. This dissertation
argues that for those who are underprivileged, class and cultural progress is made
possible through greater access to education and through technological advancements
which enable more access to the tools and affordances of cultural production.
Rather than using abstract language about revolution, one who admits that change
happens gradually would have to stake a claim in the contemporaneous socio-political
atmosphere. Ostensibly, such a perspective would seem to favor a progressive view of
history, as opposed to insisting on everything falling short of an as-of-yet-undefined
revolutionary ideal. Again, acknowledging social and artistic change as being gradual
doesn’t mean that all change is linear—it certainly might be possible for societies to
decline or move in cycles or spirals. For example, Huyssen’s own analysis seems to
indicate that the revolutionary spirit of the historical avant-garde arose again, albeit
briefly, with Dada.
Theorizing revolution as being made up of gradual and long-term changes would
lead one to consider not just the social forces of art and criticism but how moderate
changes in technology, education, the economy, the environment, and the social structure
have influenced the social power of and audience access to cultural products. Again,
Marx writes that social change doesn’t occur until it is enabled by society’s material
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conditions. Thus, to understand the agency of a cultural product in creating social change,
one should consider the material forces that it acts through and upon. This is certainly the
case when it comes to understanding the genesis of rhetoric that addresses highbrow
versus lowbrow culture as being related to incremental increases in educational
attainment and book purchasing on the part of previously marginalized segments of the
population.
In Huyssen’s narrative, the debate concerning high versus low culture is presented
as constant with a few notable climaxes in conflict. In framing the high versus low
tension as being continuous, he writes that “Ever since the failure of the 1848 revolution,
the culture of modernity has been characterized by the contentious relationship between
high art and mass culture” (16). He then argues that the rhetoric concerning high and low
really congealed following World War II (14). He attributes the timing of this
congealment to “the historical expression of the avant-garde’s failure and of continued
bourgeois domination” (Huyssen 14). This same period, though, leading up to and
following World War II, witnessed the rise of middlebrow literature, a rise that was
described in the previous chapter. Thus, rather than indicating the continued hegemony of
bourgeois culture and the failure of the radical social projects of the avant-garde, the
peak of this rhetoric on high versus low culture could be considered the reaction to the
successful rise of working-class and “petty bourgeoisie” consumers of literature and
culture.
Even though, as described in the previous chapter, literacy rates have risen and
minority and lower-to-middle class readers have increased in the last century, it is
doubtful that theorists of the Frankfurt school would call this progress. Instead, they
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might argue that the culture industry had succeeded in safely catering to, reshaping, and
commodifying the desires of a larger swath of citizens. While Adorno acknowledges that
there is power in both mass and high art, in his analysis that power is hopelessly muted
on both sides. In a letter to Benjamin, he writes that both high and low culture were
wounded by capitalism, and “both contain elements of change….Both are torn halves to
an integral freedom to which, however, they do not add up” (130). Adorno chides
Benjamin for being optimistic about the revolutionary power of mass art or of the lower
classes; indeed, he accuses him of possessing an “anarchistic romanticism which places
blind trust in the spontaneous powers of the proletariat within the historical process…a
proletariat which is itself a product of bourgeois society” (130). Adorno, like Marcuse
and others of the Frankfurt school, characteristically has little faith in those who consume
mass culture, and he sees mass culture as not much more than a top-down maintenance of
the status quo. As previously mentioned, Huyssen, in breaking with Adorno and siding
with Benjamin, is optimistic about the potential for radical change in both mass art and
high art, and questions whether the audience of mass art might be consuming it in
progressive (as opposed to passive) ways. Huyssen specifically faults Adorno for not
“pursuing the question, in relation to mass culture, to what extent and for what purposes
the products of the culture industry might precisely speak to and activate…pre-ego
impulses in a non-regressive way” (27). Again, though, Huyssen fails to clarify what sort
of impulses might be progressive and what form such progression might take, making it
difficult to determine the accuracy of his argument that culture is a continual cycle in
which the bourgeoisie has unfailingly triumphed.
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How, then, should progress be measured in the realm of cultural production? Can
culture be judged by how much it has furthered concepts in the Communist Manifesto,
such as freedom from the exploitation of labor, or the relinquishment of private property?
Have cultural products and the technology that drives them changed everyday life, which
is Huyssen’s ideal of what defines successful revolutionary change? Or, perhaps we
might measure the success of culture by how little people are distracted by it: Adorno
writes that “in a communist society, work would be organized in such a way that human
beings would no longer be so exhausted or stupefied as to require such distraction” (130).
The next section will examine contemporary internet culture with attention to questions
of radical cultural “progress” and the status of the division between high and low culture.

Literature as a Vector of Social Change in the Internet Age
As discussed in the previous section, the ideal role of cultural products in Marxist
and Frankfort school theory is to be expressive of and assistive in concurrent social
action; in a utopia, art and life would be seamless, with artistic expression and desire
immediately translating into material reality. In capitalist society, the theory posits that
art and entertainment are used to delay true expression and catharsis, and culture only
serves to trap progressive ideals and expend natural urges. Walter Benjamin describes
this contradiction in “The Work of Art in the Age of Reproducibility (Third Version):”
The growing proletarianization of modern man and the increasing formation of
masses are two sides of the same process. Fascism attempts to organize the newly
proletarianized masses while leaving intact the property relations which they
strive to abolish. [Fascism] sees its salvation in granting expression to the
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masses—but on no account granting them rights. The masses have a right to
changed property relations; fascism seeks to give them expression in keeping
these relations unchanged. (269)
If we are to believe Huyssen and Benjamin, who see a revolutionary “spark” in mass
culture despite the ruling class’s tendency to co-opt and neutralize expression, how might
such a spark manifest itself? One might wonder whether the revolutionary spark in mass
art could ever ignite into worldly action. To isolate and measure the degree to which any
text has fomented real social change is nigh impossible. Perhaps the most socially
influential book of all time, the Bible, would not have spread very far without the aid of
migration, holy war, colonialism, the printing press, and the oral and social institutions of
church and synagogue. The texts that have most formed America are nonfictional and
come from established sources of authority, whether it is the purported word of God or
Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man. That is to say, a text does not act on its own, but within a
social context.
The question, for example, of the degree to which Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg
Address united a war-torn country, or to what extent the writings of Frederick Douglass
aided in the abolitionist movement, is unanswerable. Lincoln was alleged to have said
that Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin “started the great war,” though the truth
of the sentiment, which was relayed by Stowe’s son, and whether it was ever even uttered
is highly controversial (Stowe 203). While literature can serve to help articulate, develop,
and coordinate social movements, as did the rise of black and feminist presses in the
1960s and 1970s, those movements could only have originated because of ongoing shifts
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in material reality, such as growing educational attainment by women and African
Americans.
Perhaps the one clear example of a book that wrought demonstrable change in the
fabric of society is Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle. Though it was billed as a novel, the book
attempted to capture the real conditions of immigrants working in food-processing
factories. The intense revulsion on the part of the public to the depiction of these
conditions in the book directly led to President Roosevelt’s ordering of an investigation
by the Labor Commission, the findings of which resulted in Congress passing the Meat
Inspection Act and the Pure Food and Drug Act.
Given the cases of Uncle Tom’s Cabin and The Jungle, it seems as though fiction
has the most demonstrable social effects when it brings attention, in almost a nonfictional
way, to a pressing social problem or injustice. If it was possible for The Jungle to change
factory conditions, then it may well be that many books are able to create ripples of social
change. Yet, considering the almost always amorphous and impossible-to-measure
impact of literary products upon society, can one even go so far as to argue whether
literature’s social forces have strengthened since the dawning of the internet? While
social change as a result of literary production is nearly untraceable, I would argue that
the age of the internet has made the social and worldly impact of literature easier to trace,
though said literary impact often pales in comparison to the impact of other media.
For most of the twentieth century, the most common social ways for everyday
people to recommend books was through private book clubs or word of mouth. Most
book recommendations were made from on high, meaning books were selected by editors,
reviewed by critics, or touted by Oprah or other media personalities. However, in the
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internet age, individual readers, or at least aggregated reviews from individual readers,
have more social clout when it comes to recommending and sharing items from their
reading list than ever before. They can post publicly on social media, write reviews on
sites like Amazon, participate in fan forums, and quickly find other fans from across the
globe. Yochai Benkler writes that “The easy possibility of communicating effectively
into the public sphere allows individuals to reorient themselves from passive readers and
listeners to potential speakers and participants in a conversation” (213). The previously
impenetrable barrier between novice reader and expert critic has imploded, meaning that
definitions of high and low in relation to criticism are increasingly amorphous and
crowd-driven; the top book reviews on Amazon are most often written and upvoted by
individual readers and likely receive as much attention as professional reviews.
Nonetheless, an increase in literature’s means of reader-powered social impact
hasn’t necessarily translated into literature as a stronger vehicle for social change.
Fictional works continue to serve as an impetus for reflection upon desired social change,
and they can be held as emblematic of social struggles or fomentations, as are Erica
Jong’s Fear of Flying or Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye. However, it is difficult in
contemporary American culture to point to a book that had nearly as much measurable
impact as The Jungle did.
One might argue that the supposed latent potential of mass culture in effecting
social change has been activated through online crowdfunding. That is not to say that a
crowdfunded book is in itself more likely than a traditionally-published book to create
social change. Rather, the act of crowdfunding often furthers a social cause, with the
creation of a cultural product representing a secondary expression of that cause. For
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example, the co-founders of a company called Timbuktu Labs, which creates educational
media and runs workshops for children, crowdfunded $675,000 for a progressive book of
fairy tales that are based on strong women from history (Timbuktu Labs). Those who
gave to this effort were not just expressing interest in the book, but were supporting the
larger cause of imparting progressive values upon young people. The funding levels
included the non-book category of sponsoring a workshop on “[getting] over gender
stereotypes” at the school of the giver’s choice (Timbuktu Labs). Books can thus align
with social causes and social action in more direct ways through online crowdfunding
than traditionally-published books could previously.
Thus, while the internet has enabled books to be more readily utilized in service
to social causes, that service generally expresses or serves as a vector of the cause, as
opposed to the book itself directly instigating social change. Nonetheless, crowdfunding
has brought books and other media closer to fulfilling their revolutionary potential, at
least in terms of expressing social desires, if not fomenting actual social change. Perhaps
in the future social media will activate the latent revolutionary power of media even
further, making the Frankfurt school’s critiques of mass media even less relevant.

Corporate Controlled Versus Crowd Controlled Media
Much of Adorno’s critique of mass culture was that it manipulated and
indoctrinated a passive audience that had little power to respond. As mentioned in the
previous section, that critique seems less valid in this current age, as social media,
discussion boards, and review sites have empowered consumers to more publicly
question culture and to respond to and critique tastemakers directly. In the current day
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and age there is still a tension between social media as revolutionary and as something
that is used to control and exploit its users. Rather than a divide between a high culture
that declines social engagement and a passively-consumed mass culture, social media
exists in a dialectic between a user-directed mass culture and a corporate exploitation of
the masses.
Individual authors are now able to publish and distribute their own works with at
once less cost and more precision in targeting an audience than professional publishers
were able to achieve in past decades. While in a sense the easy and zero-cost distribution
and replication of digital cultural products can be seen as an example of capital sowing
the seeds of its own destruction, at the same time the digital sphere and its giants of
industry, namely “FANG” (Facebook Apple Netflix Google), have garnered immense
profits. The internet thus enacts a dialectic between the free spread of information and
ideology and the capitalist harvesting of consumers’ surplus labor by enormous platforms
and companies.
“The culture industry” as Adorno and Horkheimer defined it, that is, monolithic
producers of pap that cater to the lowest common denominator, is arguably still alive and
well across many mediums, from soap operas to online celebrity gossip (Pressman). At
the same time, the decline in cable subscriptions and the rise of streaming services has
opened up the potential for smaller and experimental productions, such as Amazon’s
Transparent (Poniewozik). Similarly, the website The Numbers shows that the movie
industry has seen a slight decline in the number of tickets sold between 2001 and 2016,
forcing theaters to raise ticket prices, (“Domestic Movie Theatrical Summary”), a change
that has led large production houses to axe many mid-budget films in favor of big budget
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safe bets that can be assured high international revenue. This move has in turn opened up
opportunities for small-budget independent features. Again, while profits have been
challenged in the music, movie, book, and news industries, the culture industry is still
alive and well—one would be remiss to argue that mass culture of the type Adorno and
Horkheimer envisioned is no longer present or relevant. Nowadays, though, there are
more small and individual producers of media than ever: “culture” is being written on
everyone’s Facebook wall. Social media and advertising companies are capitalizing on
the endless individual streams of information granted to them by their users. In a sense,
the online culture industry has been turned on its head, with mass culture not being
dictated from above, but rather aggregated, commodified, and spoonfed back to the
consumers who created it (in the form of targeted advertisements and media). Even
traditional forms of media have begun to more closely “read” and cater to their audience;
for example, new devices are coming on the market which allow television viewers’
expressions and reactions to media to be recorded and collected (Maheshwari).
As mass culture becomes more targeted and feeds more closely off of the
reactions and desires of individual audience members, does it shift away from catering to
the lowest common denominator and become more nuanced? Whether various cultural
products appeal to the “baser” or “higher” instincts is likely a subjective and highly
variable judgment to make. Critics such as Jason Mittell and Chuck Tryon argue that
most targeted media serves to confirm users’ existing biases and often relies on rousing
anger and using sensational headlines to ensure clicks and shares. Both ends of the
spectrum, from elite arts organizations to companies that use “clickbait,” may target the
same or slightly different online audiences in different contexts.
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In other words, the audience now helps to rapidly shape what form online media
takes in a instantaneous feedback loop. Therein lies the contradiction—the internet age
has seen extreme expansions in individual content creation and curation as well as in the
top-down collection and commodification of user preferences and behavior, with usergenerated content and user clicks often propelling mass media companies’ profits. This
could be understood as mass culture in a modified form, perhaps what might be termed
mass culture 2.0: the media and advertisers’ sophisticated, targeted manipulation of—or,
optimistically, precise responsivity to—users’ personal behavior and preferences. In The
Wealth of Networks, Yochai Benkler posits that this dichotomy “structures a networked
public sphere” that is far from democratic, but is nonetheless “more attractive than the
mass-media-dominated sphere” (239).
Technology has thus enabled more bottom-up, crowd-generated culture, though
these cultural expressions have in turn been incorporated into and profited from by
various companies, and often what individuals choose to share is not user-generated
content but rather the corporate clickbait of the day—the same story or idea churned out
on multiple platforms and formats, as Henry Jenkins describes in Convergence Culture.
As Marx said in the opening quote, capital is dead labor, and in a sense the behaviors of
consumers online are forever kept and profited from like dead labor—even after users
have posted something, even after they have died, their labor can be used to derive more
profit from them or those who have similar profiles.
In a different sense, the divide between high and mass culture from the
perspective of consumption still exists, as there are significant differences in the average
consumer of certain news sources. For example, 64 percent of people who read The New
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Yorker are college graduates, as compared to 24 percent of Fox News watchers (Pew
Research Center, “Section 4: Demographics”). At the same time, the openness and
accessibility of the internet and its abbreviated methods of communication, from user
comments to memes, lends itself readily to demographic overlap.

Social media exceeds traditional reading in popularity, with a daily reach of
45.7% of Americans who use social media (Statista), compared to only 19% of
Americans who read for pleasure daily (Ingraham). The potential of comment sections
and online forums to open up spaces of discourse between users of different backgrounds
and belief systems cannot be overstated, and while such interactions may simply serve to
highlight irreconcilable differences, there is nonetheless the potential for consensus and
the building of bridges between previously divergent tastes and beliefs.
One could posit that mass culture’s revolutionary power is closer to coming to
fruition through the collective agency of social media users, though once again that
power is tempered and co-opted by the role of large corporations in exploiting usergenerated content. The dialectic then becomes not just one of high versus low culture, a
distinction which indeed is somewhat hazy but arguably still present, but of low-level
producers of labor and high-level corporate commodifiers. Mass culture is now not just
the product of large media conglomerates: there is a vast cultural output produced by the
masses which simultaneously strengthens individuals’ social reach and enables more
targeted profiting from and manipulation of individuals by corporations.
Internet culture both fulfills Benjamin’s concept of the revolutionary power of
mass culture and Adorno’s cynicism regarding the manipulation and programming
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(algorithmic or otherwise) of the masses. Both perspectives have merit and in fact
coexist. One would be hard-pressed to determine whether one aspect prevails over the
other, particularly considering how individual freedom of expression is somewhat
tempered by the overarching power of corporate and government surveillance. Theorists
such as Shoshana Zuboff in the book The Age of Surveillance Capitalism are quick to
point out how our behaviors and preferences, just as quickly as they are expressed, are
then recorded, tracked, commodified, and used to predict, control, and influence our
behavior. Nonetheless, as mass culture was historically considered as the one-size-fits-all
production of culture, and high culture was considered the culture produced by and for
those of discerning tastes, surely the newfound cultural capital of individual internet
users, and the momentum of popular internet campaigns, is an important development
and a cause for optimism.
The collection of internet users’ behavior and data points is not entirely negative,
either: advertisers and small groups can use analytics to draw users into socially positive
or progressive opportunities, such as a local market, cause, or event. This benefits smaller
businesses and groups whose products and services only appeal to a select segment of
people. Now a small business or individual producer can more easily control their
audience. With ebooks and targeted online advertising, the costs of literary production
and publicity are lower than ever before, which benefits small producers.
The technological affordances of the internet have redefined mass culture in a
way that expands both the top-down control and commodification of labor by large
corporations and the bottom-up cultural and social output by individual and small
producers. Mass culture is no longer simply one size fits all; now, because of the sharing
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of users’ demographic information and search history, all producers small and large have
a greater ability to target specific audiences.
At the same time as audiences are more easily targeted and isolated, they are also
more easily mixed online. Most news and media sites don’t have a paywall, and so there
isn’t a price differential for consumers of news or culture like there was in the past. For
example, now everyone with internet access can read Wikipedia, when before the internet
home access to encyclopedias was costly. Similarly, before their content was online, the
New York Post and The New York Times had different journalistic standards and different
price points that appealed to different audiences. That is still the case today, and
audiences self-select what news sources they wish to consume, but having the content
online and for free (even if only for the first ten articles each month) means that readers
of different backgrounds can interact in the comments section, and that price isn’t an
impediment.
In The Nature of Narrative, Robert Scholes, James Phelan, and Robert Kellogg
argue that the formal and narrative affordances of the novel encouraged new possibilities
in types of narration and narrators—namely, that the novel allowed for realism, multiple
perspectives, and omniscient narration (250- 278). The internet’s affordance of actual
commenters from different walks of life interacting synchronously or asynchronously, is
something beyond what the novel form offers. While some barriers, such as paywalls and
expensive content subscriptions, still exist between different demographics of users, the
openness and availability of the internet has nonetheless brought down many previous
distinctions between consumers of culture. Now, with many online sources, we are at a
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point where the inherent demographic differences in users and their self-selected choice
of content are more the dividing force than the content itself.
Certainly, there are still countless divisions in terms of what content audiences of
different socioeconomic backgrounds seek online, and there are many American citizens
who don’t use the internet on any phone or device. Specifically, Monica Anderson and
Andrew Perrin of Pew Research reported that in 2016 13% of Americans didn’t use the
internet, with age being the biggest factor, as 41% of people 65 and over were not
internet users. Perhaps one day there will be a more equitable public sphere in which all
consumers and producers of culture are on equal footing. For that to be the case,
however, everyone would need to have equal access to capital, equal educational
backgrounds, and equal amounts of leisure time. While that perfectly equitable public
sphere may never materialize, the internet has at least brought Americans a little bit
closer to the dream of equal participation in public and cultural discourse, a dream that
has unfortunately been challenged by the 2017 FCC decision to end net neutrality.

Factors Bridging the Great Divide
Again, the classic discussions of high versus low cultural divisions on the part of
Adorno, Huyssen, and Benjamin are vague about the material forces responsible for
reducing the distance between high art and mass culture. Huyssen’s narrative is
somewhat clouded in its description of the causes for the alleged closing of the great
divide. Rather than focusing on immediate social pressures that might have bridged the
gap between high and low, he focuses on the cultural forms and artistic movements that
he believed were instrumental, from the historical avant-garde to Pop art. When he does
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refer to social movements, his descriptions are often abstract and freewheeling, as when
he writes that “the postmodernism of the 1960s was characterized by a temporal
imagination which displayed a powerful sense of the future and of new frontiers, of
rupture and discontinuity, of crisis and generational conflict, an imagination reminiscent
of earlier continental avant-garde movements such as Dada and surrealism rather than of
high modernism” (Huyssen 191). Such a narrative somewhat obfuscates the agendas and
causalities of 1960s social movements, and how those movements affected the divide
between high and low culture.
One overlooked and concrete explanation for the postwar narrowing of the divide
between high and low culture as described by Huyssen is the bridging of the gap in
access to higher education. That is, a substantial part of what allegedly divided culture
was the complexity and abstruseness of high culture and the simplicity of low culture.
Audiences were allegedly targeted based on their educational attainment and
socioeconomic background. When a very small percentage of Americans graduated from
college, the divide between highly-educated and uneducated readers was stark and
followed class lines. However, as the twentieth century progressed, a greater percentage
of students went to college, and furthermore students from a wider swath of
socioeconomic backgrounds gained college degrees. This meant that the earlier divisions
related to educational attainment and race, gender, and socioeconomic status were
lessened: those with college degrees became gradually more diverse in those measures.
This simply means that media aimed at highly-educated readers had a more diverse
readership, and could entertain problems and concerns that had previously existed more
in the domain of “popular” media. This isn’t to say that all high culture changed to
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become more inclusive; more commonly, as explored in chapter 1, this shift resulted in
the development of niche markets such as black or feminist presses.
To illustrate this change, one must look at rates of attainment for college degrees.
In 1940, 3.8% of women and 5.5% of men graduated college. In 1970, this had increased
to 8.2% and 14.1% percent respectively. In 2015 the rate stood at 32.7% of women and
32.3% of men (“Percentage of the U.S. Population”). This gradual increase has led to
many changes in both media and society: women have become increasingly represented
in almost every career field as well as in the production of media. That being said, there
remain significant gaps in gender representation in many fields, including book
publishing, where, for example, Laura Miller notes that about 30% of most books
published circa 2011 were by female authors. Again, as with the furtherance of the public
sphere online, the progress toward educational and social equality has demonstrably
improved, but it is still far from perfect. The increase in overall college graduates, as well
as in the educational attainment rates of women and minorities, has surely aided in
bridging the great divide, but it is not the only factor.
New technologies have long broadened consumer access to media, from the
Gutenberg revolution to the paperback and internet revolutions. The widening
demographics of media consumers and the increasing affordability of media means that
in all likelihood there will be more overlap in audience demographics, a factor that would
perhaps contribute to bridging the divide between high and low culture. For example,
Jean Burgess and Joshua Green argue that YouTube is a “cultural public sphere” because
“it is an enabler of encounters with cultural differences and the development of political
‘listening’ across belief systems and identities.”
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Some forms of media lend themselves more to demographic overlap than
others. One might hypothesize that books enable more specialization in topic and
audience than network television does, simply because of the economics of airtime,
which demands mass audiences, in comparison with the economics of publishing, which
can scale up and down more readily. One could further hypothesize that what cultural
divide existed between high art and mass culture was ameliorated by the development of
radio and television, forms of media that brought together, in simultaneous viewership,
greater swaths of America than books had previously.
Internet culture itself can be instrumental in bringing together previously striated
demographics of media consumers, albeit sometimes in political debates on public
figures’ Facebook pages. Even internet memes can help to rapidly spread ideas and reach
across demographics in ways that academic articles or off-Broadway plays can’t.
Certainly the last ten years have witnessed a deluge of socially-shared and quicklyabsorbed media that have the ability to traverse socioeconomic divides. Overall, though,
both increasing levels of educational attainment and new technologies that improve user
access and demographic overlap fall short of forming an equitable public sphere.
Equal access to the internet is far from a guarantee of equal voice or parallel
usage patterns on the part of users. There is in fact a digital divide in terms of what
activities internet users from different socioeconomic statuses do online. Rosamund Hutt
notes that a 2016 study by the Organisation [sic] for Economic Development and Cooperation found that rich and less fortunate teenagers behave differently online. Overall,
“richer teenagers were more likely to use the internet to search for information or to read
news rather than to chat or play video games” (Hutt). Some countries had greater
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disparities between the online behavior of rich and poor students than others (Hutt). For
example, Finland has a very low disparity between the amount of time rich and poor
students spend seeking information and reading news online, whereas Russia had a large
disparity (Hutt). In all likelihood, the varying social and educational conditions in each
country contribute to these disparities. The US was not part of the portion of the study
which analyzed time usage, but it is worth noting that in the measure of the home access
of disadvantaged students to the internet, the US was in the middle of the list, just above
Russia, Bulgaria, and Latvia (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 2). While internet
access does more readily afford the overlapping of users from different demographics
than other media, there still persists a significant divide between the online habits of users
from different socioeconomic backgrounds.
What often is overlooked when culture is treated as a matter of taste is the
substantial number of Americans are subliterate, meaning that while they can technically
read and write, they cannot analyze, comprehend, and critically interrogate complex texts
(the last of which Paulo Freire in Pedagogy of the Oppressed calls “critical literacy”) or
perform advanced tasks. In terms of functional literacy, that is, the ability to perform
certain daily tasks to function in society, there are still great disparities within the
American population. Only 12 percent of Americans scored at the highest levels of
literacy—level 4 or 5—in a 2011-2012 survey by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development: “At Level 4, adults can integrate, interpret, and synthesize
information from complex or lengthy texts that contain conditional and/or competing
information” (2). According to the OECD report, the U.S. has higher levels of inequality
in literacy levels than most other developed countries, and U.S. literacy levels are more
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tightly correlated to race and socioeconomic background than in other countries (1). Such
a statistic shows how the rhetoric around high versus low culture is more concerned with
maintaining the status quo, with enforcing the superiority of “high” culture, than it is with
the very real crisis that the majority of Americans who are unpracticed in synthesizing
complex sources of information. This is not just a matter of taste—lower literacy skills
correlate with lower levels of health: “In the United States, the odds of reporting ‘fair’ or
‘poor’ health are four times greater for those with low literacy skills” (OECD 7). To resist
or denounce what might be termed by critics as “mass” or “popular” art means barring
the majority of the population from meaningfully participating in or commenting on
culture. It is an act of cultural hegemony, which is why rhetoric around high versus low
art should be reframed in terms of privilege and power.

Artistic and Audience Privilege and the Great Divide
As discussed earlier in the chapter, rhetoric concerning the divide between high
and low culture in literature has been rife with issues of socioeconomic privilege, both on
the part of authors and readers. Virginia Woolf in her essay “Middlebrow” writes that
“The middlebrow is the man, or woman, of middlebred intelligence who ambles and
saunters now on this side of the hedge, now on that, in pursuit of no single object, neither
art itself nor life itself, but both mixed indistinguishably, and rather nastily, with money,
fame, power, or prestige” (180). Such a description belies the kind of privilege on the part
of Woolf that does not need to concern itself with filthy lucre. Additionally, the word
“middlebred” seems to indicate how class and perhaps even intelligence are passed down
directly or indirectly from the parents. Woolf, on the other hand, says that “Since
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[highbrows] are the only people who do not do things, they are the only people who can
see things being done,” meaning that the rich have the time and means to reflect deeply
on life, as they are not consumed with everyday toil or material problems (179). They are
so consumed with ideas that they are likely to “[love] poetry…so intemperately that
[they]…[die] of consumption at the age of twenty-six,” as did Keats (Woolf 177). This
notion of detachment from everyday toil of course aligns with Huyssen and the Frankfurt
School critics’ identification of highbrow culture with the bourgeoisie.
Comparing the fiction of two authors--in this case Virginia Woolf and Chris
Abani—and their protagonists, helps to illuminate how material differences and varying
levels of privilege translate into artistic differences that are profound enough to embody
the high and low dichotomy. Michael Denning in his book The Cultural Front employs
this strategy as he traces the class and social backgrounds of various American authors
alongside the class narratives and affiliations in their works, with particular attention to
scenes of work.
Woolf, who was born into a connected high-society household in London, as well
as the highbrow writers who she mentions in her critique—all white and upperclass—are
cloaked in artistic privilege. Class, as Woolf notes, generally translates quite directly into
the imaginative worlds and protagonists of each author (177). She is no exception, as her
protagonists tend not to concern themselves with material matters, leaning instead toward
existential anxiety.
A good example of the figure of the artist in Woolf’s writing is Lily Briscoe, the
protagonist of To the Lighthouse, an aspiring portrait painter, and, for critics and readers,
a feminist icon. Unable to find success, and discouraged because of her gender, Lily
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eventually finds inner satisfaction, rather than social success or acclaim, and she realizes
that that is enough. As she paints and turns away from the material world she questions
whether art for art’s sake is enough:
…she had a few moments of nakedness when she seemed like an unborn soul, a
soul reft of body, hesitating on some windy pinnacle and exposed without
protection to all the blasts of doubt. Why then did she do it? She looked at the
canvas, lightly scored with running lines. It would be hung in the servants’
bedrooms. It would be rolled up and stuffed under a sofa. What was the good of
doing it then, and she heard some voice saying she couldn’t paint, saying she
couldn’t create… (238)
At the very end of the novel, Lily of course realizes that inner satisfaction at manifesting
her personal “vision” makes art worthwhile (310). The highbrow artist who is
underappreciated by society thus tends to turn inward, which follows Adorno’s notion of
high art being frozen and turned away from the world toward a kind of utopic vision.
Privilege, that is, the ability to live without turning to “meaningless” toil or the pursuit of
money, enables the highbrow artist the freedom to turn inward.
This narrative of the privileged artist is somewhat complicated, though, by the
fact that the character of Lily Briscoe is struggling not with a general lack of appreciation
on the part of society, but rather a rejection of her artistic desires because of her sex. She
continues the above stream of thought by reflecting on who had forbidden her to become
an artist:
Charles Tansley used to say that, she remembered, women can’t paint, can’t write.
Coming up behind her, he had stood close beside her, a thing she hated, as she
109

painted here on this very spot. “Shag tobacco,” he said, “fivepence an ounce,”
parading his poverty, his principles….He was always carrying a book about under
his arm—a purple book. He “worked.” (238)
Charles Tansley here is trying to hold his grasp on material reality above Lily—he rubs in
her face how he is materially self-sufficient. The sentence “he worked” isn’t meant to
mean that he labors physically; in fact, he is a philosophy professor, so he is flaunting
how highly men’s as opposed to women’s intellectual work is valued.
Rather than “fight against the tide” of society, Lily Briscoe finds escape in her
inner self. Though her sex reduces her social privilege, she is nonetheless privileged
enough to be able to exist and create in solitude. Her privilege is what allows her to both
retreat inward and reflect on immaterial things.
The pivotal role of an artist’s privilege in shaping their art can be understood by
contrasting Lily Briscoe’s character with that of another artist figure in fiction. Chris
Abani’s GraceLand tells the story of Elvis, a boy in Lagos, Nigeria who aspires to be a
dancer. However, to make ends meet, Elvis resorts to doing street performances for
“white expatriates and the odd tourist tanning on the beach” as an Elvis impersonator
(Abani 10).
Elvis is thus on the opposite end of the artistic spectrum from Lily Briscoe: he is
an aspiring artist who must sacrifice his vision on a daily basis to make money. His low
global socioeconomic status, his lack of education, and Nigeria’s undeveloped art market
all contribute to Elvis’s lack of privilege.
Unlike Lily, who can lose herself in her imagination, Elvis is drawn by the
necessity of remuneration into the path of an underground human trafficker: obscenely,
110

he discovers that innocent Nigerian children are trafficked, murdered, and their organs
sold to the highest foreign bidders, who are mostly Americans (242-243).
Elvis lives in a country where the only profitable media are basically American
imports, from the identity of Elvis to the cheap paperbacks sold on the streets. He has
little choice as an artist but to mimic the culture of an economically exploitative foreign
power. Abani himself grew up in Nigeria, where he was jailed for producing works that
were critical of the government—or in other words, where he was punished for self
expression (“Abani, Chris”)..
The debate, then, about the differences between lowbrow and highbrow culture,
often isn’t just a matter of taste, but of the choices afforded by author, audience, and
character privilege. Some authors and characters have the privilege of turning away from
the world, and for others the world is too much with them.

The Media Ecosystem
The aforementioned ease of targeted marketing and media distribution online has
led to a complex ecosystem for authors and consumers of media. As discussed in the
beginning of this chapter, Marx remarked that cultural production, or the superstructure,
is dependent on the material conditions of society, or the base. The seeming immateriality
of the internet nonetheless boils down to the material and infrastructural planes. One
eventually returns to the questions posed by Fuchs: “Who owns Internet platforms? Who
owns social media?” (316). Fuchs warns against critics who do not look toward material
economy:
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They focus on political and cultural communication and ignore the public
sphere’s materiality and political economy that Habermas stressed. Consequently,
they do not ask questions about ownership and do not see, as Nicholas Garnham
stresses, that besides the focus on political communication a “virtue of
Habermas’s approach is to focus on the necessary material resource base for any
public sphere.” (Garnham qtd. in Fuchs 316)
Where social media is concerned, at the close of 2016, Facebook had 1.79 billion active
users each month (“Number of Active Facebook Users”). The free labor of each user
grosses Facebook $4.84 in revenue each year, with a little more than $1 per user in profits,
according to an article on Slate by Will Oremus.
Thus on one side of this ecosystem is the vampiric power of capital to suck up
free labor. Huyssen warns that “with the help of the new technological media of
reproduction and dissemination monopoly capitalism has succeeded in swallowing up all
forms of older popular cultures, in homogenizing all and any local or regional discourses,
and in stifling by co-option and emerging resistances to the rule of the commodity” (21).
Yet, this description isn’t apt for the mass culture of today—that is, a mass culture which
doesn’t simply produce top-down cultural products, but instead absorbs and manipulates
free labor from the bottom. Rather than “homogenizing all and any local or regional
discourses,” Facebook has the opposite effect of encouraging users to attend local events
and trade and communicate with neighbors. Mass culture is now targeted enough that
each user’s experience is different, which of course has the danger of isolating
individuals and reinforcing their worldviews. In addition to revenue generated by users’
clicks and page views, users must also take into account how their online behavior is
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monitored, monetized, and used in turn to further manipulate their choices and behaviors,
from political advertisements targeted based on Facebook likes to the selling of user
searches to health insurance and other private companies (Fung). The internet, its
aggregated user data, and its infrastructure represent an apparatus of control whereby
corporate and government interests are able to assert ownership over users’ habits and
histories. Just as Benjamin posits that the ruling class controls the other classes by giving
them the right to expression, but not the right to property, the owners of internet data and
infrastructure usurp the intellectual property of their users and limit the equitable
distribution of property.
The very idea of the cloud, of a free and user-centered online experience, is
designed so as to hide the algorithms that shape each user’s online experience, as well as
the very material basis of networks; Ryan Jeffery and Boaz Levin describe how “despite
its ever-growing pervasiveness, the infrastructure of the Internet is only becoming less
visible. ‘The Cloud’ is a centralization project, emblematic of the logic of late capitalism:
a harbinger of globalization; a vast and complex network, omnipresent yet largely
invisible; a conduit of capital, enmeshing distant regions and actors.” Furthermore, as
Shannon Mattern points out, cyberinfrastructure relies on and intersects with other forms
of infrastructure, just as “Media—for their production, distribution, and consumption—
rely on the power grid, transportation networks, waste removal systems, and even…the
availability of water to power the mills and cool the server rooms. Thus, media
infrastructures are inevitably part of infrastructural ‘constellations’ involving myriad
other non-media-related networks.” Within and across these systems are intertwined
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networks of power, from governmental and legislative bodies to private companies, startups, and intelligence agencies.
To the extent that algorithms, private companies, and cyberinfrastructure are
currently sites of exploitation, one might inquire as to how they could be transformed into
sites of resistance. Most critics, such as Alan Liu, who are currently engaged in critical
infrastructure studies—who are questioning, critiquing, and suggesting the creation of
alternatives to contemporary cyberinfrastructures—see servers, internet service providers,
software, hardware, drives, and cables as sites of resistance, creativity, and possibility for
scholars who would like to reclaim their agency and control over the transmission and
use of their work in the digital realm. Liu in particular argues that infrastructure is a kind
of culture, and he outlines different approaches that scholars might take to critique and
resist infrastructural sites of power and control. One approach that Liu suggests, gesturing
to Foucault and Michel de Certeau, is that scholars take up an “antifoundationalist” form
of criticism, which critiques the structures of power as “arbitrary” and “unjust,” and
allows the critic to situate himself or herself in those structures of power and to resist
them. Liu additionally suggests the tactic of “neoinstitutionalism,” which recognizes that
infrastructures and institutions are largely controlled by social forces, and that scholars
can resist and reform infrastructure through social engagement. These tactics, however,
can’t be translated easily into resistance on the part of most digital media consumers
because these strategies assume a high level of power and ability to engage in sites of
struggle on the part of the practitioner or scholar.
Astra Taylor in The People’s Platform suggests that the revolutionary power of
social media can only be harnessed when platforms are reclaimed and controlled by
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entities that are invested in the interests of the public rather than in corporate self-interest.
While they are few and far between, there are some examples of infrastructural resistance
outside of academic and other institutions, such as the installation of internet
infrastructure by the Detroit Community Technology Project (Rogers).
For Henry Jenkins and other critics, internet technology has led to a resurgence of
a kind of folk culture. He writes that “The story of American arts in the twenty-first
century might be told in terms of the public reemergence of grassroots creativity as
everyday people take advantage of new technologies that enable them to archive,
annotate, appropriate, and recirculate media content. It probably started with the
photocopier and desktop publishing” (“Quentin Tarantino’s” 207).
The divide between grassroots and mass media has in some cases been reduced by
the internet, as when news and media choose to incorporate small producers into their
coverage. Dan Gillmor gives the example of blogs on the Iraq war that gained momentum
and were eventually picked up by major outlets.
At the same time, qualitative and quantitative differences in media and what
media different audiences consume still persist. Rather than a collapse of the divide, one
might consider recent changes to be an expansion of the dialectic between high and low.
The categories of literary fiction and popular fiction have not become obsolete, and if
anything the increase in MFA in writing programs has resulted in the continued
institutionalization of “highbrow” literary writing, along with the explosion in online
literary journals, as the cost of publishing is next to nothing.
Privilege also still plays a great part in even who the most successful small and
individual producers of media are. According to estimates by Michael Dunlop, the
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majority of the highest-earning bloggers are white men with college degrees. As
mentioned in the last chapter, white people still make up 86% of the publishing industry
(Milliot). To say that we are beyond the great divide risks discounting the ongoing and
enormous inequalities between producers and consumers of media.

Conclusion
The designation between high and low culture may be inaccurate and antiquated,
but immense disparities between the producers and consumers of culture will persist as
long as social, educational, and economic inequality continue. Some media, through their
popularity and form, may lend themselves more to a blurring between high and low
audiences than other types of media. Memes, for example, likely reach broader
demographic swaths of the American public than literary novels do.
The great divide is alive and well in terms of the division of power and ownership
of labor between large corporations and small producers. Additionally, in a world where
users and aspiring creators have vastly varying levels of technical expertise, literacy,
economic independence, and access to new technologies, the role of privilege in shaping
the production and consumption of media is still quite strong.
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Chapter 3: Literary Hybridity: the Novel’s Incorporation of New Media
The spectacle is not a collection of images; rather, it is a social
relationship between people that is mediated by images.
—Guy Debord
The novel first emerged as a form that cannibalized and reconstituted other
literary forms; Samuel Richardson’s Pamela, for example, is entirely epistolary, and
Bram Stoker’s Dracula is little more than stitched-together newspaper reports and diary
entries. Ian Watt’s The Rise of the Novel traces the novel’s realist and individualist
genealogy through letters, news reports, and even via an analogy to the Dutch school of
painting (17). Mikhail Bahktin argues that the novel is a genre that has subsumed all
other literary genres (321), with one of the main reasons for its success being its dynamic
interaction with “contemporary reality in all its openendedness” (21). According to
theorist Benedict Anderson, the novel form, like the newspaper form, came about in order
to codify and represent the emergent capitalist and nationalist social order (25).
Following novelists’ tendency to incorporate other genres of writing, and the ongoing
pressure of novels to remain relevant amidst other media, it is to be expected that
contemporary novels should utilize the forms and strategies of emerging media.
Because social media and the internet are embedded in the fabric of American life,
their presence in novels and other media can be largely understood as mimetic, as a
representation of how media operates in society. Novels may extend this mimetic
capacity into the realms of moral judgment or futurist speculation concerning new media.
In some novels, media take a central role, often as the antagonizing object of suspicion or
critique, like television and popular culture in Don DeLillo’s White Noise or wearable
and surveillance technologies in Dave Eggers’s The Circle. Often, too, the formal aspects
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of other media override novels’ storylines, to the extent that it may be difficult to discern
which form is cannibalizing which. For example, the reality television spectacle within
Suzanne Collins’ The Hunger Games largely determines the novel’s plot and its
protagonist’s strategies for success.
As established in the previous chapters, different forms of media can be
understood as being at once highly competitive and highly cooperative, with the novel
both vying against and coordinating with other media for attention within the limited time
allocated to leisure activity for the average American citizen. The novel’s reaction to this
pressure has in many cases been to mimic, critique, and narratively incorporate the forms
and strategies of other media, with varying degrees of success. The ever-changing media
landscape and novelists’ treatment of new media have led critics to wonder whether the
novel itself can be said to have been transformed or superseded by emerging media.
This chapter examines this question of how one medium competes with or reflects
another, and whether intermedia competition can transform media, via four cases studies.
The openings of popular novels of the past 110 years are analyzed to determine any
quantitative textual shifts in the amount of dialogue, sentence lengths, and reading levels
that might—hypothetically—indicate pressures on the novel form. Because the openings
of novels are expected to set the tone and pace of a work and to draw the reader in, one
might hypothesize that competition with other media would exert measurable changes in
the beginnings of popular novels, and this study specifically examines the first five
hundred words of the top five bestselling American novels at five year intervals from
1900 to 2010. However, perhaps contrary to one’s intuition, this quantitative analysis
does not uncover significant textual shifts in the openings of popular novels, apart from a
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slight shortening of average sentence length. Instead, shifts in American novels in
response to new media appear to be largely individualized, qualitative, and mimetic in
their exploration of the novel experiences, subjectivities, social configurations, and public
opinions and conceptions brought about by other media. Specifically, in the second case
study, the process by which an older medium may reflect a shift in the popular concept of
a newer medium’s value is explored using the example of newspaper articles reacting to
the dawn of television. Additionally, the pressures that might lead a form of media to
decline are considered with regard to the rise and fall of hypertextual fiction. Finally, a
case study of how protagonist and audience subjectivity and agency has shifted over time
as a result of advances in the technology of media distribution and audience feedback,
and how that shift is portrayed in contemporaneous novels, is presented through a
comparison of two popular works, Stephen King’s 1982 novella The Running Man and
Suzanne Collins’ 2008 novel The Hunger Games. Both works incorporate the television
medium and reality television in particular as central aspects of their plots, but the
differences in the two works’ treatment of these media reflect the twenty-first-century
increase in mediated and real-world agency on the part of the subjects and audiences of
new media.
Ultimately, this chapter argues that twenty-first-century American novelists’
treatment of new media can be understood as a continuation of novels’ earliest
cannibalistic incorporations of other media—that is, a mimesis of contemporaneous
social and communicative configurations. This chapter therefore argues that novels
haven’t transformed into a new medium, and that we have not entered a post-media
culture; rather, the incorporation of the forms and strategies of other media in novels can
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be considered as a kind of “literary hybridity” an incorporation of the experiential
structures and subjectivities of other media that is continuous with the novel’s early
dependence on other genres. While novels haven’t been shown to have changed formally
in response to other media, their content has continuously changed in order to mimic the
subjectivity and interactivity in new media. That is, what has changed isn’t the novel’s
form, but rather novelists’ representations of the social, experiential, and receptive
configurations enabled by new media and new means of distribution and reception.
And yet, in a sense, the form of the novel has shifted. As Marshall McLuhan
writes, “the medium is the message,” meaning that the technological form and context of
media shapes how it is received by its audience, and in turn what message it sends (“The
Medium” 203). One might extend his statement, in the context of today’s multifocal,
adaptive, and socially reactive media ecology, to posit that media and their audiences
multidirectionally reconfigure “the message” on an ad hoc basis. Novels gain new
dimensions not just through their internal mimicry of other media, but also through their
multifocal, cumulative, and simultaneous apperception by various audiences and via
other media, or what Henry Jenkins would call convergence culture or transmedia
storytelling (“Transmedia 202”).
What We Talk About When We Talk About New Media
If, as Watt argues, the novel began as an amalgamation of previous genres and
forms, and, as Bahktin and McLuhan would insist, if all media are also to be understood
as intermedial, tone might wonder whether the novel’s incorporation of late twentiethcentury and early twenty-first-century media is really anything that different in form or
content from previous intermedial iterations.
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Many theorists would indeed argue for a kind of digital exceptionalism; Lev
Manovich, for example, foregrounds the digital encoding of various media to argue that
humanity is now “post-media” (1),7 meaning that defining creative works by their
supposed medium is no longer realistic, as all media are amalgams that have converged
into software, and it would be more accurate to consider media as individual instances of
“information interfaces developed by artists, and the new information behaviors
developed by users” (9). While such a model is useful in considering the components and
digital dissemination of media, it is still premature to deign the current era as post-media;
every interface has its limitations, its own lack of fluidity, and its own purpose and
patterned placement in a media environment that hasn’t yet reached what might be
conceived a unification of all media.8 Furthermore, prioritizing a work’s “software” and
“interface” is one approach among many, and as such it disfavors the consideration of the
social, financial, and distribution/discourse networks that are in play.9
A useful complement to Manovich’s essentialist post-media perspective can be
found in the work of Henry Jenkins, who acknowledges the existence of discrete forms of
media that serve different purposes, but who nonetheless describes an ever-increasing
“convergence” in how media share information and interact. However, it is important to
7

Féliz Guattari was the pioneer of the concept of a “post-media” culture, though really in the sense of post
mass-media. See, for example, his 1986 essay “Postmodern Impasse and Postmedia Transition” and the
2012 “Towards a Postmedia Era.” Other critics writing on this concept include Rosalind Krauss, Dominic
Quaranta, Howard Slater, and Peter Weibel. Two anthologies of note are Provocative Alloys: A PostMedia Anthology, edited by Clemens Apprich et al. and L'Ère post-média, edited by Jean-Paul
Fourmentraux.
8

See Marshall McLuhan’s “The Galaxy Reconfigured, or the Plight of Mass Man in an Individualist Society”
for a discussion of how man’s senses are “fragmented” by the sensory limitations of creative media (195).
9

For a discussion of the long-term evolution of literary social communication and distribution networks,
see Friedrich A. Kittler’s Discourse Networks 1800/1900.
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note that Jenkins in Convergence Culture does not equate convergence with the synthesis
of different forms of media (Jenkins 16), or a replacement of older forms with newer
(Jenkins 14). Rather, he argues for a kind of convergence of content across media
platforms, a cooperation between “media systems” to share and spread information (282).
Jenkins treats each type of media as having its own place in the ecology, writing that “in
the ideal form of transmedia storytelling, each medium does what it does best,” and that
“Different media attract different audience niches” (96). Though Jenkins is not perhaps as
radical as Manovich, that is, not radical enough to proclaim the unification of all media,
he is nonetheless guilty of his own brand of exceptionalism: he treats the convergence of
content across media as a rather new development, when it can be traced back at least as
far as the 1700’s, when books and pamphlets were advertised in multiple newspapers and
in the books and pamphlets themselves. Nor is Jenkins’ concept of “grass roots” media
converging with “corporate” media that alien from the rise of letters to the editor in
eighteenth-century British newspaper culture. The grassroots of today is certainly more
bottom-up than the “grassroots” of the bourgeoisie, but neither is entirely perfect, entirely
representative of the overall population. Furthermore, the notion of convergence as being
a question of content alone does not take one any closer to understanding how different
forms of media operate and what their particular niche might be.
How one addresses the question of whether America has entered a post-media era
depends largely, then, on how media are defined. If digital media are broken down into
their smallest hardware or software components, or, by analogy, animals into atoms, the
distinctions are of course meaningless, as Manovich points outs. However, if one
considers media through the social, sensory, and subjective experience of the consumer,
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the distinctions between different forms are almost limitless. For this reason, discussing
and comparing media as at once discrete and overlapping entities can help to bridge this
contradiction, at least until media achieves a kind of sensory and subjective singularity.10
Critics not only differ on the question of whether America has entered a postmedia age, but also as to how new media have influenced the development of the novel.
On one side, theorist Daniel Punday argues that contemporary novels seek not to imitate,
compete against, or meld with other media, but rather to “embrace” and define their own
medium’s limits (4). In drawing lines between media and emphasizing how the novel
defines itself against other media, Punday denies the possibility of a true intermixing of
forms within any one medium. He also tries to deny any shift toward greater reader
“agency” via new media, though his definition of agency is limited to the physical control
of the media object: “While we can do many things with an old copy of a novel—reread
it, sell it, use the pages to start a fire,” he writes, “in many ways our choices with an
electronic text are considerably more constrained” (236). Such a conception of agency is
reductive, and one could just as easily argue that digitally highlighting, copying, and
socially communicating excerpts of a novel gives the reader of electronic texts more
“agency.”
Counter to this view, critics such as John Johnston argue that there is no such
thing as a pure medium, as every medium is an amalgamation, including “the novel of
information multiplicity and its successor, the novel of media assemblages, which both

10

What such a singularity might look like is interesting to consider, and one might imagine how the
different mental and sensory experiences of multiple media could be combined. Experiments in sensory
storytelling, such as the Museum of the Moving Image’s Sensory Stories, are already underway (Future of
StoryTelling).
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resist [innovations in information encoding] and attempt to delineate its most profound
consequences” (8). Indeed, in the case of the novel, the notion of media purity ignores the
novel’s continuous incorporation of media that predate and postdate the form’s own
emergence.
While the notion of media purity is false, even the most groundbreaking
recombination has its own unique limitations and strategies within the media ecology. In
that sense, both Punday and Johnston may be correct; novels might be claiming new
territory as their own, even as they struggle against their formal limitations. In short,
novels can be considered individually as imperfect hybrids, each with its own advantages
and limitations in comparison with other forms. Philosophically, every medium seeks to
recreate and redefine lived experience, but all in some way fall short of lived experience,
and will continue to do so until a time in which technology meets or exceeds the
standards of lived experience. In their book, Remediation, Jay David Bolter and Richard
Grusin describe this “desire for immediacy,” this aspiration toward a “seamless” and
“transparent” recreation of reality, in their analysis of the virtual-reality-dependent
storyline of the film Strange Days (314-318). Of course, one can alternatively argue that
media offer something more than lived experience, that books, for example, augment and
strengthen trains of thought.
In the current media landscape, where different forms may follow trends and
practices that are in direct opposition, it is often perilous to make generalizing or
exceptionalizing statements. One might even wonder whether any meaningful general
statements are still feasible; perhaps we are at a point in media studies where theorists
should only deal with specific examples, as Manovich suggests. All theoretical models of
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media should ideally begin with an apology for what is not modeled, or at least an
explanation for the limited scope of the inquiry. In that vein, it would be wise to note that
this chapter, at first very broadly and then through a case study, focuses on some of the
ways in which mid-twentieth and early twenty-first-century media, namely television and
the world wide web, have affected the content and form of American novels. Furthermore,
this line of inquiry relies on the idea of hybrid media. While Manovich’s approach favors
a consideration of the hardware and software components of media, and Jenkins at least
somewhat favors a consideration of the way in which media share and remix content, the
notion of hybridity permits a consideration of the different sensory and subjective models
that media offers the consumer. Hybridity here refers to not only the inherent
intermediality of all media, but also a medium’s strategic incorporation of other media. A
hybrid medium can be understood as a medium that interweaves other media in its
narrative, form, or function. Hybridity is a useful term in that it communicates that the
hybrid contains some but not necessarily all of the elements of its parent media. For
example, the 1993 novel Vurt by Jeff Noon incorporates the structure and experience of a
shared virtual reality into the narrative. The consequences of this virtual reality overtake
the “real” at times, creating a hybrid of waking and virtual life.
Textual Shifts: Media Mimesis
As Bakhtin notes, literature has long evolved in tandem with other forms of media.
For example, it is no coincidence that Choose Your Own Adventure books arose in the
middle of the 1970s and early 1980s, which is when early video and arcade games were
being released; though books with alternative plotlines can be traced back to the 1940s, it
wasn’t until the 1970s and 1980s when the genre of “gamebooks” became wildly
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popular; paradoxically, the beginnings of gamer culture seemed to light a fire under
gamer books, and in fact such interactive titles are seeing a bit of a resurgence thanks to
the technology of the ebook era, as Keith Stuart notes in The Guardian. Likewise, new
genres of fiction called the cyber novel or cyberpunk emerged in the 1980s and 1990s
alongside increasingly immersive video games, hacker culture, and a rise in internet
connectivity. The public implementation of media appears to often be correlated with the
frequency in which those media are mentioned in American books:

Fig. 3-1. Percentage of times the terms “computer,” “radio,” and “television” are
used in the American English (fiction and nonfiction) dataset, 1900-2008; Google
Ngram Viewer; http://books.google.com/ngrams.
The above chart indicates that the frequency of the word “radio” peaked toward the end
of World War II. As noted in Chapter 1, Google’s Ngram Viewer attempts to visualize
the frequency of words used in large corpora of books over long periods of time. This
method is imperfect, as the books are those collected from academic libraries, and are not
reflective of all books in English. Furthermore, there are often errors in dating and in
character recognition, among other discrepancies (Zhang). While such graphs can
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establish a rough correlation between the rising public usage of a certain medium and that
medium’s mention in books, such a measurement is likely to give an incomplete or
misleading picture of that medium’s popularity or prominence—something as simple as a
shift in popular terminology, from “computer” to “PC,” or an overlapping term, like
“show” being used for television or theater, can be impossible to completely control for
and can easily distort results. A word frequency graph should therefore be looked at as a
partial and necessarily incomplete picture, though one that can nonetheless be helpful in
the narrow sense of tracing the frequency of a term. In an article for Wired, Sarah Zhang
points out how the frequency in which a term is published in books has no proven
correlation with its cultural popularity, making “culturomics” a bit of a misnomer.
Furthermore, a 2015 article by Eitan Adam Pechenick, Christopher M. Danforth, and
Peter Sheridan Dodds found that the corpus of Google Ngram was highly skewed by its
inclusion of a large number of scientific journals. Above, for example, the rise in the
usage of “computer” in the early 1980s doesn’t directly reflect how popular computers
were among the general public. Computers were more popular during the 1990s and early
2000s than they were in the 1980s, though the above graphs shows that the term
“computer” peaked in the 1980s. Instead of reflecting computers’ popularity, the rise of
the term in the 1980s correlates with the publication of computer manuals that tried to
appeal to the rapidly-growing but still relatively limited consumer markets. Mobile
industry analyst Horace Dediu has created a compelling chart visualizing this rise in sales
(Smith). Although computer reference books in fields such as agriculture and computer
engineering had been published in the 1960s, the rise of nonprofessional computer use
and consumer applications in the 1980s translated into a rise in the computer reference
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book market. For example, 1960s books for specialized forms of computation like
George A. Parker’s 1964 Computers in the Mineral Industries were then in the 1980s
accompanied by more general consumer books like George Ciarcia’s 1981 Build Your
Own Z80 Computer. The above graph includes both American fiction and nonfiction
books, though a graph of these terms from the English Fiction dataset shows a peak in the
use of the term around 2005 rather than 1985:

Fig. 2. Percentage of times the terms “computer,” “radio,” and “television” are
used in the English Fiction (2009) dataset, 1900-2008; Google Ngram Viewer;
http://books.google.com/ngrams.
Again, these differences between the use of “computer” in these corpora, based on some
examination of books in Google’s library, seems to be because of the explosion of the
nonfiction computer manual market in comparison with a lesser, but still substantial, rise
of references to computers in fiction.
Graphs such as fig. 2 must be met with a degree of skepticism, but nonetheless
strongly suggest that the rise in the usage of various media often very roughly correlates
with the mention of those media in literature, meaning that novels’ worldviews are
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informed by and mimetic of contemporaneous trends and changes in media usage. This is
also seen in the frequency of the mention of different social platforms in books. The
Myspace platform peaked in popularity in 2008, when it was used more than any other
social platform, and that peak coincides with the rising popularity of the term in books:

Fig. 3-3. Percentage of times the terms “myspace” and “facebook” are used in the
American English dataset, 1970-2008; Google Ngram Viewer;
http://books.google.com/ngrams.
The early appearance of the term “facebook” in the 1980s is due to books that are
copyrighted in the 1980s but contain information about Facebook pages in updated About
the Author or other sections.
Along with new forms of media and new technologies of distribution and
reception come new opportunities for the expansion and reorganization of social,
informational, and economic networks. As Guy Debord points out in The Society of the
Spectacle, mass media have seized and expanded upon earlier forms of spectacle such as
gladiatorial combats via interfaces (television sets, for instance) and ever-grander scales
(as in a football stadium, for example). Television itself represents a massive scaling of
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spectacle, a scaling almost too great to visualize, so that it is most often simply felt
viscerally. New technologies and interfaces breed new habits—we text just as, if not
more, readily than we call people these days. The frequency with which we utilize one
screen or another has increased dramatically over the twentieth century, and in parallel,
the presence of screens has increased in books:

Fig.3-4. Percentage of times the terms “television screen” and “computer screen”
are used in the English Fiction (2009) dataset, 1900-2000; Google Ngram Viewer;
http://books.google.com/ngrams.
Since the above graph charts English Fiction, one cannot argue that the increase in the
use of the term “computer screen” is simply a byproduct of the rise in (nonfiction)
computer manuals.
Whether intentionally or not, the social codes, configurations, and fears within
novels are also often mimicries of contemporaneous reality. In a sense, then, the novel is
already expressive of the external shifts in perspective and social networks that are
propelled by other media. As Cynthia Tichi writes in Shifting Gears, new technology
“[summons] new literary forms suited to its perceptual values” (16). Tichi goes even
further, saying that “The machine-age text does not contain representations of the
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machine—it too is the machine,” and those writers who fail to incorporate the dominant
technology “suffer artistically” (16). Tichi here would also do well to recognize that
contemporary texts are just as likely to reject or interrogate new technologies as embrace
and imitate them, and literary rejection of new technology is often the first line of
response.
Narrative Hybridity
Beyond the presence of this general, mimetic background noise surrounding new
media, few authors deliberately attempt to create their novels in the form of other media,
such as writing a novel whose narrative uses the conventions of a computer multiuser
game to structure its narrative. Nonetheless, there are a number of authors and trends that
do deliberately attempt to expand the novel’s territory into new media. The 1993 novel
Vurt by Jeff Noon shapes itself in the form of a psychedelic video game, and it succeeds
in melding a spiritual and existential journey with the structure of a game and the logic of
levels. Such narrative experiments are still limited—Vurt is able to explore psychological
and existential depths that video games can rarely plumb, but a novel cannot offer readers
the real-time agency that a video game can. The combination creates something at once
interactively lesser than and psychologically deeper than a typical video game. Dave
Eggers’ 2013 novel The Circle is another example of work that relies on new media for
its central plot points—in this case, the novel concerns itself with questions of privacy
and surveillance through the vector of the protagonist’s job at a technology company.
New media and new technologies are embedded in the fabric of both lived reality
and literary representations of reality. Thus, the novel form is naturally hybrid in its
automatic immersion in new ways of ordering and perceiving the world. Some authors
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intensify the novel’s hybridity by modeling its structure off of other media, or using the
power of other media as a key plot element. Hybridity is nonetheless limited in a number
of ways, by both the technological advancement of the medium and the abilities of
human perception. For example, human perceptive faculties have difficulty following a
visual and a separate textual narrative simultaneously, which limits how well film and the
novel can be recombined. As technology develops, we may see literary hybridity develop
from picture books to neural storytelling, that is, multisensory stories that are told directly
through the brain’s neural pathways.
Narrative Shifts: Immersivity
In competing with the pace and pull of new media, novels are under pressure to be
immersive, fast-moving, and to quickly “hook” the reader. In recent years, the term
“immersivity” has come into vogue when referring to books, although it is most
frequently, at least according to Google Trends, searched for in reference to video games
like Skyrim. While the use of the verb “immerse” in reference to literature and reading is
nothing new (the phrase “immersed in reading” was used in 1800 in The Monthly
Magazine and American Review (“Memoirs of Mr. Robert 295), its use and urgency has
risen in recent decades. The concept of the reader being immersed in a book appears as
early as 1942 in The New York Times (“Display Ad 20”), and the use of the phrase
increases in the 1970s:11

11

The results in Fig. 1 are from searching for the exact phrase “immers* the reader,” with the star added
to find all variations of the verb immerse.
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Fig. 3-5. Number of New York Times articles by year that reference “immers* the
reader;” ProQuest New York Times Archive (1923-2010), 15 May 2015.
Of course, all that one can really posit from this is a rise in the use of the phrase; the
phrase’s rise in popularity isn’t a direct representation of the pressure on books to
compete with other media. One might be curious as to whether the rise in the usage of
this term simply represents its displacement of earlier terms. Though it’s difficult to
investigate this question, one can see that there was a similar rise in the usage of the term
“page-turner” in the corpus of English fiction, which suggests that the increased usage of
“immers* the reader” is paralleled by a rise in the usage frequency of “page-turner” in the
1990s:
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Fig. 3-6. Percentage of times the term “page-turner” is used in English books
(fiction and nonfiction), 1800-2008; Google Ngram Viewer;
http://books.google.com/ngrams.
Though the term immersive in the past simply referred to how the reader becomes buried
in the book’s representation of reality, in recent decades it has also come to refer to the
interface and even the formatting as enabling said immersion, or, alternately, to books
that contain multimedia elements. While it is difficult to measure how this rising concern
has played out editorially, many agents have come out and said that they are intent on
finding those narratives that quickly take hold of and don’t release the reader; in a 2012
entry on his literary agency blog, for instance, Andy Ross writes that “the big question
for me is whether the book is sucking me into an immersive trancelike vortex that makes
me want to stay up all night and turn the pages.” While it may be likely that
contemporary editors and literary agents are more likely to acquire and promote books
that grip the reader, it is difficult to discern what elements might play into the evaluation
of a book’s immersivity.
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The immersiveness of a book is perhaps impossible to quantify; rather, it may
well only be definable as a qualitative aspect that can be measured by the reader’s
answers to such questions as “Are you very curious about what will happen next?” or
“Do you find it difficult to stop reading?” or “Do you feel fully engaged with the world
and characters of the novel?” While there have been studies such as Anne Mangen’s The
Impact of Digital Technology on Immersive Fiction Reading that consider how new
electronic interfaces change the reading experience, scholars haven’t been able to create a
metric for immersivity, aside from abstract notions of suspense or not being able to put
down a book. Perhaps the closest thing to a study on the textual mechanics of reader
immersivity is Michael Toolan’s article “Engagement via Emotional Heightening in
‘Passion:’ On the Grammatical Texture of Emotionally-Immersive Passages in Short
Fiction.” However Toolan’s findings are limited to a single text, and his method isn’t
entirely scientific—he set out to analyze the grammar of the passages that he finds to be
the most “emotionally engaging” and ethically arresting” from Alice Munro’s short story
“Passion” (211). He finds that character desire, expressed by verbs like “feel, see, and
want” is more likely to be expressed in the passages that he thinks are highly engaging,
and in addition to Munro’s story, he tests and validates this theory in the stories of John
McGahern, Raymond Carver, and Katherine Mansfield (212-215). In addition to the
frequency of verbs emoting character desire, Toolan finds that the emotionally
heightened passages have other frequent similarities, such as repetition, “more temporal
simultaneity,” and the usage of “absolute” words like “everlasting” (219). However,
Toolan’s selection of passages is both highly subjective, and his analysis is largely
qualitative, and so his work, while providing some good insights into what narrative
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techniques might help grip a reader emotionally, hardly provides a means for absolutely
testing a text’s immersiveness.
One might wonder whether popular novels are becoming more immersive, but it
would be difficult to undertake a study, even a reader-oriented one, as older novels might
be less immersive simply because they engage with issues that are no longer relevant, and
their language might simply be outdated, which would risk alienating contemporary
readers. This study therefore sought to find out whether popular novels have changed in a
quantitatively measurable way, as immersiveness is too subjective to measure, especially
when trying to compare books that were published decades apart, many of which may be
about topics that are no longer in vogue.
One might hypothesize that more dialogue early in a novel, or shorter sentences,
might serve to pull a reader in. Also, perhaps a text that is easier to read would help to
propel the action forward. With these hypotheses in mind, this study performed
quantitative textual analysis on a limited corpus—the openings (the first five hundred
words) of the top five bestselling novels (according to Publisher’s Weekly) at five-year
intervals from 1900 to 2010. The openings of novels were chosen because hypothetically
the beginning of a book was vital in terms of drawing a reader in.
This limited examination of the quantity of dialogue, word length, sentence length,
and reading level in the openings of novels does not reveal any significant quantitative
differences that would indicate stylistic or syntactic changes that might correlate with
immersiveness. The average sentence length in the openings of the top five novels at five
year intervals has declined significantly, from about twenty to thirty words to closer to
ten to fifteen:
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Fig. 3-7. Average number of words per sentence in the first 500 words of the top
five bestselling novels at five year intervals, 1900-2010; titles taken from
Publishers Weekly, 1900-2010, and individually consulted.
This finding corresponds with linguistic professor Mark Liberman’s 2011 research
showing that the average sentence length of U.S. presidents’ inaugural addresses has
fallen by 50% “since the founding of the republic.” The reasons, of course, for the
reduction in average sentence length are impossible to rank or untangle. Since longer
sentences are often associated with higher reading difficulty in metrics of reading level
such as the Flesch-Kincaid standard, one might hypothesize that this change is reflective
of a continual vernacularization of culture over the course of the twentieth century. That
is, as a greater segment of the population became involved in cultures of reading with the
rise of “middlebrow” reading and the increased affordability of books, the average
difficulty of texts, and even the overall linguistic profile of language, may have lowered
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as the market appealed to a continually-widening base. Or, the reason for the shortening
of sentences may lie simply with an increased preference or necessity for efficient
communication. Whether shorter sentences might contribute to increased immersiveness
is up for debate, but it does seem likely that this change in sentence length would
promote a greater ease of reading.
Other quantitative measures, including the number of characters per word and the
number of words of dialogue, do not show significant shifts over the same 110-year
period. One might hypothesize that if novels have become more immersive, that would
mean that their openings would, over time, contain more dialogue in order to draw the
reader into immediate action, as opposed to extensive exposition, especially given
Toolan’s findings that emotionally intense passages are more likely to include “temporal
simultaneity” (219). However, that hypothesis proves false:
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Fig. 3-8. Average number of words of dialogue per sentence in the first 500 words
of the top five bestselling novels at five year intervals, 1900-2010; titles taken
from Publishers Weekly, 1900-2010, and individually consulted.
If the quantity of opening dialogue is an indicator of how quickly a novel situates readers
in the action, which is itself quite a leap of faith, then in that manner, bestselling novels
have not changed very much in the last hundred years. However, there may be other,
qualitative, changes that are difficult to measure. Determining the dividing line between
exposition and action is nearly impossible, as both often overlap in the opening of books,
but examining dialogue as a somewhat arbitrary signifier of action doesn’t seem to pick
up on any significant trends over time.
Shifts in Public Opinion Regarding Media
Just as popular novels in nineteenth-century America were excoriated for being
morally reprehensible, “[agitating] the young, [arousing] female sexual desire,” as Cathy
Davidson writes, and taking away valuable time from religious texts or other moral tracts,
new forms of media have often been looked upon as being morally and intellectually
suspect, especially by those who imagine themselves to be the protectors of whatever
canon is in vogue (6). Over time, however, forms of media mature and differentiate
commercially and formally, and as they become a part of the status quo, they find more
favor with and acceptance by various publics. Literature can be seen to reflect these shifts.
The criticism lodged at new forms of media varies—not all new forms are
criticized with equal intensity or for identical reasons. In order to understand how the
novel’s reception of new forms of media has changed over time, one might take as an
example the history of television’s critical reception. Television as a medium had a long
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prelude; talk of its invention began around 1923, and its first broadcast in America was
from the 1939 World’s Fair. However, development of the form was interrupted by
World War II, and consequently TV sets didn’t begin to establish themselves in the
American home until 1946 (Fantel H21). One might expect that with the advent of a new
medium such as television, critics would immediately unleash a variety of attacks, but
rather the critiques lodged against the form rose gradually in tandem with its increasing
presence in the American home.
In The New York Times, articles predating television excitedly heralded its
creation (“’Television Promised,’” “Radio Moving,” “Reports ‘Television’”) as a
“conquest of nature by science” (“New ‘Conquest’” 20). Subsequently, many articles in
The New York Times in television’s early days, meaning the late 1940s and 1950s, were
focused on its positive potential in broadcasting sports (Lohman X9), providing political
transparency (“TV from Lake” E8), and aiding education (“Schools Here” 21). The
majority of the negative aspects of television viewing were also foreseen in these early
days, with articles in 1950 already fearing that TV might take away time spent on other
media (“Television Effect” 36, Barclay 180, Crowther XI, and Goldwyn 167), reduce the
sales of radios (“Television Near” 29), contain too much licentious content (“Coy Warns”
54 and Lamb 105), lower the quality of American culture (Gould, “Video in Education”
X9), and harm children (Gould, “City Schools” 29, Gould, “TV Habit” 27, “TV Study”
46, “TV in Summer” 12, and “Youngsters 5 to 6” 54).
In fact, it seems as though the volume of criticism rose in tandem with
television’s ever-increasing presence in the American home and psyche. Here, for
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example, is the number of articles in The New York Times that use the phrase “violence
on television”12 by year:
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Fig. 3-9. Number of New York Times articles by year that reference “violence on
television;” ProQuest New York Times Archive (1923-2010), 18 Nov. 2014.
Looking at this figure, one notices that the number of articles that mention violence on
television rises and first peaks in the late 1970s. This first rise from 1955 to 1979 came at
the time when televisions were increasingly present in the American home:

12

It is wrong to assume that all articles that mention “violence on television” are critical of the amount of
televised depictions of violence; however, of all of the articles that were examined for this chapter, the
vast majority of those that contained the phrase “violence on television” treated televised depictions of
violence as undesirable.
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Fig. 3-10. Percentage of American Households with Television by Year, 19501978; “Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1982-82;” Census.gov; U.S.
Census Bureau, n.d.; https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/1978tvsets.pdf.
The mention of violence on television in The New York Times is also reflected in
American books:
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Fig. 3-11. Percentage of times the term “violence on television” is used in the
American English (fiction and nonfiction) dataset, 1900-2008; Google Ngram
Viewer; http://books.google.com/ngrams.
The first hump ending around 1980 coincides with the rise of televisions in the American
home in Figure 10. As television ownership and viewing became ubiquitous during the
late 1960s and the 1970s, cable networks developed shows that strayed into uncharted
territory of violence and sexual provocation. In his classic book, Inside Prime Time, Todd
Gitlin describes how the science of ratings in the 1970s led networks to compete to shock
and titillate with new offerings (Gitlin 71-72). As a result of this loosening of standards,
various governmental and organizational bodies launched inquiries into the dangers of
violence on television. An up-close examination of the use of “violence on television” in
books during the year 1977, one of the years of highest incidence, reveals official
inquiries by the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Surgeon General, and the Canadian Royal
Commission on Violence in the Communications Industry. The second hump, beginning
around 1990, when the Children’s Television and Television Violence Acts were passed,
and ending around 1999 coincides with the rise of cable television subscriptions and
governmental initiatives, such as the V chip, which curbed violence on cable television.
In 1966, Alfred Hitchcock humorously remarked that “One of television’s great
contributions is that it brought murder back into the home where it belongs” (qtd. in
“Television Murders” 75). This observation reveals how uniquely offensive television
was, as it inserted itself, a box of sound and vivid motion, into the very center of
American life, the living room. Looking at New York Times articles that are critical of
television, one can describe an overall pattern in which the volume of criticism rises in
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correlation with the popularity of the medium as well as the emergence of any new
threats, such as a particularly offensive television show. The volume of criticism also
rises and falls leading up to any official deliberation, such as Senate hearings and policy
debates. Ultimately, criticism dies down, either appeased or despairing. At this point, the
new medium may have already begun to receive artistic, critical, and even academic
respect. Creative works are quite likely to fall into this cycle of criticism, rejecting and
denouncing a competing medium before ultimately embracing and imitating it. In order
to demonstrate this cycle in action, this chapter will now examine two novels from
different time periods that both feature reality television in order to show how critical
attitudes evolve over time.
Shifts in Protagonist and Viewer Subjectivity and Agency: A Case Study
Not only do books reflect the rise of and cultural debates over different media,
and the shifting perceptions of time and space, as Stephen Kern has noted, but they also
reflect how media interactivity and user subjectivity evolve over time. In Kern’s phrasing,
which he admits is “reductionistic,” technology seemingly determines social structures,
as “class structures, modes of production, patterns of diplomacy, [and] means of waging
war were manifested historically in terms of changing experiences of time and space” (4).
Yet this model seemingly takes some agency away from the individual users of
technology. Technology itself does not determine formulations of power, but rather the
ways in which users employ technology to their benefit do. Over the past decade,
improvements in interactive technology have been utilized by consumers to gain agency
and change their subjective position from the selectors of media to the direct producers
and funders. This shift has manifested in a number of ways, including real-world activism
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promoted through social media, crowdfunding, and the easy production and
dissemination of photos and videos. Such innovations have created a new agency and
subjectivity on the part of those who consume media; media isn’t just received by the
user, but it can be controlled, responded to, critiqued, and manipulated from a public
position. These changes have major consequences for protagonists and their fictional
audiences. A prime example would be the contrast between the writings of Stephen King,
who was born in 1947, and Suzanne Collins, who was born in 1962. King’s writings
often show protagonists who are helpless against the depictions of mass media, whose
only form of resistance is destruction; Collins, on the other hand, started out as a
television writer, and her writing offers many additional options for resistance to mass
media, as well as many models of audience resistance.
In 1982, Stephen King, writing under the pseudonym Richard Bachman,
published a novella titled The Running Man. Set in a dystopian America in the year 2025,
the novella depicts a game show whose contestants are hunted and killed by speciallytrained “Hunters.” The protagonist, Ben Richards, enters the game show in order to help
his family out of oppressive poverty, as every day that passes in which he is not killed,
money is sent to his family. There is a chance for complicit participation from the general
public: if someone has a confirmed sighting of the contestant, then a payout is issued to
the citizen, and if the sighting results in a kill, the payout is multiplied (567). In this story,
television is a ubiquitous tool of the state, and it is used to both placate and intimidate the
public. Richards, the protagonist, is unable to adjust the state’s televised message; indeed,
every attempt that he makes to appeal to the audience is thwarted, his identity
manipulated visually when his onscreen image is “retouched…to make his eyes deeper,
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his forehead a little lower,” until he appears to be the “angel of urban death (567),” and
verbally when his words are alternately recorded over (600), and “drowned out
in…screams” from the brainwashed crowd (568).
Richards triumphs at the end of the novella not by taking control of what is
televised, but by destroying the TV studio itself. The final scene in the novella finds
Richards gut shot, bleeding out his life, and captured by the game show “Hunters” in an
aircraft, when he overcomes his captors and, in a suicide mission, crashes the plane into
the top of the television network building. Across the nation televisions go dead, though
whether Richards’ destructive act actually results in any sort of social change is left open
but seems doubtful. Ironically, while The Running Man seems to enact a critique of
television as a manipulative medium, it simultaneously co-opts the narrative tension of a
game show and the spectacle of terrorism to intensify its storyline. That is, the intensity
of The Running Man’s narrative depends on the recreation of the very spectacle that it
abhors, such as when Richards takes a hostage and threatens to detonate an explosive
device (though the reader is clued into the fact that both threats are empty) (649-651).
Given its high levels of violence, it is hardly surprising that The Running Man was later
made into a movie with Arnold Schwarzenegger as well as a violent video game.
Thematically and narratively, King’s The Running Man is quite similar to
Suzanne Collins’ The Hunger Games, which was published twenty-eight years later, in
2010. In fact, Stephen King has said that the two works are so similar that he didn’t even
bother to finish reading Collins’ work (Glennon). Both take place in a dystopic future
America with an oppressive government which seeks to exercise power over its
economically divided populace by televising murderous games. However, the role and
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treatment of the television medium in each of these works is remarkably different. In The
Hunger Games, the protagonist, Katniss, is able to use the television medium in her
favor; for example, she simulates an unbreakable bond of love between Peeta and herself
in order to appeal to the audience. Throughout the trilogy, Katniss and Peeta use the
television medium and their understanding of spectacle to their advantage, from their
carefully-crafted answers to interview questions to their fake pregnancy. Used as a tool
by the protagonists, the spectacle of television foments social revolution in The Hunger
Games. While Richards in The Running Man is unable to influence the television medium,
and instead succeeds by destroying it, Katniss is a master media manipulator. Perhaps
this difference can be attributed in part to the fact that Collins actually began her career in
television writing 17 years prior to the publication of The Hunger Games. Yet, author
biographies aside, the literary contrast between a paranoid rejection of television and a
ready manipulation of television on the part of the protagonist is indicative of a
generational shift. Written before the introduction of the internet, the rise of participatory
culture, and uprisings fomented via social media, such as the Arab Spring, The Running
Man is incapable of envisioning television as anything other than a top-down instrument
of oppression and rabble-rousing. The Hunger Games instead depicts television as a
weapon which can quickly be turned against the one who wields it. The audience in The
Running Man has no influence on what is televised, whereas the audience of The Hunger
Games is active and threatening. The conversation concerning mass media has evolved to
the point where the spectators are also producers and participants. As Andreas Huyssen
writes in the book After the Great Divide, the theoretical division between mass media
and high art has been bridged, albeit sometimes awkwardly and imperfectly, by new
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forms of mediated agency and subjectivity on the part of both the protagonist and the
audience. In 1967, when Guy Debord published The Society of the Spectacle, he
imagined media as a totalitarian and totalizing instrument of social power. Today,
Debord’s observation that “The spectacle is not a collection of images, but a social
relation among people, mediated by images,” is just as valid as ever, but the power of the
spectacle has been largely turned on its head (139). Though this transformation isn’t
complete, battles of media representation still rage, and Debord’s warnings about
commodification are still valid, the subjects of mass media now exercise more power
than previously to critique, create, and reframe mass media in their own image.
Formal Experiments: The Failure of the Hypertext Novel
The novel’s formal experimentation with various chronotypes and non-linear
storytelling goes back to the earliest, stitched-together epistolary novels and continues
through works such as Tristram Shandy, first published in 1759 and William S.
Burroughs’ Naked Lunch, published in 1959. With the arrival of digital storage, writers
were able to continue with alternative linear models via hypertext fiction, that is, fiction
that often gives the reader a number of different ways to explore it via internal links. One
of the earliest of these hypertexts was Michael Joyce’s 1987 afternoon: a story, which
was published along with the release of a software for the design of hypertexts called
Storyspace. Over the decade following the publication of afternoon, a myriad of
hypertextual fictions were released, and academics and literary critics such as Ilana
Snyder, Robert Coover, and J. Y. Douglas studied, praised, and saw a great future for
hypertextual narratives.
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Unfortunately, though, hypertext, or at least the hype about hypertext, peaked at
around 1999. In that year, Robert Coover was already in mourning, as he gave the 1999
Digital Arts and Culture Conference keynote address “Literary Hypertext: the Passing of
the Golden Age,” an article that was followed by a number of others such as Ruth
Nestvold and Jay Lake ‘s 2005 “What Happened to Hyperfiction?” In the current year,
2015, hypertext in its original form has all but perished, and even the use of the word
“hypertext” has peaked in American books:

Fig. 3-12. Percentage of times the term “hypertext” is used in American books
(fiction and nonfiction), 1980-2008; Google Ngram Viewer;
http://books.google.com/ngrams.
Of course, one could argue that the term itself has simply fallen out of vogue, or that the
word “hypertext” is not solely relegated to fiction, but, to the latter point, an ngram
search of “hypertext fiction” shows a similar dropoff in usage after the millennium.
While it is difficult to put a number on how many people actively read hypertext,
the number of hypertextual fictions listed in the Electronic Literature Directory has
declined in recent years:
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Fig. 3-13. Number of hypertexts listed in the Electronic Literature Directory by
Year, 19-2014; Electronic Literature Directory;
http://directory.eliterature.org/works/by-year.
There is no empirical evidence to indicate the precise reasons for the decline of hypertext
fiction, though a number of theorists have addressed the potential challenges and failures
of the form, and a comparison between hypertext and other contemporaneous media that
met with more success is certainly instructive.
One of the reasons for hypertext’s failure may be its lack of financial profitability.
Hypertextual works are distributed freely, with the occasional invocation to buy the book
version in cases such as Paul La Farge’s 2011 “hyperromance” Luminous Airplanes.
With the rise of self-published ebooks, authors might naturally have gravitate toward the
form that gave them some financial return.
Another reason is the underdevelopment of hypertext networks of creative
production and distribution. While ebooks were sold on sites that served as hubs of
distribution, such as lulu.com and Amazon.com, hypertexts were generally isolated and
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static sites presented as one-time releases by individual authors. There was no impetus to
draw users to the site of a hypertext more than once, and there wasn’t an attempt to
interlink different hypertexts. Though the Electronic Literature Organization attempted
created an online listing of different hypertexts, the interface required multiple clicks to
get to a page with access information, purchase information, and social media buttons,
and the site doesn’t offer a review or feedback system.
While hypertexts were praised for their interactivity and non-linear potential, they failed
at providing any meaningful opportunities for users to contribute or interact with one
another, and thus it is hardly any wonder that Wired’s Steven Johnson wrote about “Why
No One Clicked on the Great Hypertext Story” and Lore Sjöberg pontificated on “How
Reddit Became the Front Page of the Internet.” Successful ebooks or even electronic
publications rely on a continuously-expanding network of creative works alongside a
network of faithful users. Hypertext fiction is isolated by comparison, perhaps because it
developed prior to the explosion of social media, and many recent works, including
Benjamin Hall’s 2013 Simple Non-Linear Narrative Engine, only offer a static site
without social sharing or even commenting capabilities (in this instance, the front page
does promise that the work is collaborative, but permission and a secret code are needed
to sign in as a collaborator).
Genre Shifts: The Flight to Fantasy
In the 2010 book Why Do We Care About Literary Characters? Blakey Vermeule
argues that one of the main drives that people pursue in reading a novel is the desire for
social information (xiiv), a psychological desire that is genetically embedded in us, and
which, like other desires, “[shapes] cultural forms at least as much as, and probably much
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more than” cultural norms shape us (9). However, this kind of social information is
relayed across a variety of media, so “To make up for their disadvantages, literary
narratives have long sought to corner a very specific market. They harvest not the bright
leaves but the dark roots of our desire for social information, often delving deeper than
any other medium” (xiiv).
Social information in the form of gossip columns has existed for longer than the
novel itself, but current gossip-lovers also have the opportunity to watch reality television,
consume multimedia related to celebrity gossip, follow celebrities on social media, or spy
on whatever their friends will reveal about their personal lives on Facebook. While
novels are mere representations of reality, social media posts and diary-like entries
generally comment on real life scenarios. What, then, is the advantage of the novel form,
which cannot offer real scenarios or interaction with its characters, in the realm of
gossip? Vermeule argues that novels are more psychologically complex:
Over the course of their history, literary narratives have come to specialize in
giving and withholding just the kind of information we crave. Although they can
hardly compete—in speed, in outrageousness, in visual interest—with the spinetingling juice of the popular press, literary narratives offer other compensations:
depth and doubt, complexity and shadow, and what my students persistently
identify as the capacity to make us think. (11)
Despite these assurances that the novel cannot compete with the “popular press,” even a
cursory review of posts on Reddit.com would reveal considerable shades of depth and
complexity. For example, a recent post by user asking Russians for their opinions on
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Putin revealed some details of mainstream Russian political thought that the American
press doesn’t normally capture (themexics).
There is, in fact, a strong possibility that other media have usurped much of the
novel’s position as the great purveyor of simple and even complex social norms and
truths. Reading fiction in order to better understand the machinations of reality is
inefficient when so much can be gleaned from a 250-word blog post that captures a real
event, rather than an author’s recreation of reality. Furthermore, instead of offering a
single author’s conception of an event involving multiple people, social media captures
multiple people acting in real time, so that it offers genuine multiple perspectives on a
participatory platform in real time. Ian Watt notes that historians “have seen ‘realism’ as
the defining characteristic which differentiates the work of the early eighteenth-century
novelists from previous fiction” (10). Yet, as demonstrated by time use survey statistics
in the previous chapter, the novel no longer owns the largest market share when it comes
to realistic representations of society. Since its beginnings, the novel has moved away
from traditional realism into surrealist, modernist, and other experimental forms. One
strategy that the novel might take to compete with other realistic forms might be to move
away from realism into fantasy, whereas another, opposing, strategy might be to increase
the level of detail in one’s writing so as to make it hyperreal. In fact, a review of the top
ten bestselling novels at five-year intervals shows a marked increase in novels that are
based on fantasy and science fiction elements around 1980:
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Fig. 3-14. The Number of Top Ten Novels with Fantastic Elements at Five-Year
Intervals, 1900-2010; titles taken from Publishers Weekly, 1900-2010, and
individually consulted.
One hypothesis for this increase could be that novels, defeated by other media at the
game of realism and social mimesis, might seek success by entering into the realm of
fantasy and futurism. Tabbi and Wutz in particular argue that the “truth-telling” aspect of
literature may well already be outmoded: “What literature does best—namely, to
mediate subjective interiority and the object world that in part constitutes it, and to do so
through the detour of language—could be done (and done better) with more “truthful”
recording technologies” (5). While they do not specify what recording technologies might
apply here, it might not be such a stretch to imagine that fiction, as a representational
form, may have responded to the competition with nonfictional forms in the current
information age. Such a supposition remains difficult to prove, as the motives and
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anxieties of individual authors are difficult to capture, and authors may be influenced by
multivalent forces that are not always consciously present in the writing act.
Formal Shifts: New Media in Book Marketing
With the internet, both fiction and nonfiction have reached a new level of
immediacy and consumer response. Over 50 years ago, the rise of television news with its
potential for breaking news updates hurt the sales figures of newspapers; now, online
news is rich with different forms of media and can compete quite well against television
news and printed newspapers. With each new mode of transmission, the efficiency,
accessibility, and/or immediacy of the news product drastically improves.
Literature today finds itself in a media environment where habits of reading are
changing rapidly. For instance, many young Americans are blogging on Tumblr, where
they can follow multimodal content from other young people with like interests. Most
blog posts are 500 words or less, and Facebook posts and Tweets are also quite limited.
Novels must compete with other media in an online marketing realm that is increasingly
visual, flashy, and socially-driven, be it through shares on social media or corporate
tracking of users’ web habits. This has resulted in new strains of literary marketing such
as book trailers, online excerpts, elaborate book websites, and book “extras.” While most
of these multimedia representations of novels are easily dismissed as book marketing,
some of the most expressive and sophisticated examples can be considered as extensions
or intermedial translations of the book itself. Beyond the realm of marketing, new sites
and apps devoted to social reading as well as multimedia books made possible by
ereaders have both contributed to increased opportunities for a variety of social reading
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experiences and the possibilities of different media assemblages, both within and in
cooperation with the novel form.
This is the age of the book trailer, that is, cinematic trailers for books which are
shared online to create hype for a book’s publication. Book trailers began to emerge in
the mid 1990s alongside the rise of home internet use. As they are not economically
viable to display in movie theaters or on television, book trailers are shared on the
internet through advertisements, video sharing, or on publishers’ websites. Their content
ranges from simple text and images to artistic films meant to capture a book’s atmosphere
and mood. In one sense book trailers can be considered as a marketing ploy, but they are
in fact even more; they are the new media representations of the experience of literary
immersion, and they attempt to grant the novel a new market share in the media-saturated
environment.
In recent years, publishers have taken advantage of ereaders as a way to offer
what is called “enhanced” books, that is, multimedia included in digital books so as to
enhance the text. A new publisher called Backlit Fiction “releases books, largely penned
by television and film writers, as episodic apps and ebooks” (Watercutter). The head of
Backlit, Panio Gianopoulos, sees an intensely interactive future for books wherein
literary reading becomes even more intensely social, and readers will find themselves in a
“literary Farmville” in which “[they use] a reddit-like model to up-vote characters or
storylines they enjoy” (Watercutter). In a sense, this level of audience-creator interaction
is already happening across various media, as audiences’ cumulative reaction to a work,
voiced on the internet, can have the ability to intervene in ongoing series of media. For
example, as actress Megan Boone notes in an interview with Elizabeth Thorp, the writers
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of the TV series The Blacklist are known to write new episodes in a way that responds to
the show’s ongoing fan commentary on sites like Reddit.
Nowadays, multimedia representations are almost second nature, as many books
and graphic novels are written with movie or television adaptations in mind. The
translation of a story across multiple media, with “each medium [making its] own unique
contribution to the unfolding of the story,” is what Jason Mittell terms “transmedia
storytelling,” and he uses the example of the publication of Laura Palmer’s diary (292298). Similarly, Bolter and Grusin use the term “remediation” to describe how media
borrow from and sometimes purposely overwrite one another. These constellations of
media have the ability to add multiple, multifocal dimensions of experience to a work.
Just as these new assemblages take advantage of the ever-increasing diversification and
immediacy of the online media ecology, audiences are also empowered by the new
channels of user feedback and interactivity.
The Limits of Fiction
Many of the examples above illustrate how the novel can nimbly adopt the
structure, form, and shifting subjectivities of other media to great success. Of course,
some recombinations are more successful than others, with hypertext being a good
example of a hybrid form that ultimately failed. The pressure on the novel form to
compete with other media is very real, and in some ways, such as the measurement of
average time spent consuming various media, the novel has already been surpassed by
other forms. As argued in previous chapters, the novel has risen in the diversity of its
readership, and it hasn’t fallen absolutely in terms of sales or readership; rather, the rise
of other media that more effectively appeal to the public and whose representational
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capabilities may be superior in a number of vital ways have superseded the novel’s
cultural relevance.
Conclusion
The novel is in intense competition with other media, and it is continuously
evolving, not as a single form but rather as a constellation of hybrid forms with certain
clusters and overall tendencies, many of which may work in opposition to one another.
Even novels that do not borrow heavily from other media carry certain attitudes and
formulations resulting from pressures and societal changes brought about by new media.
In addition to this built-in hybridity, novels that depend on new media to further their
plotline are working in another dimension; they are at once playing to their own strengths
and harnessing the power of other forms, testing, for example, how to illuminate the
interiority of spectacle.
To what extent these hybrid forms have and will continue to remain relevant is
debatable; Tabbi and Wutz “observe along with the drastic decline of literary fiction’s
cultural currency an equally dramatic intercrossing of the novel’s generic and medial
boundaries” (18). As technology evolves, more and more of these boundaries will be
broken, creating new constellations of form, power, and social expression.
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Chapter 4: Online Reading and the Diminished Sociocultural Salience of the Novel Form
Relative to Other Media
When the novel form began to congeal in seventeenth-century England, part of its
purpose or reason for being, as Ian Watt and Benedict Anderson argue, was to make
sense of a world that was being reconfigured by the rising forces of British colonialism
and international commerce, as well as by the new potentialities and confluences of
individual self-determination made possible by mercantilism, trade guilds, travel, and
urban life. One might say that the novel was the rationalizing or sense-making of an
economically, spatially, and temporally shifting world; it is no aberration that one of the
earliest novels, Don Quixote, features a protagonist who is displaced in time and custom,
who is attempting to live epically in modernity. Today, many novels serve a similar
function of sense-making in an unevenly-developed world; for example, the 2013 novel
How to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia by Mohsin Hamid uses the second person (with
“you” being the main character) to situate the reader within the most likely unfamiliar
lower stratum of an unevenly-developed nation with high degrees of inequality (in this
case, Pakistan). This chapter considers sense-making and other purposes of the novel
form that have been proposed by critics against the changing social and technological
conditions that have arisen in twenty-first-century America in order to consider how and
why other forms of media—and particularly media that can be read online—have
surpassed the novel form in popularity and social salience. Paradoxically, as mentioned in
earlier chapters, some of the same social and technological forces that have broadened the
novel’s reach and social impact have also led other media to surpass the novel’s social
gravity. Just as the loss of cultural hegemony of the novel form led to rhetoric around the
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death of the novel, this diminishment of traditional literary reading’s sociocultural
salience has been met with a rhetoric that concerns itself with the decline of what Sven
Birkerts in The Gutenberg Elegies calls “deep reading” (146). This chapter acknowledges
what is likely a decline in the traditional attentiveness on the part of readers to one single
text, but argues that this shift is often misconstrued as being shallow or inattentive.
Rather, the tendency in the internet age to read more “between texts,” and to participate
more in reader commentary, is not a disruption of reading, but rather a furtherance of
what Bakhtin terms “heteroglossia:” the multivocal and dialogic nature of the novel as a
form (274), as well as a re-centering or de-centering of the main text relative to outside
texts and commentary. The novel has always been a mix of texts and voices, and so
pretending that the kind of reading that the novel form encourages is more “pure” than
online forms of reading fails to recognize the historical impurity of the novel. That is not
to say that there are not qualitative or quantitative differences between the average act of
novel reading and the average act of online reading, but online reading should be seen as
part of a continuum of other reading practices rather than a total disruption. Within such a
continuum, not all books can be considered as being more conducive to deep reading than
all online texts, nor can all books be said to encourage focus on one text more than
multiple texts. Walter Benjamin’s The Arcades Project would be an extreme example of
a book which encourages deep reading between fragments of texts, and such an act of
reading would certainly be possible online as well. However, though the risks of “shallow”
reading are overblown, and while each print or digital work is different, this chapter
argues that digital reading does pose a challenge to the purpose and efficacy of the novel
form, and that in fact digital reading has changed the way in which many books,
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especially nonfiction books, are read and evaluated. Though the novel has been posed by
Benedict Anderson as an instrument of nation building, this chapter argues that digital
reading, instruction in online literacies, and social media may be more efficient and
socially salient instruments of identity and nation building in the present day than is the
novel form.

Social Conditions Surrounding the Rise of the Novel

The novel form arose in Britain during a time of modestly increasing literacy rates,
with an estimated 52 percent of the population being literate by 1852, according to Mark
Hampton’s Visions of the Press in Britain (26-27). Additionally book reading and reading
in general were highly socially divided, meaning there were deep economic class
divisions in who could read and who could afford to buy books, and books themselves
were very much differentiated based on what their target audience could expect to afford.
The examples that Richard D. Altick gives in the book The English Common Reader are
that “When an unbound copy of Hamlet was selling for 6d., master artisans and
handicraftsmen in London—carpenters, joiners, cobblers, smiths—earned about 16d. a
day” (22). While there was a lower class of readers than these artisans, that is
“apprentices, common laborers, peasants, rivermen and the rest,” the texts that were sold
to them were far shorter and cheaper than Hamlet—generally, they were sold “broadside
ballads and chapbooks” (Altick 28). On the higher scale, “An ordinary clergyman made
between £10 and £20 a year, which means that the purchase of Sidney’s Arcadia or
Hakluyt’s Voyages would have required the sacrifice of one or two who weeks’ income”
(Altick 22). Despite some of the cheaper unbound prints, early books “were the
possession chiefly of the more prosperous members of the middle class in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, as well as that permanent nucleus of well-educated upper-class
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readers” (Altick 23). Thus when books first emerged, they were highly rare and
economically stratified; the British government taxed them highly and even limited their
print runs (Altick 20). The deep class divisions between readers and non-readers
restricted the social reception of printed books, so that even though many books were
read and shared socially, it seems likely that there wasn’t much sharing and discourse
between classes.
Today, the social stratification of literary readership and of literary production
still exists, as do differences in adult literacy and educational attainment, but to a greatly
diminished capacity than at the dawn of the Republic; Max Roser and Esteban OrtizOspina document how both worldwide and in the U.S. literacy rates have been climbing
from 80% in 1870 to 99% today. As noted in Chapter 1, and as documented by Gordon
Hutner, Janice Radway, Carl Kaestle, and Shelley Rubin, the number of middle and
lower class literary readers and book buyers increased circa the 1920s and the 1950s
alongside increases in educational attainment and technological innovations in low-price
book production. The question then becomes whether this expansion in readership has
affected the meaningfulness or influence of the novel form.
Hypothetically, the novel form as a viable instrument for the definition and
discovery of identity is perhaps as relevant now as it ever was, given the unevenness of
its economy. Americans are, for example, attaining higher levels of education than ever
before (Wilson) even as the inequalities in salaries between the highest earners and the
rest of the population have been growing since the 1970s, according to a summary of
statistics gathered for the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities by Chad Stone, Danilo
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Trisi, Arloc Sherman, and Roderick Taylor. The need, therefore, that the novel addresses,
of navigating an economically uneven and unequally developed country and globe, is still
relevant. Now that literary readers are more diverse than ever before, as shown in Chapter
1 (Joyce; Kaestle and Radway), it also would seem that books have an increasingly
potent power to spur reflection and discussion among larger swaths of the population. In
other words, the world is more complex, convoluted, and difficult to navigate and make
sense of than ever before, and so the novel as a quest for meaning and identity is as
relevant as ever.
Indeed, as the educational attainment of different classes converge, potential
audiences for books have more potential to overlap and broaden. This means that the
novel as a signifier of class values has had the opportunity to evolve in ways that could
realistically be both intrinsically and extrinsically more inclusive and wide-spanning. The
potential for the novel to unite readers and aid in redefining class, personal, or national
identity is perhaps even more imperative today than it was at the dawn of the form. As
global markets become more fragmented, economic development continues to be uneven,
and inequality rises, the need to make sense of it all through narrative is more pressing
than ever. This need for explanation and understanding of complex global phenomena
has also arisen in many fields such as ethnography. Wesley Shumar and Nora Madison
describe the genesis of this concern in this field:
Ideas about pristine locales and an ethnographic present that represented a native
world that changed slowly were always false, but with imperialism and the wars
of colonialism it became harder and harder to justify these fictions. This leads to
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the second crisis, which was a crisis of interpretation that had at least two parts.
The first part went all the way back to the 1950s, when Ph.D. students going into
the field began to see themselves as agents of normalization under colonialism,
and questioned the anthropological project as the interpretations of a dominant
group laid upon a subordinate group. Later in the 1970s and 1980s, led by
feminists, ethnographers questioned whether there could be one culture with one
truth to be told by an ethnographer. As the world became smaller, it became
harder for ethnographers to sustain the view that they had correctly captured the
‘truth’ about a culture and that there could even be one ‘truth’ about that
culture…Is it not more the case that within every culture there are different
interest groups with different stories to tell and that each of these stories might be
in conflict with others (Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer
1986; Clifford 1988). (161)
The modern or postmodern condition that followed, among other things, America’s
deployment of two atomic bombs on high-density Japanese civilian populations,
occasioned many forms of self-reflection on the part of members of many segments of
Western society. While realism, the original formulation of the novel, according to Watt
(9-35), and twentieth century modernism were seen from the postmodern standpoint as
insufficient in addressing the problems of the world, the search for individual, communal,
and national meaning remained important in literary pursuits.
While the essential aims of the novel are still vital, the question then becomes
whether the form and function of the novel have grown less relevant in comparison with
other forms of media, and specifically, for the purpose of this chapter, in comparison with
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social media, in serving these aims. In considering how social needs are fulfilled by
various media, it is helpful to have a theory of the intersections between technology and
social change.
As critic Raymond Williams writes, around the creation of every technology is a
“complex” of forces; television, for example, “depended on a complex of inventions and
developments in electricity, telegraphy, photography and motion pictures, and radio. It
can be said to have separated out as a specific technological objective in the period 18751890, and then, after a lag, to have developed as a specific technological enterprise from
1920 through to the first public television systems of the 1930s” (7). Rather than argue
that technology determines society or society determines technology, it is perhaps more
accurate to avoid absolutism and see technological innovations as catalyzing a series of
often unforeseeable social shifts. This view is consistent with Marshall McLuhan’s idea
that people create forms of technology, but then those forms re-shape society: “We shape
our tools and thereafter they shape us” (this quote reflects McLuhan’s philosophy, and it
often misattributed to him, when it was in fact written by his acquaintance, John M.
Culkin, who was writing about McLuhan in The Saturday Review) (“We Shape Our
Tools”).
In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson discusses how the newspaper
form created a sense of a national community and identity by enabling the daily, nearsimultaneous dissemination of information. Newspapers additionally encouraged civic
and social engagement, as they were often exchanged and discussed by a rising
bourgeoisie in British coffee houses. As a form of communication, books have never
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commanded the same kind of novelty and simultaneous impact, though they have served
as transmitters of social and class identity and values. Perhaps the closest thing to this
kind of simultaneous readership in early novels was the serialization of nineteenthcentury British writers such as Dickens and George Eliot. Later, in America, the rise of
working and middle class book culture (Rubin) and the expansion of readership (Kaestle
and Radway) encouraged a national simultaneity of readership in the form of mail order
book clubs.
Ironically, social media has both increased the sense of simultaneity and
community response in the readership of books even as social media posts have
hypothetically competed with the social salience of novels. By social salience, I mean the
relative social impact or importance of—in this case—a form of media. Today, novels
can be read and discussed simultaneously in a classroom environment or in a book club
format. However, that kind of simultaneous experience isn’t as built into the book form
as it is built into forms of social media. It requires more planning and organization to
enjoy a book simultaneously with others than it does to respond to and discuss a trending
Twitter post. There are, naturally, many online communities like Reddit and Goodreads
where books are discussed, but because book chapters are consumed at each reader’s own
pace, rather than released at set intervals, like TV shows are, many of the conversations
must take place after the book is completed, as opposed to the more synchronous,
episode-specific, and ongoing conversations that occur around television shows or social
media posts.
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Because Twitter and Facebook are focused on disseminating information in real
time, users are more likely to share short articles, quotes, videos, or news updates than
entire novels. The high frequency and simultaneity of communication have led to more
brevity—for example, a literate person in the eighteenth century might have penned a
five-page letter to a distant relative once or twice a year, whereas a literate person in
America today is likely to text one sentence at a time to those they wish to contact. So
even though the sharing and social capability of social media has helped form
communities of readers (through sites such as Wattpad.com, known as “the YouTube of
books” (Bosker)) and increase access to literature (though programs such as poem-a-day
(Academy of American Poets)), this chapter argues that the rapid pace of communication
today diminishes the relative immediate social salience of novels vis-à-vis other media.

Networked Intelligence
In his essay “The Storyteller,” Walter Benjamin says that “The art of storytelling
is nearing its end because the epic side of truth—wisdom—is dying out” (146) and
overall personal “experience has fallen in value” (143). Another way of thinking about
such a shift is through the lens of postmodernism—after World War II, the power of
individual truth and the perceived wisdom and rationality of Western Civilization both
dissolved, and instead of absolutes America was plagued by an unending list of
uncertainties. Critics Wesley Shumar and Nora Madison describe this shift in economic
terms and through the work of Mark Poster:
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Further, Poster frames the issues that are addressed by a number of social theorists
in a very interesting way. He suggests that identities shifted from the modern
Cartesian subject, internally coherent and separate from the object world, to a
more fragmented and diffuse identity. These shifts of subject and identity occur
within a three-stage shift in the information political economy: the age of print
capitalism, the age of broadcast media, and now the age of the Internet. While
print media reaches back into earlier centuries and is part of the rise of a
democratic culture in the West (Habermas 1989), we can situate the rise of a more
powerful print capitalism and the establishment of the modern nation state on that
print empire to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Ohmann 1987;
Anderson 1991). (Shumar and Madison 256)
Following World War II and later with the rise of a dizzying information economy, the
power of modernism and of the modern novel seemed to have failed to fill the holes in
reality, or at least that is what many postmodernists concluded.
Benjamin further notes that the novel was born out of a kind of rugged
individualism, writing that “The novelist has secluded himself. The birthplace of the
novel is the individual in his isolation, the individual who can no longer speak of his
concerns in exemplary fashion, who himself lacks counsel and can give none” (146).
Lukács in The Theory of the Novel similarly expresses how the novel form is meant to
express a prolonged individual search for meaning: “The inner form of the novel has
been understood as the process of the problematic individual’s journeying towards
himself, the road from dull captivity within a merely present reality—a reality that is
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heterogeneous in itself and meaningless to the individual—towards clear self-recognition”
(80). That is, the individual seeks personal clarity despite the chaos of modern life.
Novels are generally written by one individual who is trying to make sense of the
motivations and machinations of individuals from other social strata and of society itself,
or at least that is Watt’s classic analysis of early novels such as Clarissa and Tom Jones,
which depict complex class tensions (Watt 221-270). Yet this representation of reality,
born out of an individual author’s design, can only be a pale imitation of the real
negotiations of separate individuals and actual social forces. Never before have such
negotiations been so visible and available for participation than they are through the
internet and social media. The novel served to illuminate the kind of interactions that
were difficult for the general public to see—disputes over inheritance or farewell wishes
to a loved one. Now, these same moments are made visible on many users’ Facebook
feeds, and news sites and organizations make it possible for users to converse, share their
experiences, and argue about an infinite variety of topics. What is considered private and
public has very much changed, and so the position of the novel in revealing a swath of
society or of interpersonal reactions has become less unique.
With this intense and immediate degree of social networking, knowledge is
increasingly based on the interactions of networks of individuals. For example, before the
internet, if someone had a specific medical question, they would most likely wait to ask a
doctor. Now, there are online forums where patients who have experience with that kind
of problem can offer answers that arguably offer a broader reflection of the ways in
which a medical ailment is tested for and treated. Doctors do follow certain protocols, but
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at the same time they have some flexibility in how they test and treat different ailments.
Patients can look up scientific papers documenting treatment outcomes for their
conditions, and they can get the perspective of other patients who have had different
doctors and different courses of treatment. This type of knowledge, social and networked
knowledge, is quite different from a single writer’s worldview in a novel, and one could
argue that this kind of knowledge is superior to knowledge manufactured by only one
individual. An example of this is the common phrase “I skipped to the comments section”
which reflects that getting the multiple perspectives from comments on articles is often
more illuminating and valuable than reading the articles themselves, which are the
opinion of one writer. Or, alternately, if the audience is seen as not being sympathetic to
the source, one might warn others “don’t read the comments,” which still implies that the
comment section is an important and potentially defining part of a work’s reception.
Critics Wesley Shumar and Nora Madison likewise describe the internet as a medium for
continuously-updated and indeterminate information, and the place where the self gains a
new, networked identity:
The moment of broadcast gives way to the era of the Internet, which Poster
defines as a moment of ‘underdetermination.’ For Poster, this notion of
‘underdetermination’ is a way to talk about how digital products are subject to
infinite copying and also infinite revision. The subject re-enters the media field as
an agent who is actively involved. But this is not the same self as the one in the
era of print, because for Poster, the self in the era of the Internet is a truly
postmodern self, a self that is one node in the networked society no longer subject
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to an objective world (Poster 2001). What is lost in this moment is the separation
of subject and object. (Shumar and Madison 256)
In such a world where the self is inextricably linked to others and is able to immediately
negotiate with them, the figure of the lone writer who toils away at a book-length work
seems to be outmoded and unwelcome.
The book itself, as a fixed and determined physical object, is also to some degree
outmoded by the constant flux and iteration of online texts and commentary. Critic Carla
Hesse points out how books had been condemned as outdated as early as the 1600s and
1700s by John Locke and Condorcet:
…long before the advent of the digital revolution in publishing, a central strand of
Enlightenment thought…had already condemned the book as an archaic and
inefficient cultural form. As knowledge came to be seen as derived from
experience, it also came to be seen as ever-expanding, and as opened-ended as
experience itself. To fix knowledge between two cardboard covers, and to
attribute ownership of that slice to someone was to constrain its circulation. The
best way to spread knowledge, according to Condorcet, was through authorless
and open-ended texts, circulating freely between all citizens. (Hesse 23-24)
Information is meant to be set free, and today the views of Condorcet are certainly in
vogue, echoed by critics like Raffaele Simone who writes that “Our intuitive idea of the
text is changing rapidly. It is no longer that of a closed and protected entity but that of an
open and penetrable object which can be copied and interpolated without limits” (249).
Experience is indeed expansive and identity is shared and transferred. The internet
merely aids in efficiently expressing and conveying the human desire to share
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information and experience. Rather than saying that Americans are living in a state of
distraction, it might be more accurate to say that our lives are increasingly networked,
and by moving from one post to another we are actually stitching together the fabric of
reality as well if not better than a single writer can.

Rhetoric Around the Loss of “Deep Reading”
As previous chapters have shown, concerns about the decline of literary quality
have seemingly existed for as long as literature itself, with many nineteenth-century
popular American novels having fallen into the critical category of “sensationalism,” or a
work that garners attention through “superficial pleasure and spine-tingling thrill”
(McIntosh 25). Only later were novels exalted among other artifacts of high modernism,
and largely as a bulwark against political and existential threats following World War I.
As a corollary to the rhetoric around the death of the novel, many critics have lamented
the death of the act of sustained and deep reading.
The dawn of television and later of the internet have paradoxically led many
critics to issue warnings about the death not of the novel but more abstractly of critical
and deep thinking. The main proponent of this line of thought is Neil Postman’s 1985
Amusing Ourselves to Death, which expresses concern about American thought being
swept up in a tide of news blurbs and superficial personality contests in place of
substantive debate of issues. To some extent, Postman’s critique of popular culture still
rings true today in the fake news era, but one could argue that the problem of
misinformation is not a media problem but an educational problem. The answer to fake
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news is not to switch off the TV, or to switch media, but to inform the populace on how
to engage and interrogate information critically.
Later on, the dawn of the internet brought a similar line of critics who concerned
themselves with the decline of deep intellectual engagement. Nicholas Carr’s 2011 The
Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to Our Brains uses multiple research studies on
reading hyperlinked texts to argue that reading online is necessarily a shallower
experience than traditional reading because hypertext creates information overload. One
study that Carr relies on was done by Erping Zhu:
She had groups of people read the same piece of online writing, but she varied the
number of links included in the passage. She then tested the readers’
comprehension by asking them to write a summary of what they had read and
complete a multiple-choice test. She found that comprehension declined as the
number of links increased. Readers were forced to devote more and more of their
attention and brain power to evaluating the links and deciding whether to click on
them. That left less attention and fewer cognitive resources to devote to
understanding what they were reading. (Carr 128)
There are problems with this line of argument. For one, Zhu’s study was conducted in
1999, and it is likely that many of its participants did not have a lot of experience with
navigating hyperlinks or cruising through information on the internet. Secondly, if the
hyperlinks that Zhu added were extraneous to the text, then it would logically follow that
the readers spent less time with the main text, and would score lower on a multiple choice
test about that text. Writing a summary and answering multiple choice questions focused
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on one out of multiple texts are two criteria that don’t truly capture whether the act of
reading between texts is shallower than reading a single text.
Furthermore, Carr’s notion of the internet as a shallows relies on an argument of
technological determinism—that the way that the internet is designed lends itself to
distraction and shallow thinking. In this line of thought, humans are victims to their
brains’ circuitry and reward systems, and the “Net” necessarily “diminishes…the ability
to know, in depth, a subject for ourselves, to construct within our own minds the rich and
idiosyncratic set of connections that give rise to a singular intelligence” (Carr 143). This
perspective—that information overload must by definition overwhelm a user’s critical
and creative faculties—is overly focused on critiquing technology and neurology, when
individual users’ educational background and ability to engage in critical and what I
would term “synthethic” thinking (weighing and combining multiple sources and types of
information) would seem to be the criterion that is more predictive of how one’s mind
performs on the internet.
Cathy N. Davidson’s book, Now You See It, provides the necessary opposing
viewpoint to Carr. Rather than being a detriment to civilization, “distraction” for
Davidson “is one of the best tools for innovation we have at our disposal—for changing
out of one pattern of attention and beginning the process of learning new patterns” (56).
Davidson takes the utopian view that the transformative potential of technology and the
internet needs to be better harnessed and incorporated in education. Of course, this open
embrace of technology as being an instrument of opportunity and new perspective must
now, seven years later and in the aftermath of the Russian misinformation and hacking
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campaigns of 2016, also incorporate a more stringent critique of information and
technology as weapons of indoctrination and surveillance. Openness to technology in
education must be accompanied by definitive instruction on how to vet and interrogate
information online. The internet is only as smart and substantive as its users permit it to
be. Internet literacy is truly the next frontier in civic engagement and in creating an
“informed public;” the social costs of a misinformed public can run as high as a measles
outbreak or a lost election.

Interrogating the Internet as Shallows
Currently there is no shortage of scholars and researchers who are warning about
the consequences of “shallow” reading. In a 2018 article titled “Skim Reading is the New
Normal. The Effect on Society is Profound,” Maryanne Wolf cites numerous studies and
anecdotes that purport to show that young people are not deeply absorbing, but rather are
skimming texts, with dire results for reading comprehension, deep thought, and empathy.
Wolf implores readers to “cultivate a new kind of brain: a ‘bi-literate’ reading brain
capable of the deepest forms of thought in either digital or traditional mediums.” At stake
in this endeavor is “the ability of citizens in a vibrant democracy to try on other
perspectives and discern truth; the capacity of our children and grandchildren to
appreciate and create beauty; and the ability in ourselves to go beyond our present glut of
information to reach the knowledge and wisdom necessary to sustain a good society.”
Indeed, many internet users are in need of improvement in their ability to deeply
comprehend and critically appraise online sources. The problem, though, isn’t shallow
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reading, but a basic lack of literacy. Wolf’s argument equates deep reading with critical
thinking, but it is quite possible to both skim a document and to think deeply and
critically about it. For example, one might skim the results of eight scientific experiments
and come to a nuanced conclusion about a scientific question that unites the experiments.
The idea of deep skimming isn’t new: over a century ago, Ralph Waldo Emerson would
move “rapidly” through a text, “looking for what he could use,” and not getting trapped
in the details (Richardson 67).
In addition to creating a false dichotomy wherein skimming a text necessitates
uncritical thinking, Wolf makes the dubious argument that more skimming will damage
deep thought:
The possibility that critical analysis, empathy and other deep reading processes
could become the unintended “collateral damage” of our digital culture is not a
simple binary issue about print vs digital reading. It is about how we all have
begun to read on any medium and how that changes not only what we read, but
also the purposes for why we read. Nor is it only about the young. The subtle
atrophy of critical analysis and empathy affects us all. It affects our ability to
navigate a constant bombardment of information. It incentivizes a retreat to the
most familiar silos of unchecked information, which require and receive no
analysis, leaving us susceptible to false information and demagoguery.
By invoking the fear that our current climate of media consumption will actually
“atrophy…critical analysis” Wolf seems to be staking a side in the latest round of conflict
between high and low culture. In this narrative, memes and skim reading will soon secure
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the downfall of civilization (after the notable failure of cartoons, comics, and pulp
novels).
If this supposed decline in critical thinking is recent and is affecting mostly the
younger generations, then one must explain the fact that most sharers of misinformation
online are senior citizens, at least according to recent research by Andrew Guess,
Brendan Nyhan, and Jason Reifler. If deep reading and critical thinking have been such
cultural mainstays prior to the internet, then wouldn’t seniors be immune to fake news?
The more likely explanation isn’t a new cultural decline as a result of digital reading, but
rather that existing weaknesses in reading comprehension and critical thinking on the part
of large segments of the U.S. population have been drawn into focus as a result of the rise
of internet reading. Certainly, some media producers seek to take advantage of and
harness those weaknesses, but it seems quite likely that those weaknesses predate the
internet.
If anything, the “epidemic” of skim reading might be blamed on the limitations of
the human mind to both efficiently and deeply absorb large quantities of information.
One might prefer that a doctor closely read all new articles related to the doctor’s practice,
but at what price would that close reading be accomplished? A doctor who read
everything published that was of interest would probably not have much time to practice,
and in turn would be a less experienced doctor. Certainly, information and nuances are
lost when readers increasingly skim texts. Yet which reader has a better understanding of
a topic—the reader who skims ten books, or the reader who in the same limited time is
able to closely read half of a book? Such questions are perhaps facetious, but given that
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the true cause of skim reading is a glut of information, to skim hardly seems a weakness,
but rather the best possible outcome given human limitations in the face of large bodies
of knowledge.

Social Reading and Communities of Readers
In addition to questions of the impact of the internet on the qualities and strategies
of reading, there is the issue of how the internet impacts the social aspects of readership.
The ethnographic study of online communities poses a number of problems for
researchers. What methods should be applied to online communities versus traditional
communities is one such question. Many ethnographers use Anderson’s Imagined
Communities to understand how identity, values, and beliefs are shared and transmitted.
Shumar and Madison argue that in many ways every community, online and offline, is a
social construct, or is imagined:
Drawing on the above discussion of the transformation of our social world and the
importance of information technologies in that transformation, and drawing on
social theory—from Harvey to Anderson to Appadurai—we would suggest that
any ethnography is a virtual ethnography. Similarly, every community is a virtual
community and identities are formed in all these communities. That said, it does
not mean there are not differences in this ‘rhizomatic’ structure; further, those
differences should be accounted for and not ignored (Deleuze and Guattari 1987).
We do not want to suggest, however, by the above discussion that nothing has
changed and that the world after the Internet and new media technologies is just a
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continuation of the world before these media. (264)
As, for example, retail moves increasingly online and companies like Sears, Macy’s, and
J.C. Penny find their profits dwindling and their stores shutting down, the distinction of
the online world being “virtual” and the real world being “real” will likely continue to
collapse. Internet theorist Nathan Jurgenson has argued against dividing the real from the
virtual world, a logical fallacy that he calls “digital dualism;” instead, Jurgenson states
that “digital and material realities dialectically co-construct each other.” Even
generalizing about real versus virtual realities risks leading researchers down the wrong
path, and “Ethnographers are increasingly becoming aware that each field location is a
very different social space that involves different technologies, used perhaps
idiosyncratically in its formation” (Shumar and Madison 264).
Ethnographic studies have shown that the social interactions within online groups
and communities can cross geographic and cultural boundaries to solidify subcultures,
and online conversations can even have reverberations in real life. Lara Šesek and
Maruša Pušnik did interviews with citizens of their native country, Slovenia, to determine
how online reading habits shaped people’s identity and culture. They found that
Slovenians who participated in online reading communities brought some of the values
and interests of global readers into Slovenian culture, and they argue that online reading
communities form what they call “consumer tribes,” so that “new age readers construct
their identities in a weakly connected group of people, who prefer to communicate on
different digital communication channels rather than in real life” (103).
For example, their study found that Slovenian readers changed their word usage
online to use more English terms like “teaser,” “spoiler,” and “e-book” in order to better
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relate to foreign readers (Šesek and Pušnik 115). This finding suggests that online
interactions can create or at least maintain norms that are different from the norms of the
participants’ local culture. Hypothetically, then, the internet could unite otherwise
disparate sections of American culture, though unfortunately the uniting power would be
restricted by the demographic reach of a given online site or medium. Often all that
internet culture succeeds in spreading is a single signifying phrase, such as Charlie
Sheen’s proclamation that he was “winning” when he was removed as the headliner of
Two and a Half Men. That single phrase signified a number of different, competing ideas,
and could be used by members of society in a wide variety of contexts. Although using
this phrase likely didn’t great influence anyone’s beliefs or behavior, knowledge of the
phrase and Sheen’s breakdown could easily serve as an icebreaker or a site of common
understanding between Americans from different walks of life, or strangers who are just
getting to know one another.
While memes aren’t often noted to change lives or belief systems, literary reading
and the reinforcement provided by online subcultures can sometimes affect real-life
identity and behavior. Šesek and Pušnik found that many interviewees who were a part of
online literary fan communities changed their activities (such as travelling to cities they
read about) or chose their love interests differently because of books they enjoyed and
characters they admired (122-23). They also adopted global practices like “fan fiction,
real person fiction, and fan edits” (124).
In a way, then, the novel form’s negotiation of identity and navigation of a
complex world has been fulfilled more genuinely and immediately through social media.
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Perhaps it is foolish to mourn the loss or diminishment of one medium, when the same
aims and possibilities are more readily explored through another. In fact, some writers are
even calling the current age the time of “peak media” (Frank, Chin, and Ciolli), as it is
difficult to forecast a time in the future when Americans will spend more time consuming
media than they do today—according to Nielsen, the average American in 2018 spent
eleven hours and six minutes a day consuming media, which is an increase from nine
hours and thirty-two minutes circa 2014 (Fottrell). And yet, if Americans adopt wearable
technology like Google Glass in the future, that eleven hours and change could increase
to almost every waking second. If Shakespeare were born today, perhaps he would have
been a film director or screenwriter, and his works might have garnered larger
contemporaneous audiences.
If, as Benedict Anderson theorizes, one of the main functions of newspapers and
novels was to solidify nationalism in the hearts and minds of British subjects, then the
discussion and sharing of literature on the internet and through social media have surely
furthered new “imagined communities.” Critics like Zizi Papacharissi have argued that
the internet does reproduce existing inequalities, but it also has instantiated a public
sphere that is more inclusive in terms of users’ access to information, geography, and
connectivity to those in authority than the public sphere written about by Habermas.
As Šesek and Pušnik note, “In the past, popular literature readers interacted in
libraries and book clubs; today, they interact in online environments via their computers,
tablets and smartphones” (111). Again, these online imagined communities have the
potential to truly connect like-minded citizens from different locales and backgrounds,
with the additional possibility of spontaneous cultural invention and normalization.
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Blogs are the New Books
Despite knowledge and identity being increasingly networked online, there is a
form of online media in which a single narrator gives his or her perspective—blogs. Blog
entries are short, nonfictional forays into personal or professional meaning on the part of
individuals. The internet offers a new platform for every participant to position and
present him or herself, and in a way, blogs are like serialized books. Some bloggers even
capture enough views and clicks to make substantial income. In all likelihood, the
amount of time that many people read blogs has displaced or lessened the time they those
same people used to spend reading traditional literature, a possibility that is explored in
studies such as the National Endowment for the Arts’s 2004 Reading at Risk, which
states that the decrease in literary reading between 1992 and 2002 coincided with the rise
in home internet use, and “the Internet…could have played a role” (30). To lament this as
a loss seems like a statement of taste more than a logical observation, as what is really
being lost? Bloggers have more independence than authors, they still make money, books
are still published and read, and the length and public placement of blog posts encourage
active readership, commentary, and sharing. As Umberto Eco writes, “in the history of
culture it has never happened that something has simply killed something else.
Something has profoundly changed something else” (304).
Perhaps it is time that critics stop reifying forms that are perceived to be noble.
Rather than worrying about the salience of the novel form, we should embrace a
continuous conception of media—that is, we must recognize the ways in which the aims
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and purposes of one medium are also exercised and expressed in others. Umberto Eco
takes a similar tack when he simplifies the aims of all media:
People desire to communicate with one another. In ancient communities they did
it orally; in a more complex society they tried to do it by printing. Most of the
books which are displayed in a bookstore should be defined as products of vanity
presses, even if they are published by an university press. As Landow suggests we
are entering a new samizdat era. People can communicate directly without the
intermediation of publishing houses. A great many people do not want to publish;
they simply want to communicate with each other. The fact that in the future they
will do it by E-mail or over the Internet will be a great boon for books and for the
culture and the market of the book. Look at a bookstore. There are too many
books. I receive too many books every week. If the computer network succeeds in
reducing the quantity of published books, this would be a paramount culture
improvement. (Eco 301)
Even while Eco embraces various forms of communication, he sets forth some value
judgments regarding how there are too many books published and that it would be a
blessing for there to be fewer. One of the anxieties that cultural critics have is that the
sheer volume of new material will make it difficult to find worthy books. Such a view,
though, distrusts the judgments of the crowds of readers, or the value of word of mouth.
Eco’s wish that digital interpersonal communication would reduce how many books are
produced is obviously never going to bear itself out. The opposite is true, as when more
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people are literate than ever and self-publishing is affordable and easy, it is clear that
more and more books will “crowd” the marketplace.
Additionally, rather than seeing forms of media as competing with one another,
one could consider how a medium could actually be ‘set free’ by no longer being the best
in a certain category of artistry. As Eco writes, “Debray has reminded us that the
invention of the photograph has set painters free from the duty of imitation. Without the
invention of Daguerre, Impressionism could not have been possible” (Eco 304). Perhaps
to some extent the often short and to the point form of social media posts has freed the
novel to lurk more willingly in extended, long-form introspection, and to be more
meditative. At the same time, though, new media also invite the novel to imitate them and
to draw conclusions and make observations about the impact and experience of those
using these media.

Futures of Social Reading
In recent years there has been much despairing about the fate of artists, writers,
and great literature given the increases in illegal downloads and the admittedly
overwhelming influx of online content and user commentary. Geoffrey Nunberg poses a
number of questions in this vein, including “What is an author, after all, if the new media
no longer support the legal status or institutional privileges that have traditionally defined
the role? And what real increase is there in the ability of the average citizen to affect
public opinion if anyone who wants to gain the attention of a mass audience has to
compete for attention with millions of other ‘authors?’” (105-106). Again, though, this
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line of concern reveals a surfeit of confidence in the previous institutions and gatekeepers
of culture, and a corresponding lack of faith in the taste of the “masses” of readers. Of
course, there may be some foundation to some concerns about the divisiveness of online
activity—the ways in which, for example, extreme communities like The Red Pill (a
Reddit forum for men who wish to exert social dominance and exploit women’s
weaknesses) can normalize unpopular or toxic sentiment. There is also an inherent risk in
targeted media manipulation online. Such concerns can be addressed on a number of
fronts, such as education, standards of online literacy, and even, controversially,
corporate and government policies. In Teledemocracy: Can Technology Protect
Democracy, which was published thirty years ago, the critic F.C. Arterton was already
considering some of the risks and benefits of using communication technologies to
encourage democratic participation. He found contemporaneous efforts encouraging
citizens to participate in politics, mainly exerted via television, to be insufficient.
However, in the current day and age, American politics is consumed with the question of
how much social media and news stations influence minds and votes: in recent years we
have been overwhelmed with articles and books, such as Professor Kathleen Hall
Jamieson’s Cyberwar: How Russian Hackers and Trolls Helped Elect a President and
What We Don’t, Can’t, and Do Know that are concerned that media exert too much
influence over voters.
As long as small and large media companies are allotted equal bandwidth (which
may not be long given the removal of net neutrality), self-publishing is simple and
accessible, and reader or user reviews are as important as critics’ opinions, the traditional
gatekeepers of culture have lost a substantial amount of their sway. For example, self185

published books now make up 31% of Amazon ebook sales, and the top five publishing
houses only represent 13% of ebooks on Amazon’s bestseller lists (Sargent). Now when
consumers consider books, they are more likely to look at the sum of other readers’
reviews on Amazon than to seek out a single cultural critic. Of course, there are large and
small publications and sites that are devoted to reviewing, recommending, and marketing
books. Even the ease of creating a book review website represents a lessening of the
power of gatekeepers and critics. Ironically, though, even user-centered online book
review sites are likely to become, if not new gatekeepers of culture, then new corporate
overseers of culture—Goodreads, the largest online user-based book recommendation
and review system, was purchased by Amazon in 2013.
While the format, platform, and interactive capability of media may change—as
advertising money shifts from print to digital, and music sales move from brick and
mortar to phone apps—there will certainly be individual winners and losers, and skill sets
will need updating, but there will continue to be a profit and livelihood to be made in
creative industry. Steven Johnson used government labor statistics to determine that in
fact the number of employed artists, and, to a greater extent, self-employed artists, is
growing, specifically with the number of overall artists increasing from 1.5 million in
1999 to 1.8 million in 2014, a rate that “modestly outperformed the rest of the economy”
during that time.
New technologies such as the digital distribution of music and books have offered
setbacks as well as opportunities. The music industry suffered a substantial fall in sales
due to illegal downloads:
186

The record industry’s collapse is real and well documented. Even after Napster
shut down in 2002, music piracy continued to grow: According to the Recording
Industry Association of America, 30 billion songs were illegally downloaded
from 2004 to 2009. American consumers paid for only 37 percent of the music
they acquired in 2009. Artists report that royalties from streaming services like
Spotify or Pandora are a tiny fraction of what they used to see from traditional
album sales. The global music industry peaked just before Napster’s debut, during
the heyday of CD sales, when it reaped what would amount today to almost $60
billion in revenue. Now the industry worldwide reports roughly $15 billion in
revenue from recorded music, a financial Armageddon even if you consider that
CDs are much more expensive to produce and distribute than digital tracks. With
such a steep decline, how can the average songwriter or musician be doing better
in the post-Napster era? And why does there seem to be more musicians than
ever?
Part of the answer is that the decline in recorded-music revenue has been accompanied by
an increase in revenues from live music. (Johnson)
The maxim today is that most recording artists make the majority of their money from
touring. Ticket prices have risen in part to reach previous levels of income from album
sales. Johnson notes also that the crisis in music sales greatly overshadowed, in its
severity, other crises in the book, television, and movie industries. While this may be true
in the macroeconomic view of overall jobs and income levels, one also recalls how The
New York Times and other leading news outlets had to fire many veteran journalists in the
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last decade, and also how, at least anecdotally, there are more and more freelance literary
editing positions and less full-time spots (U.S. statistics are lacking, but in 2015 Nielsen
found that 74% of publishers polled used freelance book editors) (“The Lean Publisher”).
And for many creative employees, adjusting to these crises may not be as easy as
retooling: “The vast machinery of promoters and shippers and manufacturers and A&R
executives that sprouted in the middle of the 20th century, fueled by the profits of those
high-margin vinyl records and CDs, has largely withered away. What remains is a more
direct relationship between the musicians and their fans” (Johnson). As artists seek to
improve their profit margins, and as artistic production becomes more streamlined, many
ancillary workers may find themselves struggling.
Overall, though, the markets will move to contain creative crises. Amazon
deliberately made Kindle files, the mobi format, difficult to replicate and pirate. In a
similar way to the rise in concert prices, the traditional movie industry has increased
movie ticket prices at theaters to recapture some of the income lost from illegal
downloads and streaming services. The moral of the story is something like media
doesn’t die, but when one stream of income falters, a new value proposition must be
established. There are real losers who are unable to adjust, and real winners who profit
off of the opportunities posed by each crisis.

Conclusion
Social media and the internet have improved the visible social impact of and
immediate access to literature. At the same time, the networked social structure and
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instantaneous sharing have diminished some of the novel’s social relevance. When the
novel form emerged, society’s media usage was quite stratified and individuals did not
generally have a lot of opportunity to interact with those outside of their locale. Now,
79% of adult Americans are on Facebook (Pew), and so most Americans are effortlessly
more networked than early novel readers. Thus the social gravity of the novel in terms of
solidifying identity or national values is somewhat obsolete when social media allows
actual individuals to negotiate these problems in real time. As Americans continue into
this world of networked information and negotiated identities, there will be real threats to
civility, privacy, and democracy. Media bubbles can serve to insulate different factions of
the body politic from each other and increasingly divide citizens. There is also the fear
that open texts and identities risk “losing the means of associating a particular work or
text with an individual agency, or of losing the writer’s and even the reader’s
individuality” (Hesse 27). Yet such fears ignore human progress as an open and quite
often unauthored system of work and collaboration that is successful because of how
countless individuals contributed their labor in ways that are not immediately apparent.
The possessiveness projected by American culture over individual experience and
intellectual property, written into Article 1, Section 8, and Clause 8 of the Constitution, is
a convention that helps to protect profit; imagine, though, what creation and intellectual
ownership would mean without a profit motive. Even as the walls of intellectual property
and critical authority have fallen, creative output has and will continue to flourish.
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